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Abstract of thesis entitled: 
This research studies the formation of the war ethos and practice in ancient Greece, from 
800 to 404 BCE. It argues that war was a culture and by this it intents to explain the causes 
and results in the changing and how these were related to the concept of military culture, 
through comprehending the ancient texts and archaeological evidence. This research is 
divided into 3 main parts — the first part studies the Homeric Warfare and its relationship to 
the formation of Greek military culture; the second part the origins of Archaic Warfare and the 
impacts of the Persian Wars; the third part the legacy of the Persian War and how the pro-
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Warfare, as the great affair of state, the ground of life and death, the way 
for survival and distinction, must not be overlooked. 
Sunzi, The Art of War. I 
Greek Military History 
Military conflict, doubtlessly, was an important part of Greek^ history. Indeed, it had 
ignited the tradition of western historiography - Homer composed his immortal epics to 
commemorate the Trojan War, Herodotus had his inquiries to record the Persian Wars, Thucy-
dides initiated his work on the Peloponnesian War, and Xenophon succeeded Thucydides to 
finish his work and also the war henceforth, putting asides numerous ancient works contribut-
ing to the history of warfare. Warfare, to the Greeks, was so vivid a thing that almost every 
generation of ancient Greeks had either himself seasoned in war or had witnessed it happened. 
Therefore, the study of military history is inevitably an essential part of Greek history. Frankly, 
not a few of the persons who work on the Greek military history, including I myself, have 
fancied on the romance of warfare, especially attracted by the idiosyncratic war ethos of the 
Greeks, fighting as hoplites in phalanx. Most of us had never experienced war, but we, after 
millennia, still honored those noble warriors, most of them died namelessly. Cartledge arouses 
our ardor by one laconic sentence: 
1 It is essential for us to notice that the ideology of Greek is but invented by our contemporary schol-
astic works. To the Ancient Greeks themselves, they probably yet not created any sense of either Greek 
or Hellenic at the age of Homer. Thucydides says that the name Hellas referring to the realm of Greece 
emerged after Hellen (Thuc.，1.3.2-3). Later, the entire realm of "Greece," the alleged Megala Hellas 
includes areas around all coasts of the Aegean Sea, no less remarkable than the Mare nostrum of 
Roman Empire. Emporiai were excavated at Libya, Sicily, Cyprus, and even southern Spain. But as for 
the convenience of recognizing, "Greece" and "Greek" in this work refers to the essential part of the 
area in the southern Greek Peninsula, which nourished the Archaic Culture of ancient Greece, but 
"Ionian" and others would be adopted in mentioning non-mainland Hellenic areas. 
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Leonidas Lives! With him, Sparta does too.� 
Paul Cartledge, The Spartans: 254 
The motivation of the study of the history of warfare, in most cases, lies on the fancy of 
the war. However, the study of warfare requires insight and ingenuity far greater than this 
simple passion. One brilliant avant-garde in this field is William H. McNeill, with his The 
Pursuit of Power. McNeill puts special emphasis on the reciprocal relationship of advance-
ments of technology, socio-economic circumstances, and military practices throughout the 
entire human history. Ancient Greece, the alma mater of European civilization, reserves a 
section for herself - McNeill has used Xerxes' expedition as an example to illustrate the im-
portance of logistic supply for armies? In the profession of Greek military history, Donald 
Kagan, an estabihsed scholar in studying the Peloponnesian War, is one of the most well-
recognized figures in the founding of modem study of Greek military history. In a recent work 
of his, Kagan stresses on how crucial was the Peloponnesian War by stating that it "is a pow-
erful tale that may be read as an extraordinary human tragedy, recounting the rise and fall of a 
great empire, the clash between two very different societies and ways of life, the interplay of 
intelligence and chance in human affairs, and the role of brilliantly gifted individuals, as well 
as masses of people in determining the course of events while subject to the limitations im-
posed upon them by nature, by fortune, and by one another.”4 Moreover, J. K. Anderson is 
also an outstanding scholar in studying Greek military history by his famous work Military 
Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon/ besides many other articles published. He 
scrutinizes not only the Classical warfare but also its roots with reference to former cases. 
John F. Lazenby is another luminous author in Greek military history whose study covers the 
2 Paul Cartledge, The Spartans: an Epic History (London: Pan Books, 2003), 254. 
3 William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 8-10. 
4 Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War (New York: Viking, 2003), xxvii. 
5 J. K. Anderson, Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1970). 
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period from the Persian Wars to the Peloponnesian War. He examines and analyzes the mili-
tary organization of Sparta in his The Spartan A广my； and in addition, he accuses Herodotus 
for not being neutral in his descriptions in his The Defense of Greece? 
The first impression of Greek warfare of most of the people, whether professionals or 
amateurs, is the distinctive form of infantry battle known as hop lite warfare in modem. Enter-
ing into Archaic Period, there were comprehensive changes in Greece that indicated the end 
of Dark Ages, and among these changes, one of the very remarkable changes was the rise of 
hoplite infantry warfare. Infantry has been the comer stone of many armed forces in ancient 
world, and it was not alien to any history; but the Greeks had developed their distinctive way 
of hoplite warfare. Apparently since the century BCE, the well-to-do farmers in ancient 
Greece began to arm themselves with bulky bronze armaments and iron pointed crushing 
spear and were fighting in a rigid infantry formation named phalanx. For centuries long after, 
the Greeks, given the impact of the Persian Wars and the prolonged Peloponnesian War, had 
retained this practice of infantry warfare as their main way of waging war. Unfortunately, 
many scholars have considered that the idiosyncratic practice of hoplite warfare to be 
irrational. Ferrill states this discontentment in his The Origin of War. 
Heavy infantry by itself can only make sense in a world where other armies are 
also heavy infantry, but does it make sense even then? If so, it can explain hoplite 
warfare from 700 to 500 B.C., but it does not explain why the Greeks continued to 
believe so strongly in the priority of heavy infantry down into the fourth century. 
Even in the conditions of Archaic Greece (700-500 B.C.) the phalanx was 
militarily an oddity. An integrated force of skirmishers, light infantry, heavy in-
fantry, and light and heavy cavalry, often with special emphasis on one compon-
ent or another, is more effective and less demanding on society.^ 
Arther Ferrill, The Origin of War. 144 
6 J. F. Lazenby, The Spartan Army (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1985). 
7 J. F. Lazenby, The Defence of Greece 490-479 BC (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 2008). 
8 Arther Ferrill, The Origin of War: from the Stone Age to Alexander the Great (Colorado: Westvievv 
Press, 1997)，144. 
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Similarly, Ober puzzles on this by pointing out the two ironies of the continuous prac-
tice of hoplite warfare — the first accusing the Greeks failed to assert their rationality in deve-
loping a tactic more suitable to the mountainous relief of Greece other than the hoplite battle; 
and the second wondering the Greeks had slow development of poliorcetic science given the 
treasure of rich stone source in the country.^ Were the Greeks so irrational in their own prac-
tice of war? Perhaps they are, but obviously they were not. 
Many scholars in Greek history had recognized the "rationality" of the Greek way of in-
fantry warfare and admit its continuity in the Greek history. Besides Anderson who has stud-
ied explicitly the hoplite warfare in his work,'® Victor Davis Hanson and Hans van Wees are 
two renowned scholars in the quest to explain the formation of hoplite tradition. Hanson in-
spires the field with his dissertation Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece by exploring 
the details of the military tactics of devastation and re-examining its effectiveness." More-
over, Hanson further his study in Greek military history by publishing his masterpieces of The 
Western Way ofWar^^ and A War Like No OtherIn the former work, he gives a full account 
on different aspects of the hoplite tradition; and in the later, he aims at investigating various 
issues in the Peloponnesian War, paying special attention to the tactical aspect of these issues. 
From another dimension, Hans van Wees has with him many publications attending to 
the socio-economic aspect of warfare. In his early work, he spends much effort in exploring 
the military idea in the Archaic Period. One of his most early publications Status Warriors 
works on the interrelationship between social history and military practice in Homeric Age. 
9 Josiah Ober, "Hoplites and Obstacles," in Victor Davis Hanson ed. Hoplites: the Classical Greek 
Battle Experience (London: Routledge, 1993), 173-174. 
J. K. Anderson, Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1970)，esp. 13-42; 111-140. 
‘‘Hanson, making use of his own experience in viniculture, argues that the devastation of land requir-
ed laborious effort in pre-industrial world and the effectiveness was limited; thus he suggests that trad-
itional accounts of the result of devastation might sometimes misleading. Victor Davis Hanson, War-
fare and Agriculture in Classical Greece (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 131-184. 
12 Victor Davis Hanson, Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 2009). 
13 Victor Davis Hanson, The Other Greeks: The Family Farm and the Agrarian Roots of Western Civ-
ilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 
5 
Interestingly, he spends a chapter on the role of "anger" in the Homeric Warfare." Later, hav-
ing published "The Myth of the Middle-class Army"'^ for the Danish academic conference, 
van Wees continues to use the term "myth" for his recent work, Greek Warfare}^ Not only 
does van Wees give an account of the amateur nature of hoplite infantry in ancient Greece, he 
also endeavors to explode several myths in Greek warfare; while at last concludes that the 
beginning of the pursuit of wealth and glory of a polis was largely a product of her citizens. 
Peter Krentz, on the other hand, offers the field with inspiring idea. In his "Fighting by 
the Rules," he insightfully puts emphasis on the concept of nomos (vonoq) and expounds that 
the hoplite tradition, having its idiosyncratic protocols was something like an agon (dytov). 
While he further illuminates the changes in these protocols during the century BCE and 
how experience altered military practices.'^ In a very recent work, The Battle of Marathon, he 
gives a detailed account of the Persian army based on the Greek classical sources and arch-
eological evidence in chapter In the following chapter, he rebukes the conventional thou-
ght on the weight of hoplite panoply'^ and criticizes the conventional emphasis on the role of 
dthismos in hoplite battle as initiated by George B. Grundy. 
The word "military" is often followed by "science," supposing it a pragmatic and scien-
tific nature. Nevertheless, the ones who conduct war are simply human beings. Human be-
haviors are not fully regulated merely on objective circumstance and natural environment, but 
usually empirical, sometimes sentimental. Military history, thus, is not only a study of sc-
Hans van Wees, Status Warriors: War, Violence and Society in Homer and History (Amsterdam: J. C. 
Gieben, 1992), 67-165. 
15 Hans van Wees, "The Myth of the Middle-class Army," in Tennes Bekker-Nielsen and Use Hanne-
stad eds. War as a Cultural and Social Force: Essays on Warfare in Antiquity. (Copenhagen: Det Kon-
gelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, 2001): 45-71. 
16 Hans van Wees, Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities (London: Duckworth, 2004). 
17 Peter Krentz, "Fighting by Rules: the Invention of the Hoplite Agon," in Hesperia no. 71 (2002), 
34-37. 
18 Peter Krentz, The Battle of Marathon (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2010), 23-37. 
19 He suggests that the weight of the hoplite panoply was about 28-45 pounds instead of 70 suggested 
by Hanson. Ibid., 45-50; cf.\ Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Class-
ical Greece, 55-88. 
2° Ibid., 53-62; cf... George B. Grundy, Thucydides and the History of His Age (London; Murray, 1911), 
268. 
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ience, but a comprehensive and omnibus scrutiny of human behaviors. Ashley states clearly in 
his work that "the military doctrine, composition and armament of ancient armies were 
largely determined by the type of government they adopted, the social conventions they prac-
ticed, the terrain of their homeland, and the enemies they had to face."^' So, to understand the 
form of military practice, we have to examine the roots of its development. Development 
itself is an evolution emerging out of past experience and in many cases the reason of certain 
practice is based on common usage. As a result, military study or history of warfare is a stu-
dy of "culture." Many ancient practices to us are irrational, even absurd — we could never 
imagine the worship for Ares for favorable omen before battle, nor to others under our skep-
ticism. The purpose of proposing the notion of "military culture," hence, is to investigate the 
organic evolution in Greek warfare and the reasons behind it. 
The Perspective 
The study of military practice is, in my eyes, not sufficient with only the conventional 
approach, which emphasizes how the physical condition and the human society had influenc-
ed warfare. As Hannestad and Bekker-Nielsen name their edited publication, war was a cult-
ure and social force. ^ ^ Warfare is a culture, so was it in ancient Greece. The "culture" in this 
context is neither that in culture study, which concentrates on the cultural explanation of spe-
cific symbols, nor that which employs the discipline of sociology. Human behavior is driven 
by memory, the embodiment of past experience. Fishbien and Ajzen in their introduction to 
the fundamental theory of psychology of memory state that "attitude is typically viewed as a 
latent or underlying variable that is assumed to guide or influence behavior."^^ They further 
state that it is undisputable that "attitudes are learned" as "past experience" and "it is widely 
21 James R. Ashley, The Macedonian Empire: the Era of Warfare under Philip II and Alexander the 
Great, 359-323 B.C. (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1998), 13. 
22 Tennes Bekker-Nielsen and Lise Hannestad eds. War as a Cultural and Social Force: Essays on 
Warfare in Antiquity. 
23 Martin Fishbein & Icek Ajzen, Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior: an Introduction to Theory 
and Research (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1975), 8. 
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accepted that residues of this experience influence or modify behavior of the organism. 
Human psychology is not unfamiliar to military history - but it is apparently employed 
only in modem warfare like the two World Wars or the Cold War, and seldom has it an estab-
lishment in the study of ancient warfare. The ancient Greeks were indeed so humane in nat-
ure, making their behaviors in much the reflection of their current memory and experience. So, 
the rise of hoplite warfare in the Archaic, other than being a symbiosis to the rise of poleis, 
was a practice embodied the collective memory of their past, i.e. the Greek Bronze Age and 
the Homeric Age. The infantry tradition was different to be an invention of the Archaic 
Greeks but an evolution based on their antecedents. Fishbien and Ajzen lighten the study by 
saying: 
Clearly, the level of predispositional specificity of which an investigator is work-
ing will tend to determine the kinds of past experiences that he considers relevant 
for attitude formation. For example, concern with predispositions to perform a 
particular response is likely to lead to considerations of past experiences directly 
related to performance and nonperformance of the behavioral response in the pre-
sence of the stimulus object. Thus investigation may focus on consequences of the 
behavior, such as monetary rewards, punishments, social approval or disapproval, 
and on the effort involved in performing the behavior, as well as on social 
pressures to perform or abstain from performing it.^ ^ 
Fishbien & Ajzen, Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior. 10 
To investigate the military history with the light of psychology, we have to study what 
were the predispositions of the Greeks, i.e. to explore how the Greeks responded to test 一 in 
this case, but wars and battles. Of course, the sources for such study is scarce and far from 
sufficient, especially we could never experiment with the presence of the investigated objects, 
the Greeks. However, the ancient texts, especially those being accused of having biases, illu-
minate us. Homer's epics, with even their author under disputes, are by no means an accurate 
24 Ibid.,9-\Q. 
25 Ibid., 10. 
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historical account of the legendary Trojan War, but they are still valuable for estimating the 
ancient sentiment and custom of warfare. So does Herodotus, so long being blamed for his 
Hellenocentricism, who evokes us in examining the thoughts of the Greeks under the Persian 
Wars. And even to Thucydides, who wrote with purposes and judgements, the value is 
undiminished. 
This study, therefore, attempts to examine how the idiosyncratic nature of warfare had 
evolved and how it was related to the actual practice, and further to evaluate to what extent 
older experience would be replenished by new one. The thesis of this study lies on the investi-
gation of two concepts, "ethos" and "practice." The English word "ethos" comes directly from 
the Greek ethos (f)0o(；). Wisse explains by Rhetoric of Aristotle, saying that ethos does not 
mean only character but also the representation of virtue and goodness, inclination to what 
were just and right. ^ ^ So the "ethos" this study referring to is the idiosyncrasy of Greek war-
fare and also the thoughts of warfare in the mind of Greeks. 
"Ethos" alone is not sufficient for us to comprehend the full picture of Greek warfare 
and military history, but accompanied with delving into "practice" we could probe the matter 
with more insight. "Practice," of course, refers to the more substantive forms of military be-
haviors, or simpler how the Greeks had waged wars. Although military tactics has been of the 
interest of both ancient and modem writers working on the study of warfare, such as Arnold 
W. Gomme, Kagan, Hanson, and Krentz and many more, it is not the focus of this study 
because the study of tactics on one hand does not much fit the aims of investigating the gener-
al evolution of military culture, on the next hand, it must rely heavily on the contemporary 
method of fighting. I intend to study how cultural element had formed the modus operandi of 
warfare. I adopt the term modus operandi to refer to, as Krentz puts in his "Fighting by the 
26 Jakob Wisse, Ethos and Pathos: from Aristotle to Cicero (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1989), 5, 
29-36. See also (Aristot. Rh. 2.1.5): [TOU |i£V ouv autouc; eivai TTIOTOIX; TO\)(；入EYOVTCIC; rpia saxi TA ai-
Tia- ToaauTQ ^ap eati 6i' a KiaT£\3O|i£V E^ IO T(I)V dnoSei^ecov. eari 5e taura (pp6vr|aic; KUI dpetfi KCXI EU-
voia]. 
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Rules," the protocols and intrinsic rules in carrying war and conducting the fighting. Thus, in 
short, this study intents to trace back the evolution of Greek military culture through examin-
ing both the "ethos" and the "practice" in Greek warfare. 
The Scope 
The scope of this study is on the period of history starting from 800 to 404 BCE. Chapter 
II studies the Homeric warfare and the Greek military culture. The century BCE was the 
starting point of the Archaic Period in modem classification and is conventionally believed as 
the initium historiae Graecae because the earliest written sources accessible to us, such as 
those of Homer and Hesiod, dated probably to the middle of century BCE. Conventional 
scholars of Greek military history, except some like Hans van Wees,〕？ do not put much 
attention to the Age of Homer, and, moreover, the study of Homer is by itself a profession. 
But none of us could deny that the nature of these epics is on war and they are valuable in the 
study of military history. Although M. I. Finley in his famous The World of Odysseus "if it is 
true that European history began with the Greeks, it is equally true that Greek history began 
with the world of O d y s s e u s , t h e center of scholars studying war-related topics in Homer-
ology is on the legendary Trojan War.^^ And so, the linkage between the Homeric warfare and 
the Archaic warfare is often neglected, and it seems that scholars of Homerology and of the 
Classical Period are studying separately in other own course. 
The idea of warfare presented in Homer does not include merely the early Archaic when 
"he," supposedly, composed the epics, but it is also a record, though might not be too accurate, 
of the war ethos inherited from Bronze Age. The evolution of warfare in Greece was organic 
and it was a process starting from the pre-historic period, and, therefore, the Homeric warfare 
is indeed a crucial step for us to comprehend both its past and its future. The 8& century BCE 
27 E.g:. Hans van Wees, Status Warriors: War, Violence and Society in Homer and History. 
28 M. I. Finley, The World of Odysseus (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1979), 25. 
29 E.g.-. Caroline Alexander, The War that Killed Achilles (London: Penguin Books, 2009) and Barry S. 
Strauss, The Trojan War: a New History (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007). 
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was a transitional period, and it is essential for us to understand how the war ethos of the 
Heroic Age had evolved into that of Archaic Greece. 
Chapter III explores the military culture of Archaic Period. The first part of it continues 
the previous chapter in exploring how military practices and ideas were formed in Archaic 
Greece; and the later part works on how the Persian Wars had challenged the established 
hoplite tradition and how the tradition had response under severe challenges. The Persian 
Wars were remarkable. Our first "history" ever in Greece was written by the stimulation of 
them and many modem authors also notice the importance of the triumphant was far greater 
than merely tactical but monumental. 
Chapter IV re-examines the well-studied century BCE. In contrary to previous works 
in the field, it attempts to focus on the psychological development of the military culture and 
how the prolonged Peloponnesian War had discouraged the traditional thoughts of military 
practices; and by this argues that Greek military culture had underwent gigantic changes in 
nature during this period. The study ends with the traditional year of the end of the War in 404 
BCE, despite the fact that Lacedaemonians entered Piraeus in 403. The reason of cutting the 
study here is that I believe that the warfare ideology and culture within the scope of this study 
belonged to one segment. While on the other hand, the aftermath of Peloponnesian War, 
having much simulated and altered from the tradition, was a transitional period to the upcom-
ing of the Macedonian warfare. As a result, this study ends with the War and concentrates on 
the segment before it. 
This study uses mainly classical sources from ancient authors with the aids of archeolog-
ical evidence. I adopt all Greco-Roman classical texts from the Loeb Classical Library pub-
lished by Harvard; and the translation of ancient texts is on my own, based on the method of 
E.g.: Emma Bridges, Edith Hall, and P. J. Rhodes eds. Cultural Responses to the Persian Wars: 
Antiquity to the Third Millenium; Peter Krentz, The Battle of Marathon., and Richard A. Billows, 
Marathon: How One Battle Changed Western Civilization (New York & London: Overlook Duckworth, 
2010). 
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plain translating, though sometimes I must admit that there are difficulties in directly trans-
lating the ancient Greek into readable English. For the spelling of names, I retain the tradit-
ional Latinization method — I can hardly persuade myself in writing "Herodotos" instead of 
"Herodotus;" "Romeros" instead of "Homer;" "Thoukudides" instead of "Thucydides." I do 
not follow the conventional method of putting those uncommon names in direct Latinization 
because I insist that it is better to unite the method of Latinization. But for all Greek words, 
which are directly Latinized, I have them in italics. I use for "rj；" "o" for "co;" and "w" for 
" D . " 
12 
Chapter II 
Homeric Warfare and the Greek Military Culture 
They, on both sides, (the Trojans and the Argives) gave dreadful shout-
ing to fight for the corpse which had fallen in death. 
Homer, Iliad: XVI, 565-566 
Homeric Age and the Study of Greek Warfare 
The Age of Homer was a significant era in the entire history of ancient Greece. Most of 
modem perceptions of ancient Greek culture concentrate on Archaic and Classical Period, 
probably due to the availability of written sources, and thus make pre-Archaic Period blurred 
and obscure. However, if we consider the entire chronology of ancient Greek culture, which 
started around the second millennium BCE, we should notice that it is impossible to bypass 
pre-Archaic Period in the quest for the roots of Greek culture. The Aegean Bronze Age had 
nourished Minoan Civilization in Crete and Mycenaean Civilization in the mainland of Greek 
Peninsula, both the alma mater of the whole of Greece Civilization. Nonetheless, what had 
succeeded these flourishing civilizations was the alleged Dorian Dark Age. By apparently 
1100 BCE, Mycenaean Civilization was terminated by raiders from the north, the Dorians, and 
the period from that until 800 BCE when a "renaissance" was initiated is commonly addressed 
as "Dark Age" in modem consensus. Given the name of "Dark Age," this particular period is 
somehow overshadowed; whereas if we examine Greek culture from different aspects, the 
result is quite distinctive from the aforesaid conception. Within this period, Greek culture had 
undergone several important evolutions, and thus it is impossible for one to deny its signific-
ance in sculpturing Archaic Greece. 
Among those evolutions, the most obvious one was the beginning of Iron Age. The arch-
13 
aeological term Geometric' is more accurate for us to address to this period, comparing to the 
concept of "Dark Age." The use of iron had become relatively mature in Geometric Period; if 
we put this in the contemporary international circumstance, the Greek Iron Age was relatively 
advanced. Usage of iron was first discovered in Mesopotamia, and Mesopotamians plausibly 
started their Iron Age at around the second millennium. Ferreous tools and weaponry had 
grown common around the river basin near Babylon.2 It is promising for us to believe that the 
Greeks leamt and imported the technology of iron from ancient Mesopotamians through 
lonians, and the myth of Hephaestus bringing fire from the East suggests an analogue hypo-
thesis to that. In the case of Egypt, the Egyptian Iron Age, which began at Third Intermediate 
Period, was relatively late as it started almost simultaneously to the Greek Geometric. Alth-
ough we are convinced by other conditional reasons why the Egyptians was relatively slow in 
the evolution of the usage of metal, such as the lack of metal mines and being unnecessary of 
advancement in using metal, we could neither deny that Greece Civilization was somehow 
advanced in metallurgy and was able to catch up with the two oldest civilizations, Mesopota-
mia and Egypt, by the time of the first millennium. 
The Greek Iron Age was prominent in giving form to Archaic culture. In especially the 
study of military history of ancient Greece, the adoption of iron weaponry is particularly im-
portant and remarkable. However it is also a fact that the study of Geometric Period could 
only rely on archaeological evidence. With merely archaeological evidence, the examination 
of Greek history is not fruitful. Therefore, as to explore the Greek military culture, we must 
‘Starting from 1100 BCE, southern Greece, including Attica, Argolid, Corinthia, and Thessaly, had 
advanced into the using of iron, and it is classified as Protogeometric. And from 900 BCE onwards, 
most parts of Greece had entered the Iron Age, and it is named as Geometric by archaeologists. 
Geometric is further divided into three periods, Early-, Middle-, and Late-, and indeed the Late 
Geometric extended into early Archaic. Technically, Corinthia was the first place which has been ever 
discovered of a new emerging culture, especially in metallurgy, at around 725 BCE. The era is thus 
named after the place as Protocorinthian. For study of the chronology of Iron Age, see A.M. Snodgrass, 
The Dark Age of Greece: An Archaeological Survey of the Eleventh to the Eighth Centuries BC (New 
York: Routledge, 2000)，esp., 106-139; James Whitley, The Archaeology of Ancient Greece (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001)，esp., 77-101. 
2 Jane R. Mcintosh, Ancient Mesopotamia: New Perspectives (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005), 258-
259; Karen Rhea Nemet-Nejat, Daily Life in Ancient Mesopotamia (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1998)， 
291-295. 
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put also an eye on available written sources. The available sources are never sufficient, and 
that is why the epics of Homer are indispensable. The two famous epics of Homer�，Iliad and 
Odyssey are the most reliable and the most copious written texts in studying the pre-Archaic 
Greek history as they were the only complete volumes remained in the Epic Cycle, which 
records the legendary Trojan War, and meanwhile give more abundant sources than indivi-
dual Homeric Hymns and more fruitful accounts of warfare than the pieces of Hesiod. Con-
cerning the age of the epics, they apparently belong to the 8【卜 century BCE fabrication, the 
Early Archaic Period. Given the fact that written language was not common in the earlier 
Geometric, they are invaluable "flesh materials" reflecting history centuries ago/ Of course 
the epics were not composed for our modem purpose of historical studies and therefore the 
accuracy of the texts is questionable in reflecting the actual scenery, however, it is on the 
meantime almost undoubted that these epics could reflect better than any other ways the tho-
ughts and values of the Greeks, and at least give an account commenting on the character-
istics of their age. Hence, this chapter studies the Age of Homer, which bridged the pre-
historic and the historic period. 
What we could acquire from the Homeric compositions is fruitful. The Homeric War-
fare reflected by the poet was not only a realm of century BCE, but indeed a far greater 
notion concerning the endogenous factors in forging the Greek tradition and ideology of 
warfare. The linkage in between the Homeric Warfare and the Archaic Warfare is insepa-
rable and tightly bounded together by the culture. Archaic Greek Warfare is best-known for its 
3 The authorship of Homer in Iliad and Odyssey is questionable, and the two epics probably originated 
from different authors and even merged form different shorter versions. See Charles Rowan Beye, The 
Iliad, the Odyssey, and the Epic Tradition (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1966), 2-37; A. T. Murray 
trans., Jeffrey Henderson ed., Iliad, Book I (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 1-5. I retain to use "Homer" as it is commonly recognized, and it seems 
unnecessary to change as long as the authorship remains obscure. 
4 The Trojan War should be happening during the Late Bronze Age as the epics in the Epic Cycle 
reflect and mirror influential Mycenaean culture within them. The leading position of Argrive Aga-
memnon proposes an analogous atmosphere as the Mycenaean Civilization; and ad interim, weaponry 
such as tower shields, chariots, which were by any sense already antiquities during Homeric Age, are 
familiar to us by the narrations of the works. 
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hoplite, the heavy infantryman armed in panoply; however the hoplite warfare was surely not 
purely a revolution, nor any means of new-creation, at least not culturally. 
For the purpose to re-illustrate the Greek military culture, Iliad is particularly substant-
ial in studying and reconstructing the war ethos and practice in pre-Archaic warfare as it 
records plenteously the narrations of the Trojan War, both in terms of military thought and 
behavior. For technological aspect, the epics reflect an interesting circumstance with refer-
ence to other pieces of archaeological evidence. It is suggested by excavations of ferreous 
tools and weaponry that, by the Age of Homer, Greece had already entered Iron Age for a few 
centuries, whereas the narrations of the epics demonstrate intensively the bronze cult, 
especially by the synonymy of bronze and weaponry. This discordant phenomenon is usually 
explained by pointing out that the Trojan War happened in Late Bronze Age, yet, this judg-
ment is somehow inappropiate if we give it the light of comparison. The Chinese Romance of 
the Three Kingdoms {Sanguoyanyi 三國、 )寅義 ) c o u l d illuminate our understanding on the 
nature of the Homeric epics through its anachronism in descriptions of weapons. The novel 
was composed apparently in the intersection of Dynasty Yuan and Ming, commemorating the 
Three Kingdoms Period of the century, whereas in which the weapons of different char-
acters shown are completely contemporary to the age of the author.^ It is reasonable for any 
author, for their convenience, to employ his own personal experience in writing as Atwood 
states, "fiction is where individual memory and experience and collective memory and ex-
perience come together.，，6 For Homer, it is difficult to narrate accurately what happened in 
Late Bronze Age environment as he could only rely on oral tradition of history. Therefore we 
must not neglect that the bronze cult presented by Homer was not merely historical to him and 
the Greeks at that time, but also a contemporary cultural tradition pass through from the 
5 Especially in Romance of the Three Kingdoms, e.g.: pole axe of Xuhuang ( 徐 晃 ) a n d also Green 
Dragon Crescent Blade 刀） o f Guanyu (關羽） a r e completely unknown in the I"'' century. 
6 John Demos, "In Search of Reasons for Historians to Read Novels," AHR, Vol. 103，No. 5 (Dec., 
1998), 1526. 
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pre-historic period to them. The image of bronze in Iron Age did not receive any sort of 
inferiority, however, overwhelmed the gray iron by its ideological nature inherited from the 
ancient Bronze Age. "Gleaming bronze" (vtbpoxj/ xa入K6(；) is widely used in Homer attribut-
ing to this shinning metal, which possessed cultural value more than a mere working material 
in metallurgy and a bare means of tools. 
Metallurgy and weaponry are fundamental in the study of ancient warfare as they had 
influenced the actual combat environment in battles. Illuminated by numerous archaeological 
excavations in the 19* century, we are able to comprehend what had the ancient Greeks used 
to do fighting and combats. But strictly it is unsatisfactory for a scrutiny in the whole mili-
tary history of ancient Greece. In order to reconstruct the mechanism and practices of war-
fare, inspirations from the narrations of Homer is inevitably required. Frankly, we are never 
given adequate resources to examine the reliability of Homer and his epics, and therefore it 
demands extraordinary efforts to scrutinize the texts. The dilemma of materials is not unsolv-
able when we link the verses of Homer with later period. The result by doing this is auspici-
ous as we could not only enlighten our understanding of the Homeric Warfare, but at the 
meantime conclude the development and evolution in the military history of ancient Greece. 
In pre-Archaic Period, the warfare was versatile: the use of chariots is especially distin-
ctive to later period as it was completely vanquished from the ancient Greek Warfare until 
when Agesilaus lead the Lacedaemonians to Asia;? missiles, including bow and arrow, stone, 
and the hurling of spears, were also widely used. The war scenery vividly delineated in Iliad 
is remarkably prosperous, and thus gives comprehensive accounts on warfare technology of 
Homeric Warfare. Comparing to the hegemony of hoplite in Archaic Period, we could obser-
ve a changing way of warfare in the battling behaviors and practices: from versatile to mono-
type domination. The changing in the practices indicates an evolution, which had transfonn-
7 Xenophon records that Agesilaus encountered the 2 scythe chariots of Pharnabazus (Xen. Hell., 4.1. 
17-19). 
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ed the ancient customs into new form of being, in Greek military culture. 
Homeric Age is as well known as the Heroic Age to us. In the epics, heroes, including 
Achilles, Hector, Odysseus, Diomedes, Aeneas, and etc., fight with their brilliant competen-
ces and courageous heart, with the aids of immortal gods. The heroes are astonishing and 
impressive to any who is reading, and they evoke probably many whose souls are passionate 
in hearing war stories since their childhood. The heroes are awesome and noble; among the 
mortals, they achieved god-like power and thus dominate the battlefield. The Heroic Age is a 
notion which we could directly and immediately perceive from the ancient sentences of 
Homer. This concept of warfare seems to be digressed from what we had leamt from the later 
Archaic hoplite warfare, which emphasized on the cohesive strength of the entire army 
instead of individual outstanding heroes, and under which personal passion and bravery were 
praised far depreciated from the spirit of the whole. The changes between Homeric warfare 
and Archaic warfare were however not such alien and transgressed as depicted by this per-
ception. The vocabulary "hoplite" never appears in the epics, however, essential concepts of 
the hoplite warfare were already known; if we look at Iliad, it is not difficult for us to find the 
common addresses of "phalanges" (cpd入cryye^ ;). Of course we would presumptuous to be-
lieve therefore the "phalanges" in the epics acquired identical content to that of Archaic 
Period; yet, it is still a hint to us as it demonstrates how armed force functioned in the battle.^ 
Prompted by how the Greeks in Homeric Age fought their dreadful battle, we can hen-
ce discover the adherence relationship between the war ethos and practices. Greek spirits and 
essences, shaped by different aspects of the military culture, were the inheritances of the pre-
historic period. Among these aspects, the most pre-eminent one was the emphasis of courage 
and kinship, which we could but treat them as a unity, and by which the ethnicity and moral 
8 Phalanx ((p<i入a丫《）often appears in plural form phalanges (cpaXayYeO in classic texts. The word by 
merely itself means "line" or "row" in Greek. In military usage, it probably refers to the line of soldiers, 
and it suggests that the soldiers were not fighting without organization but indeed formed battalion or 
formation during close fighting. See later in this chapter and n. 47. 
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conducts in warfare were fashioned. It is even more popular for this in the accounts of later 
Greek authors such as Herodotus and Thucydides that courage and kinship were merged 
together for enhancing the spirit of war. The Greek attitude to the war was a pursuit of glory, 
in sharp contrast to modem resentment towards war. Homeric Age was an era which the 
military behaviors experienced significant changes while simultaneously the Greek military 
ideology was firstly promulgated; the concept of "military culture" is built upon the investi-
gation of the military thoughts and the evolution of warfare. 
Metallurgy 
Bronze and iron were the two generic metals in the making of early human civilizations 
as they, comparing to wood and bone, enabled early human to craft on harder materials, and 
slay animals or their own kind more efficiently. Since arboreal and osteal tools of Neolithic 
had failed to fulfil the demands of human, copper obtained the superior status as a new form 
of material in producing human tools. Copper is soft and flexible, and has low melting and 
softening temperature^. These qualities make it easy for bending and working, whereas limit-
ing its strength. In this case, the ancient blacksmiths began to add tin into copper, usually at a 
rate of around one to nine, to form an alloy, bronze, which was then widespread in ancient 
world. 
Bronze was an ideal material for tool-making, therefore, it had gradually replaced wood 
and bone as a major means of material in the making of weapons. In Greece, as what we have 
found, the Minoan and Mycenaean Civilizations began the use of copper and bronze, and they 
had initiated the earliest stage of Greek Civilization. Minoans started to use bronze for 
making swords, daggers, spearheads, and arrowheads. The technological breakthrough of 
bronze weaponry marked one essential transformation of melee technique and norm in fight-
9 The melting temperature for copper is around 1, 000°C. And for the softening temperature, it de-
pends on many extrinsic factors. It is probably around 100-125°C as suggested. J.N. Gregory & J.A. 
Spink, "Lubricating Properties of Molecular Layers of Stearic Acid and Calcium Stearate on Metal 
Surfaces," Nature, 159, (22 March 1947), 403. 
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ing. In the Neolithic, arboreal and osteal assault weapons could only deal damage through 
hitting and beating, while, as one could conclude with ease from the archaeological evidence, 
the bronze weapons were aimed at causing cutting and slitting. One may instantly discover 
this change by contrasting the swords and daggers of Greece with the obsidian "sword" of 
Aztec in later period. iG 
、“/ Jf^ 
Figure 2.1a: Minoan t j ^ ' . f f Figure 2.1b:, Mycenaean 
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Reflecting to the advancement of assault weapons, defensive weaponry was introduced 
to the ancient Greeks in regarding to protect the fragile human bodies in confronting the new 
kind of bronze weapons. Wooden shields were commonly used as the primary kind of pro-
tective armament. Homer records in Iliad that Aias had bore a tower-shield clad with bronze 
and hide, 11 which probably already an antiquity at his own time. And as shown from the pic-
ture of Minoan period, we may have a more impressive understanding of this ancient design 
of shield. 
In addition to the shield, helmets made of boar's tusks were also common in the Mino-
an and Mycenaean world. The famous suit of armor from Dendra reveals to us the full 
The obsidian "sword" was used by Aztec warriors in the pre-Columbus era. The weapon was broad 
in shape and inlaid with sharp obsidians. The "sword" had to retain part of the beating power in its 
design thus to make up for the inadequate cutting ability caused by the limitation of the material. 
“ ( H o r n . II., 7.219): "So Aias came near carrying a tower-like shield, of bronze and of seven folds of 
hide [Al'ac; ‘6 eyYuOev fjXGe (pepcov adKO<; nute TTupyov, xciXkeov eTTTa(36£iov]. It was nonsense to have a 
tower-shield merely of bronze and seven folds of hide as it is too heavy for any normal man to carry, 
and properly the shield was a wooden one clad with bronze and hide. 
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panoply of a Mycenaean warrior. The corslet was made from binding together the bronze 
strips. Although not excessively heavy, it is relatively bulky and inconvenient for dexterous 
movements due to its design. The contemporary metallurgy technology of Mycenaean was not 
yet advanced enough to produce a suit consisting one single beaten breastplate and another 
backplate. However, such kind of corslet seemed to be an exceptional privilege for upper 
class or even rulers. First of all, the tower-shields or alterative "figure-of-eight" shields were 
able to offer full body protection, or otherwise, such design would be extremely inefficient 
during melee. And moreover, producing such kind of suit required great resources, and it was 
unlikely for ordinary soldier to own such precious armament. ！之 
The Minoan and Mycenaean Civilizations have marked the High Bronze Age of Greece. 
The Mycenaean culture ceased at the century BCE and presumably tides of Dorians from 
north had invaded Greek Peninsula. By apparently 1050-1025 BCE, Attica and its sur-
roundings had entered the Protogeometric Period, which represents the coming of Iron Age. 
The reasons of the adoption of iron have long been controversial among archaeologists. A. M. 
Snodgrass suggests in his book The Dark Age of Greece that one of the driving motivation of 
the adoption of iron was because of a bronze shortage in G r e e c e ” In response to his argue-
ment, James Whitley counter-argues in his book The Archaeology of Ancient Greece that, fir-
stly, the shortage of bronze is questionable as the bronze of Early Geometric were not poor in 
tin, and, secondly, the adoption of iron was not merely a substitute to bronze yet instead an 
essential technology because the iron technology could not be simply achieved by ancient 
Greeks themselves but by importing from Asia M i n o r . " As both of their statements are built 
upon primary hypotheses based on scarce evidence, the argument could only remains contro-
12 The Ancient Greeks could only gather the metals from trading and importing from rich mining 
locations because neither copper nor tin mines has ever been discovered in a satisfactory scale in 
Greece. And thus it is reasonable for us to believe that producing bronze was a momentous estate of the 
realm. As shown from the archeological evidences, resources of copper and tin were located at chiefly 
at the palace, and, therefore, it is persuasive to state that bronze was precious in the Mycenaean world. 
13 A. M. Snodgrass, The Dark Age of Greece: An Archaeological Survey of the Eleventh to the Eighth 
Centuries BC, 237-239. 
14 James Whitley, The Archaeology of Ancient Greece, 81. 
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versial. Statistical result of the metal materials in the Early Iron Age of Greece gives us a 
clearer understanding. 
Table 2.1: Metal objects from Early Iron Age graves in central Greece'^ 
Number of Number of 
Period graves metal objects Iron Bronze Gold Silver 
SM 376 354 一6% ~ 4% 一 1% — 
T G — 390 446 — 41% — 48% 11% “ 0% 
"¥G/MG — 392 778 — 27% — 45% 27% “ 1% 
Tota l 1158 1578 26% 55o/o I S � / � lo/o 
Key: 
SM = SubMycenaean (c. 1150-1025 BCE) 
PG = Protogeometric (c. 1025-900 BCE) 
EG/MG = Early Geometric to Middle Geometric (c. 900-700 BCE) 
As shown in the statistics, it is reasonable for us to believe in Snodgrass' theory of the 
shortage of iron. The use of bronze was still dominant in the last stage of High Bronze Age 
(SM), while suddenly the usage of iron increased for 35% in the earliest stage of the Iron Age 
(PG). This unusual uprising might match with Snodgrass' idea, and it could be further attested 
by the drawing back of the proportion of iron wares, which might indicate a recovery on 
bronze supply. However, it is also unable to deny that iron technology was a signifycant tech-
nology in Greece. Snodgrass himself has put a gaze at the memorable status of iron by putting 
"if there is one incontrovertible fact about the period covered by this study, it is that it 
witnessed the adoption of iron for practical uses in Greece."'^ 
On technical dimension, iron requires higher technology level for working. Its melting 
temperature reaches around 1500°C, and thus demanded a more advanced furnace in the Early 
Iron Age Greece. Moreover, carbonization, a process which hardens iron wares by adding car-
bon into it, was considered also magnificent.'^ The carbonization had raised the carbon con-
15 I. Morris, Archaeology as Cultural History: Words and Things in Early Iron Age Greece (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 1999), 211. 
16 A. M. Snodgrass, The Dark Age of Greece: An Archaeological Survey of the Eleventh to the Eighth 
Centuries BC, 213. 
17 Snodgrass reports that the carbonization may "happened by pure chance, with the use of charcoal for 
fuel and a reduced draught to the fire." Ibid., 214. However, it could be, as what Whitley has com-
mented, the entire iron technology was imported to the Greece from Asia Minor. James Whitley, The 
Archaeology of Ancient Greece, 81. 
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tent from 0.2% in primitive iron ores to 0.9% in a piece of worked iron raw material, and by 
this process, the raw worked iron in ancient Greece had reached a comparable content to mod-
em steel (around 2% of carbon). Quenching was also known as a proper way to give extra 
hardness and sharpness to iron weapons by sudden cooling of the blade, plausibly through 
putting the blade inside cool water. In this sense, the starting of using iron as producing prac-
tical weaponry had made slaughtering more effective in the Early Iron Age Greece. Bronze 
weapons were in many aspects, sharpness, hardness, and availability of resources'^, inferior to 
iron as the tools for killing and slaying. Starting from Early Geometric, iron was commonly 
used in making the blades of assault weapons. 
Figure 2.2: Iron arrow-
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Prompted by the adoption of iron weapons, defensive armament under the Iron Age had 
faced challenging circumstance. However, archaeological discoveries of defensive armament 
in Early Iron Age are severely inadequate for delineating even a rough scenery. The situation 
grows better as a full panoply of bronze armor was excavated in Argos. (See Figure 2.4) 
18 The nearest major copper mines to the Ancient Greeks were Cyrus, Sicily, and Anatolia. Tin mines 
were allocated even remoter from Greece. The richest tin mines of Europe were on Britain. Arch-
eological discovery of tin in Spain, where is not tin producing, suggests that Spain might be the ancient 
entreport for tin business between the Aegean region and Britain. Meanwhile, tin could also be 
imported from Near East through the trading with Ionia and Cyrus. In contrast, iron is a very common 
kind of mineral in the world, and Greece was iron-producing, which makes the gathering of iron much 
convenient. 
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The defensive armor of Argos shows the technology of beating bronze plate in the Late 
Geometric. The beating of bronze plate had enabled the craftsmen of Late Geometric to forge 
an armor combined with only two bronze plates, the breastplate and backplate, fitting to the 
muscular human body. And on the meantime, the famous style of helmet with horse-hair is 
firstly shown to us through this unique suit of armor. Inferred from the later Corinthian body 
armors and helmets, plausibly the dominant material for producing defensive weapons during 
pre-Archaic Period was still bronze. 
i 
Figure 2.4: Bronze panoply from 
l l i P ^ . Argos, tomb 45 (Late Geometric, 
c. 720-7 lOBCE). 疆 
The style of shield in pre-Archaic Period is however unknown to us by archaeology. 
Nonetheless, from Iliad, we may somehow get an image of shield in Iron Age. In Homer's 
depictions, shield, if ever mentioned of its shape, was in round shape; and it had a strap for 
handling. 
For his sweat had distressed himself (Tydeus) beneath the broad strap of the 
well-rounded shield. 
iSTTcbc; ydp [iiv 爸 t e i p e v utto tt入aT£0(； TeXajidrvoc; daTu(6o(； £i3kuk入ou. 
Homer, Iliad: V, 796-797 
In front of him (Hector) they (Trojan warriors) held their well-rounded shields. 
&入入^1 Trdpoi0£v daT[i5ac; eOkCk入ouc; (tx£0ov auToi). 
Homer, Iliad: XIV，427-428 
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Beside "well-rounded" (evKVKXoq^), Homer uses commonly another term "shield equal 
at every side" (daTTi<; TidvToa' eiar|) to address the round shield. 
And Hector in the front had carried the shield equal at every side. 
"EKTTOP 5’ iv TTptoToioi (p£p' daitiSa TtdvToa' eiar|v. 
Homer, Iliad: XI, 61 
For he hid beneath the shield equal at every side, which he was used to carry 
and covered with hide of bull and gleaming bronze, (and) fitted with two rods. 
Kpi)99r] ydp un' daTTi6i TtdvToa' eiar|, Tfjv dp' o ye pivoiai (3od)v KQI vtbpoTti 
Xci入6ivtoTfiv (popeEGKE, 5心0) Kavoveaa' dpapmav-
Homer, Iliad: XIII, 405-407 
As witnessed by Homer, one major change in the style of shield was on the shape, from 
the tower or "figure of eight" shield to the round shield. We of course from merely the texts 
can not have any knowledge on the accurate diameter of such round shield, nevertheless, from 
extra emphases on extraordinary large shields, and from the later hoplon, it is promising for 
us to believe that the round shield could cover only the upper body and was around and 
if the shield was nearly reaching the height of a man, it would be too bulky for carrying. This 
changing in shape of shield proposes that in Iron Age, ordinary wooden tower shields with 
only hide of bull was growing insufficient in defending the metals, including both bronze and 
iron in practical use. Obviously, an extraordinary large shield reaching the feet or a tower 
shield was too awkward for handling, especially during close-fighting melee, as it was too 
cumbersome to move it around preventing enemies from different directions. Advancements 
did not solely happened on the shape of the shield, but also on the material and texture of it. 
Homer records many cases of shield texture in the great epic on Achilles and Hector. 
19 £UKI3KXOC; comes from EU(；, which means good or well, and KUKXOC;, which means circle. 
As aforesaid, the shield of Aias has received extra attention to the mention of Homer. (Horn. II., 7. 
219); see also (Horn. II., 17.128). Moreover, Homer also puts a note on "a shield that reached to the feet 
(against) javelins which he (Hector) had carried [Tfjv auroc; cpopeeaKe T[O6R|V£K£' gpKoc; CIKOVTCOV]" 
(Horn. //., 15.646). 
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(Tychius) who made him his glancing shield of seven hides of sturdy bulls, 
and over it had beaten an eighth layer of bronze. 
oq ol eTioir|oev adKoc; a�6入ov eTTTa(36eiov taupcov ^atpecpecov, ETII 6' oySoov 
fjA-aae xa 入 kcVV. 
Homer, Iliad: VII, 222 
And the two (Alcimedon and Automedon) walked straight forward, their 
shoulders clad with dry and tough bull's hide shields; and much bronze had been 
welded (on them). 
TO) 6 ' 101)c; Pi^ Tr|v PoEr|c; EiXu^evo) a)|iou(； aui^ai aTepefjaL- TTO入心c; 6 ' eneXi^ XaTo 
XaXKOc;-
Homer, Iliad.. XVII, 492-493 
Accounted by Homer, a general Iron Age shield of Greece was heavily clad with hides 
and bronze layer. The shield of Tychius, which was clad with seven fold of hides and an 
eighth layer of bronze, was probably the most ordinary kind of Iron Age shield; and the core 
of the shield might be wood as no other materials is mentioned. A phenomenal account of 
Achilles' exquisite shield^' was not likely to be a norm for shield of Iron Age as it would be 
on one hand too lavish for common soldier to bear, and on another hand too ponderous for an 
ordinary man to hold. 
From these proofs, it was uncontroversial that the majority of defensive weapons in Iron 
Age of Greece were chiefly made of bronze. We can observe that the technology of defensive 
weapons was advancing for the purpose of protecting the fragile human body while iron 
technology had introduced into the offensive weaponry. The reason why iron was not used by 
the armor or helmet production is still obscure and remains controversial. It maybe due to the 
limitation of iron metallurgy as the technology was still unable to produce beaten iron plate 
for making suit of armor. Bronze had given not only a physically protection, but mentally as a 
material far more contented in the cult of Greek military ideology. 
(Horn. II., 20.270-272): for five layers had the crook-foot god welded, two of bronze, and within two 
of tin, and one of gold, in which the spear of ash was stopped [eTiei TTEVTE TTRUXAC； nXaae KU入入cmoSicov， 
Td<; 6i)o xa入K£�a(；, 6i3o 6' ev6o0i Kaaaitepoio, Trjv 5e |iiav xpucriiv, p' eoxefo [lei入ivov eyxoc;]. 
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Although it is quite justified, in purely technological term, saying that iron was in many 
senses superior to bronze as the material of military weaponry, the ancient Greeks however 
considered it in an adverse manner. Bronze, as depicted by the Greeks themselves, received 
much appreciation, while in contrary iron gained no special attention. Indeed, the ancient 
Greeks had invented the "cult of bronze," which linked the metal itself with metaphysical and 
ideological consensus among the realm, and thus infused the intrinsic value into the shinning 
metal. It was very important for us to notice that psychology and consciousness beneath the 
metal were not purely materialistic, nor merely technological, yet, cultural; and this cultural 
consensus was not invented, nor forged, but was inherited from the ancient cults and beliefs. 
One simplest way to explain the cult of bronze is by stating the difference in value of bronze 
and iron. If we scrutinize the ancient text, we could investigate the values of the two metals in 
ancient Greece. 
And then from Glaucus did Cronos' son, Zeus take away his midriff (the seat of 
heart and spirit), in that he made exchange with Tydeus' son, Diomedes, golden 
for brazen, the worth of one hundred oxen for the worth of nine. 
8V9' auT£ R入ai^ Kip Kpovi6r|(； 9p£va<; £�£入STO Ztvc,, be, Tipoc; TuSeiSriv Aiojii^Sea 
TEUXE ‘ &|i£i(3£XP心Gea xa入Kdcov, £KaT6|i(3oi' evvea(3oia)v. 
Homer, Iliad: VI，234-236 
If we believe in this only occasional account of Homer in mentioning the value of bron-
ze, then the ration of gold to bronze was approximately of 1 to 10 (9 to 100 to be accurate) at 
the Age of Homer. Gold of course is very precious, but as it is also rare, in substitution, bron-
ze had indeed been the indication of wealth in the Greek world. 
(Achilles): "Atreus' son, but of you what you are unhappy, and what you lack? 
Your camps are full of bronze, and there are many women who could be taken 
away in your camps...” 
ATpei6r|, TEO 5’ aur" em|i£|I(p£AI I^Se xciti(£ic;; it入ela[ TOI xa入KOG K入idai，TTO入入al 
6e yuvaiKEC; eiaiv evl k入 e ^ a i p e t o i . . . 
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Homer, Iliad.. II’ 225-227 
It is not dubious from this accusation of Achilles to Agamemnon that bronze itself was a 
fine indication of wealth. This argument could be further proved by several cases that account 
for the preciousness of bronze. ^ ^ On the other hand, iron was comparatively less valuable than 
bronze referring to another narration of Lycurgus^^ by Plutarch. 
For the first place, he obliterated all the custom of using gold and silver, and 
ordained to use iron only. Then to a great weight and mass of this he gave a 
small power, as things of ten minas^"^ required a large space in the house, and a 
yoke of cattle to carry it. 
7Tp(i)Tov |iev Y^p dKupd)aa(； rtdv v6|iia|ia xpuaouv Kcd dpyupouv [iovco xprjcrGai 
T(I AI6R|PCP TTPOAERA^E- K a i TOTJTCO 5E DRUO TTO入入OI3 ATA0|IOI3 KCD 0 7 K 0 U 6U-VAMV 
oXiyriv £6a)K£V, &AT£ SEKCI I^ VOJV d|IOI(3FIV DTTO0QKR|(； T£ [ieyd入rjc； o'lKig 6£io0ai 
Kcd (euyouc; dyovToc;. 
Plutarch, Live of Lycurgus: IX，1-2 
Iron had a very low actual material value comparing to bronze.^^ Of course, numerical 
figures in ancient texts are always dubious to our modem age, which somehow overpowered 
number itself, and moreover, Lycurgus had on the other hand depreciated iron manually; 
however, the aforesaid cases, even though might not be accurate, still suggest a substantial 
difference in the value of bronze and iron. 
It seems reasonable for this explanation but the cult of bronze was indeed strongly pre-
sented in pre-Archaic Greece. Bronze, despite what its materialistic or weaponry value was, 
had a special cultural and scared meaning to Homer and his age. Homeric Age although ex-
perienced a great influence of the introduction of iron technology; nonetheless, in their ment-
22 E.g.: offering bronze as a means of ransom, see (Horn. //., 6.37-65; 10.378-379); and using it as a 
bribe, see (Horn. II., 9.277-282). 
23 Lycurgus was the legendary lawgiver, king of Sparta. His age was obscure, probably around 700 
BCE. Plutarch reports that he was of the age of Homer, and even met him, see (Plut. Lyc., 1.2). 
24 One talent of gold (about 26kg in Attica) is equal to 60 minas in the scale of Ancient Greece. 
25 If the ration of gold to bronze was approximately 9 to 100, then 10 minas (about 4.3kg) of gold was 
equal to about 48kg of bronze. Corresponsively，10 minas of gold was said to be equal to iron consum-
ing a big place in the house by Plutarch. 
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ality, the Greeks had had an elaborated respect and emotion to the brazen metal. To illustrate 
this point, we must first evaluate the nature of Homer's narration. It is de ratione that the Epic 
Cycle is commemorating the Trojan War, which happened in the pre-historic Mycenaean time 
at High Bronze Age of Greece, but the scenery and features of these epics are de facto con-
temporary to Homer. This is positively proved by the anachronic narrations of Homer. Many 
features in Iliad and Odyssey, including the round shield, the horse-hair crest helmet^^, and 
the gyala (yuaXa)^^, did not belong to Bronze Age but indeed from the world of Homer 
himself. It is common for any author to adopt his personal experience in writing; and the 
anachronism of Homer illustrates this theory appropriately. 
Although Homer was probably a person of Iron Age, he himself retained the emphasis of 
bronze, synchronic to Mycenaean Argrive culture. It is well known to us by archaeological 
evidence that by Homeric Age, around 700 BCE, iron was commonly used simultaneously as 
bronze to make the assault weapons. To Homer, iron blade, spear-head, arrow head, and iron-
wares should not be alien as it was one of the dairy materials in the ancient Greek world. But, 
opposing this acknowledgement, all weapons depicted in the epics were bronze if the material 
was ever mentioned. In the lexicon of Homer, "bronze" even has a parallel meaning to 
“weapon.，，28 Bronze was sharp, good at cutting, excellent in dealing damage and even super-
ior in slaughtering; this infers that bronze was treated as the "ideal" metal for weaponry, re-
gardless to the existence of iron, not to mention the materialistic difference between the two.29 
It is so obvious that bronze bore special appreciation in Homeric Age. "Gleaming bronze 
26 It appears frequently in Iliad. E.g.: (Horn. / / .， 3 . 3 3 6 - 3 3 7 ) : cap (helmet) with horse-hair (KUVE-
r|v...i'7T7Tovpiv); (Horn. II., 13.132): helmet decked with horse-hair (mTTooKOfioi KopuBec;). 
27 YTjaXa is the plural form of yuaXov, which originally means curved surface. In the usage of Homer, 
Y心a入ov refers to the breastplate of the warrior, see (Horn. //.，5 .99) . And y心a入a refers to the suit of 
armor combining both the breastplate and backplate, see (Horn II., 15.530). The technology of produc-
ing plate armor obviously did not belong to the Bronze Age Greece. 
28 (Horn. II., 4.510-511) not stone, nor iron (was) their body to resist the sharp-cutting bronze when 
they were struck [ETTEI OU acpi Xi0o<; XP山G ou5e al6r|PO(;xct入K6V dvacfxeciOai TA|^£mxpoa (3a\\o|I£voiaiv]; 
(Horn. II., 7.77): (Hector): if that man slay me with long-edged bronze [ei fiev KEV £|_ie KEIVOC; SXT] 
xavai^KEi x a 入 ( H o r n . II., 11.153): (they) slaying with bronze [xciXkc^ ) 6r|i6u)VT8c;]; (Horn. II., 19.25): 
wounds caused by bronze [XCC入KOT心Trou(； DRRSI入DC;]. 
29 See also (Hes. WD. 150-151). 
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(vcbpoxj/ xa入k;6(；),” indeed, is the term adapted by Homer to describe the fairness of this 
metal. 30 The disregard of the existence of iron weaponry and the preferential quality of bronze 
is what in this thesis called "the cult of bronze." The "cult" itself was not an invention, and its 
root could be tracked back to the pre-historic tradition. It would be rather difficult for us to 
investigate this in Bronze Age as no written texts are available for verifying. The most reliable 
way to examine the root of this "cult of bronze" is to study the religious aspect of the "cult." 
In Homeric Age, a strong linkage between religion and bronze had been adapted. 
And Hector in the front had carried the shield equal at every side. Just as from 
the clouds there shines the gleaming baneful star, and then it plunged back 
again into the shadowy clouds, so Hector brought to light (or showed) among 
the front, and at another time commanded in the back; and then all in bronze he 
had lighted like the lighting of father Zeus, the aegis-bearing. 
"EKTCOP 6 ' ev TtptoToiai (pep' da7ii6a TtdvToa' EIAR|v. oioc; 5’ £K vecpecov dva(pai-
VEtai ouXioc; daxfip TTa|I(paiva}v, TOTE 6’ auTic; e6u vecpea aKioevxa, a)(;"EKTcop 
6t£ |i£v te TTptbtoim cpctveaKev, aAAoTe 5' ev TTUfidtoiai KeXeCtov Ttdc; 5’ 
a p a xa入入知cp’ wq TE aTeponfi TraTp6(； Ai6(； a i^ioxoio. 
Homer, Iliad.. XI, 61-66 
Given that "gleaming" was one essential idiosyncrasy of deity, the metaphor of Hector 
and Zeus reveals the compact relationship between the "cult of bronze" and the religious be-
liefs. Moreover, epithets of Ares, the Greek god of warfare - brazen Ares (xdXKeo<; 'Apr|(；) and 
bronze-clad (xaXK0K0puaTi^<;) '^ also present an analogous notion to this linkage. Religion is 
one of the oldest essences and beliefs of man-kind long before any writing was developed, 
any form of public government was established, and any kind of tradition or culture was 
fashioned. The interlocking association of military ideology of bronze and the religious sector 
3 � S e e (Horn. II.，2.578-579; 11.16; 13.406; 14.11, 383; 16.130). Also (Horn. //.，11.83; 19.363): 
flashing of bronze [xa入Koi) axepaui^v]. (Horn. //., 22.32): the bronze shinned [xcx入Kdc;...aTTi0£am]. 
(Horn. 11., 23.27): glittering bronze [x^ i入Kea |iap[jaipovTa]. There are occasions that iron was depicted 
as shinning — (Horn. II., 7.473): shinning iron [ai'Gcovt aiSi^po)]; (Horn. Od., 1.184): shinning iron 
[ai'6(ova ai6r|pov]. However, we could not find any case of iron weapon in Homer's narrations, and, 
moreover, it is also undeniable that iron received no specific appreciation in ancient text comparing to 
bronze. 
3 � F o r brazen Ares, see (Horn. II., 5.504; 16.543); for bronze-clad, see (HH, 8.2). 
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in Homeric Age implies that the "cult of bronze" emerged not merely because of the value of 
the metal, but indeed it was inherited from the ancient time. 
The pre-historic period of Greece is obscure to us. Apart from archaeological discover-
ies, we are not given any extra information to discuss. However, military culture does not 
emerge in a sudden, whereas indeed it requires a long period to nourish. Homeric Age was in 
the transitional period in between the border of pre-historic and historic, and, therefore, it 
worth our scrutiny so as to understand the age and its preceding era. As we explore the "cult 
of bronze" depicted in Homer, we could have a perspicacious knowledge on the pre-historic 
military culture of ancient Greece, and thus illuminate the study of the later development of 
Greek military culture. 
The Inception of the Greek Way of War 
It is well illustrated that Homeric Age had inherited the emphasis of bronze from its an-
cient antecedent. The military culture was not refrained in just the material dimension of 
warfare, and in additional, it did also involve aspects of the war ethos of the ancient Greek 
World. If weapon is the machine of war, then, within the "industry" of war, soldier is the labor 
of war, generalship the management of war, and tactic the technique of war; but above all, it is 
the war ethos to act as the modus operandi for instructing the fundamental process of the 
battle. In ancient battlefield of Greece, what drove the entire scenery was neither theory of 
military science, nor the commands of the general, but, as the core engine running the process 
of battle, the ideological consensus of warfare. In modem military science, tactic and strategy 
is the most often discussed theme, in response to the conception of war study. But if we are to 
exaggerate this conception of war study into the military history, especially the pre-modern 
world is misleading, and really if so, will narrow down the realm of military history. In the 
ancient Greece, Xenophon has reserved for us one brilliant conclusion of the entire study of 
the ancient Greek Warfare by stating that, "This [tactics] is only a small part of 
31 
generalship.” 32 
Technically, in ancient world like Greece, it was impossible for any general to com-
mand the army liberally without any aid of modem communication technology, while it was 
neither possible for one to have a comprehensive knowledge on the whole of battleline with-
out any assistance of modem satellite surveying and accurately depicted cartography. This 
problem could be softened by a well developed command system of battlefield, which was 
what the Roman Empire had done. But beyond this, on the cultural aspect, beyond any 
manual instruction being enforced into the modus operandi, military culture and war ethos 
had routinized the way of conducting war. Different kinds of military culture or war ethos 
may be strange to us when we apply our "rational" sense; and so ours to them. Surely, ethos 
or culture is not a set of rules which could not be offended, while it nonetheless found the 
groundwork of existing values and "rational" sense. What seems rational to us is not necess-
ary to be in others' eye, and vice versa-, therefore, in the study of history, one must not put 
aside the considerations of the contemporary people in any category of historical analysis. 
The military culture and war ethos of Homeric Age came from the Bronze Age; hence, 
Homeric Age does not represent only itself, but furthermore the preceding cultural heritage 
and also the prologue of succeeding military practice. It had transformed the ancient prehis-
toric segment to the illustrious idiosyncratic section of Archaic Greece. The most notable 
component of the military culture of the Homeric Age is the prominence of heroes, contri-
buted by the elaborate depictions of the epics of Homer. 
The perception of such pre-eminence of heroes was indeed built upon the emphasis of 
individual importance. The most elementary factor of creating a heroic culture is by remem-
bering different identical names of the heroes. Names were fundamental because no one 
would reserve a share of his brain commemorating stories without a protagonist, nor a hero 
without a name, despite how one have fought bravely and courageous. Achilles, Hector, Aga-
32 (Xen. Mem., 3.1.5): [TOIJTO YE NO入入OOT6V jiepoc; EOTI atpaTriyiac;]. 
32 
memnon, Menelaus, Odysseus, Diomedes, Teucer, Aeneas, Alexander, and countless other 
names are all remembered by us, who live almost three millennia after, by the records of 
Homer. It is very common for us to discover the accounts of one asking the name of his op-
ponent or reporting his before having combat. Thus, to be remembered was a main theme of 
the ancient Greeks. 
(Agamemnon): "This, I suppose, is going to be dear to Zeus of exceeding might 
that the Achaeans was to perish here away from Argos namelessly." 
outco TToi) All I^d入入EI i)Ti£p[I£vei cpl入ov eivai , vcovijfivouc; (!tTToX ;^cr6ai CITT' ’ApY£0(； 
Homer, Iliad: XIV，69-70 
Agamemnon's words demonstrate such sentiment clearly by raising up the possible 
catastrophe of being nameless; and in this sense Iliad has performed a good deed to the wish 
of Agamemnon and his peers. As name was to be remembered, personal accounts of accomp-
lishment in warfare had received extraordinary attention of ancient Greeks. Iliad of Homer, in 
commemorating the death of Hector, records one section of the entire Trojan War, and it is 
nonetheless astonishing for us that there are more than 200 accounts of recorded deadly com-
bat, inscribing both the names of killer and the slain. Some of these accounts do not merely 
record the names but also with elaborating descriptions on the combats, showing how the 
Achaeans fought with the Trojans. This kind of personal accomplishment probably was es-
sential and vital in career, mirroring the feudal tradition of Japanese samurai class. ^ ^ 
(Achilles): "Aeneas, why did you raise to come so far out of the throng? Is that 
your heart commands you to fight with me, hoping that you will be master of 
Priam's honor among the horse-taming Trojans?" 
33 The exact wording of "vtovufivouc; diTToAicrOcu dTi' 'Apyeoc; £v6d6' Axaiovc; (the Achaeans was to 
perish here away from Argos namelessly)" appears also in (Horn. II., 12.70). 
34 Dual was the elementary way of conducting war in Japan before the introduction of firearm and 
mercenary army in 16"" cent., known as the Late Sengoku or Azuchi-Momoyama Period. Although 
thereafter dual nearly vanquished in the battlefield, yet, the spirit had remained prevailing in martial art 
of the populace until now. 
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A'lvela, "d crO x o a a o v 6[ii\oTj no入Xdv irre入0(bv £aTr|(；; f| ae ye 6u|i6(； e[iol i^axecr-
aa6ai (ivtb^ yeie入T[(i)|ievov Tptbeaaiv dvd^eiv iTTTio6d[ioiai riiafjc; Tfjq npid|iou; 
Homer, Iliad: XX, 178-181 
The accuse of Achilles to Aeneas could in such manner evidence how personal accom-
plishment could affected one's reputation and career, as military strength constituted the most 
fundamental basis for power. Meanwhile, as a means to display individual accomplishment, 
"dual" was one remarkable way of war in Homeric Age, and with which our perception of the 
Heroic Age is formed. 
Indeed among the Trojans had come fore to fight Alexander of god-form, hav-
ing on his shoulder a leopard skin and a curved bow and a sword; brandishing 
two (wooden) spears tipped with bronze he had challenged (had called forth) all 
the best of the Argives to dual (fight face to face) (with him) in dread combat. 
Tptoalv [i£v npo|idxiC£v ^VXegavSpoc; 0eo£i5fi(；， Tiap5a入eriv (j3|ioiaiv excov Kai 
Ka|xm3入a to^a Kctl 柳 o c ; - aurdp 6oOpe 5心co K£Kopu0|i6va xa入ndWcov Apyei-
tov TtpoKcx入iCeTo TidvTac; dpiaToi)(； a v t i p i o v [iaxecraaGai ev cdvfj 6riLOTfjTi. 
Homer, Iliad: III，16-20 
(Apollo): "Let us arouse the mighty power of horse-taming Hector, hoping that 
he may challenge (call forth) someone of the Danaans, one to one, to dual (fight 
face to face) in dread combat, and shall the bronze-greaved Achaeans in delight 
arouse someone to fight with noble Hector. 
"EKtopoc; 6PATO|iev KPATEPDV [levoc; iTT7To6d|ioio, f]v Tivct TTOD Aavad)v TtpoKcc入E-
a a e x a i oioBev 0i0(； dvTiPiov [laxeaciaQai ev a'Lvfj 6r|ioTfiTi, oi Se K' ctyaaadi iEvoi 
Xa\KOKVi^ (ii6£(； Axaiol oiov erropaeiav tto入e|il(£iv"EKT:opi Sicu. 
Homer, Iliad: VII, 38-42 
The two narrations above demonstrate intimately the straight scenery of a single combat 
of the Heroic Age. The Greek verb rrpoKcx入eco (to call forth), combining the adverb pro (forth, 
front, before) and the verb kaled (call), was adapted by Homer to depict how a warrior 
charged his opponent by calling aloud him to come forth. In this sense, to make such a com-
bat, each warrior from each side should depart himself from the throng of army, leaving the 
34 
cover and assistance of his friends and attendants, and presumably he should thus come forth 
to a ground in between the two armies and fight the deadly combat. Of course cases of assist-
ing attack are available, dual was still a preferred means to conduct such honorable heroic 
performance. The phrase dvxipioq |idxo|iai, which consists of anitbios (face to face)^^ and 
machomai (to fight), was used by Homer to delineate the scenery of a dual between two 
courageous warriors. The case of Alexander (Paris) reveals how a champion warrior would 
have done in Homeric Age - coming out from the throng, calling aloud to challenge the op-
ponents, hoping to gain any personal accomplishment of his own. 
Moreover, apart from the dreadful dual between warriors, another iconographic element 
in depicting the valiant and audacious image of heroes was the chariot. Chariot was not new 
to the Greeks of Homeric Age since it had been known to the Greeks as early as to Minoan 
and Mycenaean Civilizations.^^ To discuss on the topic of chariot of ancient Greece, we must 
precede the study on horse, which is inseparable from the concept of chariot and was 
sometimes used as synonym to chariot in Homer's verses. Even though horse technology was 
already not alien to the Homeric Greece, it was probably one cherished skill worth special 
praising. Horse breeding is the most fundamental technology in order to enable the use of 
chariot. As to applause the importance of this, term like "horse-breeding Argos CApyoc; ITTTTO-
(3crro(;)，，37 was used. Depictions of strong horses like Xanthus of Hector are not uncommon in 
the ancient texts, and meanwhile above horses, the taming skill of the animal received also 
attention of the Greeks; the adjective of "horse-taming" (iHTT66a|io<;) was often attributed to 
tribes38 or individual person^^. 
dvTiPioc; is formed from dvti and (3io<;. dvTi refers to the concept of "parallel or opposing of two se-
parate things." (3ioc; refers to life-hood, which is different from merely biological life and has a meaning 
similar to the Lain vita, and expanding from this it acquire a meaning of "person" or "soul". Therefore, 
dvTi(3ioc; in here literally means the opposi t ion of two souls. 
36 John Chadwick, The Mycenaean World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 164-171. 
37 (Horn. II., 3.258). And also (Horn. II., 4.202): horse-breeding Trica (Tp(vor|(； ITTTTO (36TOIO). 
38 One very obvious example in Iliad is "horse-taming Trojans (iTtKoSafioi TpwEc;)," see (Horn. //., 3. 
127, 131, 251; 4.80, 333, 509; 6.461; 7.361; 8.71, 516, 525; 10.424; 11.568; 12.440; 17.230). 
39 E.g.: horse-taming Hector (EKtcop lTTn66a|ioc;), horse-taming Diomedes (Aio}ii]6r|c; iTTTToSafioc;), and 
35 
In the meantime, the function of chariot is still obscure. Chadwick states that it was de-
signed for the purpose of locomotion/�whereas the Iliad supposes a mixed function of char-
iot. Accounts such as Menelaus "immediately leapt from chariot with his weapons to the 
ground”4i when he met Alexander and so Sarpedon when he met Patroclus^^ suggest that the 
Greeks might use chariot as a transport device and they would dismount themselves if they 
were to fight. Truly, we have no knowledge of how the Mycenaeans fought with their chariots, 
but, for the Homeric warriors, chariot had double functions - both as a means of locomotion, 
and a kind of weapon which acquired similar characteristic of cavalry. 
The charioteers of the Trojan War accounted by Homer were not merely mounted infan-
try, like Dragoon of 1 c e n t u r y Europe who used horse only for the purpose of acquiring 
higher mobility but not for charging. We could witness many accounts of fighting on the char-
iots; and the attendants of warriors who hold the reins will be useless if charioteers were 
simply to do battle on foot. It is unambiguous that chariot had occupied an important posit-
ion in pre-Archaic Greek Warfare. The case that Agamemnon asked the Argives for provis-
ioning their horses and taking care of their chariots before the battle proposes a vigorous post 
for the .chariot in the battle.43 
On one hand foot soldiers were slaying foot soldiers fleeting with force, and on 
the other hand horsemen (charioteers) horsemen, and beneath them aroused 
from the plain the dust, which the loud-thundering hooves of horses aroused, 
and (they were) slaying with bronze. 
TteCol |iev K8(oi)c; OXEKOV cpe心yovTcu; dvayKfi, ITTTT£1(； 5’ iTiTifiac;, UTTO bk acpiaiv 
(I)pTO KOViri £K TTESIOI), TrjV (Lpoav £piY60U7T0l Tt65£<； lT[7Tli)V, XCt入6ril6tOVT£C；. 
Homer, Iliad: XI，150-153 
(Horn. II., 3.272): horse-taming Castor (Kdaropa i7T7T66a|iov). 
John Chadwick, The Mycenaean World, 164. 
4� (Horn. II., 3.29): and immediately he (Menelaus) leapt from the chariot with his weapons to the 
g r o u n d [au t iKa 5，e^ oxewv CR)V T d ) x现V & 入 T O X 叩 轮 ] . 
42 (Horn. II., 16.426): and he (Sarpedon) leapt from the chariot with his weapons to the ground [KOI E^  
OXETOV cK)v TEUXECJIV & 入 T O XCIFID(E]. 
See (Horn. II., 2:382). 
36 
The usage of men (fiev) and de (6e), which indicates two actions happening at the same 
time, suggests that foot soldiers and horsemen (charioteers) were fighting separately. Mounted 
on chariot, warriors could level themselves higher than ordinary infantry; by doing so, 
charioteers could endeavor a superior elevation, which enabled them to fight with other infan-
trymen with level advantage, and prevented themselves from being at an inferior ground when 
they were to fight with other charioteers. The above battle scenery portrays vividly the two 
stratified companies in battling — foot soldiers and horsemen (charioteers). This at least sugg-
ests that foot soldiers seldom challenge charioteers even during fleeting, plausibly because 
they could neither chase the horsemen, nor able to make efficient damage to elevated enem-
ies. 
(Lycaon): "And horses are not here, nor chariot which I can mount." 
iTiTroi 6' ou napiaoi KQI d p i i a t a , t(I)v K' e7TiPair|v-
(Aeneas): "But otherwise it will not be until we two with horses and chariots go 
to face this man and make trial of him in arms." 
TTcipoc; 6 ' ouK e a a e r a i aAAcuc;，rrpiv y' ETTI vd) T (P5 ' dvSp l CTUV I'Turoiaiv KQI 6X£-
09IV dvTiPir|v £\06vTe auv £VT£ai TT£ipr|6f]vai. 
Homer, Iliad: V，192, 218-220 
From the conversation of Lycaon and Aeneas, the significance of chariot in battle is well 
illustrated. Even for those high-spirited heroes, they could not fight properly without chariots 
and horses. It is unambiguous that chariot did not provide only a mean of transport to the an-
cient warriors of Homeric Age, but it also gave them a battling position strictly different from 
other foot soldiers. It seems impossible for any infantryman to challenge directly a mounted 
warrior on chariot; Lycaon and Aeneas reaffirm this statement as the situation would not be 
better though the infantryman was a mighty man-slaying hero. 
Until now, the battle scenery of Homeric Age, of which the concentration was posited 
upon the heroes, manifests an utterly discrepant modus operandi of warfare to the hoplite 
battle of Archaic Greece. As the heroic culture depicted in the epics of Homer shows nearly 
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no comparable idiosyncrasy to the Archaic Warfare, it is, thus, reasonable for us to believe 
that it was the heritage of the pre-historic Greek culture. Since dual is the simplest form of 
warfare, it is primitive and antique. Primitive warfare had reserved this concept in the pract-
ice of battle behaviors, creating an adverse war ethos to that of organized warfare. Heroic 
culture is obviously an ancient cult in such sense. If we treat the purpose of having warfare as 
fundamentally to solve disputes, then the using of a single combat to settle the dispute bet-
ween the Achaeans and Trojans, as suggested by Apollo, would be making sense in the man-
ner that it would conserve many unnecessary loses both in terms of life and resource. 
Given the aforesaid essences of heroic cult in war ethos, it is appropriate for one to 
concludes that the warfare of pre-Archaic Greece was the battles of heroes, who had march-
ed themselves with others in the dreadful battlefield. It is true that properly Mycenaean war-
fare was conducted in this very manner, as we are given no other strong evidence against this 
idea hitherto. However, the concept of warfare was changing during Early Iron Age, and 
Homeric Age was indeed a remarkable era proceeding the changing of military concept, from 
the heroic remains of pre-Archaic to mass heavy infantry battle of Archaic Period. 
Verily, from the inspiration of the hoplite warfare in Archaic Period, the crucial point of 
changing laid on the role of infantry in warfare. Although provided with well illustrations of 
the chariots and the heroes in the Homeric Warfare, infantry, i.e., foot soldiers meanwhile also 
occupied an important status that should not be underestimated. In any kind of warfare from 
any region in the pre-modern history, infantry was always the most elementary military unit. 
It required no specific technology like horse-breeding and taming of cavalry or gun-powder of 
artillery, and therefore, it was cheap and convenient; in theory, the only requirement of raising 
an army of infantrymen is manpower, the availability of strong men who could grasp any 
means of weapon and fight. But frankly speaking, it, although cheap and convenient, is defin-
itely inferior to mounted soldiers in single combat. The essence of infantry in warfare is its 
quantity but not quality. In the Homeric Warfare, when individual accomplishment in battle 
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was mostly praised, infantry was ineluctably placed in a subordinate position, and its role in 
warfare was barely supplementary. 
In front the horsemen (charioteers), and after had followed a cloud of foot 
soldiers, countless. 
TTpoaGe |iev iTTTtfjec;, pEtd 8k vecpoc; eiTteto ne^ajv, [lupioi-
Homer, Iliad: XXIII，133-134 
He (Nestor) arrayed the horsemen (charioteers) in the front with their horses and 
chariots, and in behind (or at the rear) the foot soldiers, many and brave, to be a 
fortress of battle. 
iTTHfiac; |i£v TTpd)Ta ai)v iTtTToiaiv KCTL oxeacpi, TT£(O心C; 6 ' e^oTiiGe aTfjaev noAiac; xz 
Kal £(J8入O心(；，epKOq £ |I£V TTO入£(IOLO-
Homer, Iliad: IV, 297-299 
These two examples propose how the Greeks of Homeric Age had arrayed the army — 
chariots at the front and foot soldiers at the back; the array of army in such fashion was very 
logic and straightforward. It allowed the best portion of the army, who mounted themselves 
with chariots and horses, and the best weapons, to charge the enemy at the first moment when 
they had been engaged in battle, and by doing so, they were hoping to crush into the enemy's 
formation and to trample over opposite infantrymen. This way of war is analogous to ordinary 
cavalry charge, which initiates the triumph by smashing over enemy's formation. Of course 
the enemy would try to do the same thing, and the result was a din of battles among the 
foremost charioteers of two sides, which demonstrated a typical heroic warfare. But the fact is 
that these charioteers properly consisted only of a little proportion in the army, and even 
though they were pre-eminent like Hector or Achilles in Iliad, the majority laid upon those 
fought on foot, the infantrymen. 
It is highly dangerous for one to bypass the scrutiny of the function and role of infantry 
in the modus operandi of warfare if he is to study the Homeric Warfare. The most essential 
function of infantry was to form a mass of base as Nestor tells, "to be a fortress of battle 
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(epKoc; £|i£v TToXefioio)," and this throng of infantry could backup the charioteers in the fore-
most in different ways. 
And glorious Aias rushed up to it (the corpse of Amphius) to strip the armor, and 
the Trojans upon him poured the spears, sharp and gleaming; and (his) shield 
caught most of them. But he with heel stepped on the corpse and pull out the 
spear of bronze, but then still he was not able to take away the rest of the fair 
armor from the shoulder; for he was oppressed by missiles. And he feared the 
strong defense of the Trojans mighty in combat, who encountered (him), many 
and brave, having their spears (in their hands), and who trusted him back from 
them, even though he was great and mighty and noble. 
6 6' e7Te6pa|ie (pai6i|iO(； Ai'ac; teux^ci auXi^acuv. Tpciec; 6' em Soupar' exeuav 
o^ea 7Ta|i(pav6a)VTa- aciKoc; 6' civeSe^aTo no入入(i. autap 6 X^ ig TipoapcK； £k V£K-
pou xa^Keov 'iyxo(； tondoai:'- ov8' dp' ex' 5uvi^craTo T£i)X£a KaXct c6|ioiiv 
dtcpe入Aa6ai- £tt£[y£To y^ip (kAiecrai. 5ekre 6' 6 7' d|i(pipamv Kpcnxpfjv Tptoiov 
dyeptox^^v, 01 tto入入oi ire Kal ecrG入ol ecpgcrraaav iyx^' exovtec;, 01' i [igyav ntp 
EovTa KQi i'(p0i|iov Kal dyauov woav dnd acpeituv- 6 6e xcicrad[i£vo(； 
Homer, Iliad.. V, 617-626 
This delineation has eminently pinpointed the supportive role of infantry in the Homeric 
Warfare. When Aias was about to strip the armor from the corpse of Amphius, the Trojans had 
tried their best to stop him, by casting their spears and shooting missiles. These brave Trojans 
soldiers were apparently infantry as they would challenge Aias directly in a dual if they were 
charioteers. It reveals conspicuously how infantry would support the foremost warriors,斗斗 and 
that was why Menelaus, for the purpose of getting cover of his comrades for stripping the 
armor of Podes, had to drag the corpse into his own t h r o n g . T h e throng of infantry had crea-
ted a shelter of the charioteers and could assist them to retreat from the front if they were to 
flee. 
44 For similar sceneries of oppressing opponents by missiles, see also (Horn. //., 11.576-589; 13.509-
511). 
45 (Horn. II., 578-581): Then him (Podes) tawny-haired Menelaus struck on under the belt with spear as 
he was eager not to fight, and drove the bronze right through; and with a thud he fell; but Atreus，son 
Menelaus dragged the corpse from among the Trojans into the throng of (his) comrades [TOV pa KARA 
((oaTfjpa pdA.e ^avOoc; Mevi入ao(； di^avta (p6(3ov6£, 6idTTp6 5e xa入K6V 爸入aaa£. SounriaEv 6e rreacbv-
dxap ATpei6r|(； Mevt入aoc; VEKPOV UTTEK Tpcotov epuaev |i£TA £0vo(； etaipajv]. 
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(Hector struck Aias but failed to touch his flesh) And Hector was angry as the 
swift shaft fall vainly from his hand, and he retreat back again towards the 
throng of his comrades, avoiding Ker (the fate of death). 
X^CJATO 6 ‘ "EKTTOP, OTTI pd o�（3认0(； COKU etcbaiov EKCPUYE £^ip6(；, a\J/ 6，etdpcov 
£i<; £6vo(； exd(£To Kfjp' dXeeivcuv. 
Homer, Iliad.. XIV，406-408 
And Hector went back again into the throng of men, being afraid... 
"EKTCOP 6，AUTIC; eSuaeto oi3入A|idv dvSpwv TAP(3qaa(；... 
Homer, Iliad: XX, 379-380 
Although retreating back into the throng was seen as an action of cowardice/^ it was 
still necessary for rescuing one's own life when he was in distinctive danger. The aforemen-
tioned cases have delineated how infantry in the back of the battlefield would aid the horse-
men; but most importantly, they also illustrate the core difference in the ways of war between 
infantry and horseman - to fight as a whole and as an individual respectively. Although those 
great heroes mounted in chariots occasionally would fight in company of few, their identity 
was individualistic and their fighting method was never conducted in a sense of group fight-
ing; however, in great contrary, the fighting style of infantry was highly adhered to the 
grouping of people, homilos (6|iiXo(；, a throng of people) and ethnos (e0vo(；, a group of people 
accustomed together, a company). Moreover, this throng of infantrymen was not merely a 
crowd of unorganized foot soldiers, staying at the back of the battlefield without any kind of 
formation. 
Apparently, the majority of the armed force of infantry was maintained in formation 
called phalanges ((paXaYyec;, ranks)". Of course it is not appropriate for us to pose an identi-
cal meaning between this of Homeric Age and that of Archaic, but somehow this phalanges 
shows many parallel concepts between the infantry warfare of Homeric Age and the hoplite 
46 See also (Horn. II., 8.94): where (or why) are you fleeing with your back turned, like a coward in the 
throng [TTfi (peuyEK； |i£Ta vwra |3a入cbv kukoc; (ic; iv 6[it入(p;]? 
47 Phalanges ( c p d 入 i s the plural form of phalanx ((p(iXcryO, a rank. It appears in Homer and also 
Hesiod usually in plural form, to refer to ranks of people. Its usage is different from that of Archaic 
authors like Thucydides and Xenophon, which directly refers to the ideology of hoplite warfare. 
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warfare of Archaic Greece. 
And then on both sides the two Aiantes had stood their mighty battalions 
{phalanges), which neither Ares might find fault of entering, nor Athene, the 
rouser of armies; for they who were the best chosen from the Trojans and god-
like Hector, fencing spear with spear, pressing shield close with shield; shield 
pressed hard on shield, helmet on helmet, and man on man; and the bright 
horse-hair crest helmets touched the ridges (of others) as they moved the heads, 
close that they had stood by each other, and spears in bold hands had over-
lapped as they were brandishing; and their minds were thinking straight, and 
they were eager to fight. 
a|i(pi 6 ' dp' Ai'avTQc; 6oioi)(； laxavTo (p(i入cryYe^ ； Kapxepai, ac; oi3T' dv K£V 'Apriq 
ovoaa iTo |_I£T£X6(BV oi^xe K' A0r|va[R| Xaoooooc,- oT ^ctp dpiaxoi KpivBevxec; 
Tp(i)dc; "te Kar'EKTopa 6iov £|ii|ivov, (ppd^avT£(； 66pu 6ovpi , adKO(； adKci Ttpo-
6e入心livcp- danlc; dp ' daTtiS‘ £pei6e, Kopuc; Kopuv, dvepa 6 ' dvqp- \(/aijov 6 ' ITTTT-
6K0|i0i K6pu6£c; Xai^ TTpoiai (p(i入oim VEUOVTCOV, COC; TTUKVOI ecpeaTaaav (kXXi^ -
Xoiaiv，48 ey^ea TiTuaaovTo Spaaeidcov ctTto xeip^JV a£L6|i£v'- o[ 6' iOuq (ppo-
v£ov , | i£ | i aaav 6e | idx£a9ai . 
Homer, Iliad: XIII, 126-135 
Then at that time the close battalions {phalanges) of Danaans moved continual-
ly without cease into battle; and each of the leaders commanded to their own 
(men); and the others were marching in silence, you may say that neither they 
who followed in such mass of men have sound in their breast, all in silence 
fearing their commanders; and on every man the inlaid arms shinned, which 
they marched clad with. 
&Q, TOT' ETiaaauTepai Aavcuiv KIVUVTO CPCI入CRYYE^； VCOXEJIECOC; 7X6入EJIOVSE- K^VEUE 
6e oia iv £KaaTo<; f)Y£|^6va)v- oi 5 ’ dWo i dKf]v I'aav, oi)5£ k£ (pa[T](； x o a a o v 入 a d v 
£T[ea0cu £XOVT' EV ATT]0£aiv auSi^v, aiyfj 6ei6i6i:£(； ARN a^vTopac;- djicpl 5£ Tidai 
Teuxea TTOIK【入’ e入a|_i7Te, r a £i|i£voi eoTixotuvTo. 
Homer, Iliad: IV，427-432 
The two Aiantes and the Trojans had lined their phalanges in such a close formation, 
48 The exact wording of "darrlc; dp' da7Ti6' epeiSe, Kopuc; Kopuv, civepa 6 ' civqp- v|/ai5ov 6 ' iTTKOKOiioi 
KopuGec;入ajiTTpoTm cpcidoiai veuovTtov, cbc; HUKVOI ecpeaTaaav di入AY|Xoujiv (shield pressed hard on shield, 
helmet on helmet, and man on man; and the bright horse-hair crest helmets touched the ridges of others 
as they moved the heads, close that they had stood by each other)" appears also in (Horn. //.’ 
16.215-217). 
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which not even the god and goddess of war could have entered into them, and as their shield 
was serried to form a line of rigid infantry front, they could plausibly repulse whatever form 
of assault of their enemies. The extra emphasis of the rigid arrangement of the shields 
parallels the most fundamental idea of the phalanx formation, in which one's shield was able 
to protect his own left and the unprotected right of the one on his left. Moreover, the marching 
of Danaans reveals that the infantry was usually grouped in well rigid formation, even during 
time without battle. It may suggest that the array of such rigid formation would definitely cost 
much time to do so or else it was needless for them to retain their formation for vigilance. 
And during the din of battle, the formation would even be strengthened, lined in an even 
closer formation.49 This kind of primitive phalanges apparently fought in groups. 
But when he (Hector) encountered the close battalions (phalanges), then he set 
as he drew very close (to them); and the sons of the Achaeans opposed him, 
piercing with swords and double-pointed spears, and thrust (him) back from 
them. 
aA-X' 0T£ 6fi Tii)Kivf)<; evEKupae (paXay^i atf] pa |id\' oi 6 ' dvTioi 
i)i£c; Axaitov vuaaovtec ; ^icpemv Te Kal eyxsc iv (i|i(pry心oimv (Laav dTto acpeitov-
Homer, Iliad: XIII, 145-148 
Being very similar to the case of Aias, what Hector encountered in the ship of Achaeans 
were a throng of soldiers in close formation, like a tower (TTupyriSov) as Hector himself com-
mented. Of course the weapons used were not unique as the hoplite of Archaic Period, the 
idea of forming ranks as the modus operandi of warfare is illustrated efficiently by these nar-
rations. And because the infantrymen were likely to fight in a close formation, the breaking of 
the lines was remarkably catastrophic that it would drive the entire army into chaos and rout. 
Therefore, an epithet of Achilles, breaker of ranks (prj^qvcop)^', had received special attention 
as it was critical in shaping the situation of battle. In this sense, destroying of battalions and 
49 See (Horn.//., 11.214-215; 12.415-416; 13.126-135; 16.563). 
5�（Horn.//.，13.152). 
See (Horn. //., 13.324; 16.146). 
4 3 
lines became a straight indication of a rout," and usually could neither be stopped until a new 
battalion was formed. 
The fighting mechanism of these Homeric phalanges was in a similar fashion as that of 
the Archaic hoplite warfare, in which two opposing force of phalanges crushed together and 
fought in close melee. 
Then when they had reached going into one place, as the same time they dashed 
together the ox-hide shield, and with spears and the courage of bronze-mailed 
men; and they studded shields filled each another, and much din had aroused. 
OL 6 ' 6T£ 5T] P ' £ ( ； x&pov £VA ^uviovtec; IKOVTO, auv p' £(3aXov pivouc;, ai)v 6' 
eyx^ci Kal [ieve' dvSptuv xciXKeoGcopi^ Ktov- dxap daTtiSet; 6|_i(paX6£aaai ETtXrivt ‘ 
( ! 1 入 入 ! ^ 入 ] " | ( 7 1 ， 7 1 0 入 心 ( ； 6 ’ 
Homer, Iliad: VIII, 60-63 
Ebalon (£(3a入ov), from balld (|3(i入入co)，in here of course does not really mean that the 
belligerents were throwing out their shields; but instead as the record later states that "the 
studded shields filled each other (doTri6£(； oficpaXoeaaai err入rjVT’（i入入nm),，’ the assaults of 
the fighting were initiated by pressing forwards their shield of each side. This account of figh-
ting in Homer's verses depicts a scene not altered from our conception of classical hoplite 
fighting. At least from the above comprehensions of the Homeric Warfare, the Archaic War-
fare of hoplite and rigid phalanx formation was hardly said to be a new invention as we could 
observe that the practices of warfare were evolving with the Greek civilization. 
The way of war in the Homeric Warfare was doubtlessly in the process of transition. On 
one hand, heroes were audacious in their personal fighting. They mounted themselves on the 
chariots, fighting dreadfully with others of their own class and trampling over opponent's in-
fantry formation as to create better situation of the whole army. But on the other hand, the in-
fantry, which was irreplaceable in the warfare, fought in ground against whatever enemy they 
were going to encounter. The Homeric infantry warfare was inspiring to the Archaic Greeks, 
52 See (Horn. II., 8.273-279; 11.90-91, 143-148, 503; 15.448-449; 16.394-398; 19.151-152). 
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and by apparently 700 BCE, infantry became the prelimilary unit of army and thereafter had 
dominated the western military culture for more than a millennium until feudal knights con-
trolled the scenery. 
The Idea of Warfare 
Warfare, the most fundamental form of human conflict, which is almost as old as hu-
man civilization, has been the comer stone of human history. It is neither peripheral of history, 
which commemorates only a minority of the human culture and society, nor something of un-
importance, which rarely gave inspirations to the world. Therefore, the study of the history of 
warfare is not merely a study of warfare itself yet in much extent a plenteous survey of the 
history; consequentially military history is more intricate that purely a science exploiting the 
history by modem ideology of rational sense. So saying, practices of Greek Warfare interlock-
ed with the core beliefs of the Greeks themselves. The idea of warfare, in this sense, incorpor-
ates both ideological and technical dimensions of Greek Warfare. 
The Homeric Warfare illustrates the organic development of Greek Warfare and it arous-
es our interest of inquiring its root and role in the contemporary Greek environment. The 
Homeric Warfare was the prototype of the Archaic Greek Warfare, and it had rendered the 
cultural root of pre-historical Greece into a new form of being, which bridged the Heroic Per-
iod and Classical Period. Although the practices of the Heroic Warfare, including weaponry, 
style of combat, and chariot fighting, were mostly abandoned in later time, essences of Heroic 
Warfare were not distinct but were indeed preserved in a sound place of the battlefields. But if 
we must tell the major ideological difference of the Heroic Warfare and the Archaic Warfare, 
then it would be the rising recognition of being in a group than being a single person, in order 
words, the idea of warfare was changing from accomplishing individual glory to fulfilling and 
protecting the common benefits of those accustomed together. 
Nothing will be more essential than asking the purposes of warfare while we are going 
to comprehend the idea of Greek Warfare, which was originated from neither noble, nor moral 
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concurrence of the society, but instead from the desire of the few, a class of warriors who 
were eager to have war on behalf of their own profit and fortune. It is especially well explain-
ed by the Trojan War, which Agamemnon, leading a crowd of Greek soldiers crossing the 
Aegean, and nominally for his brother's sake, besieged the city of Illios. Homer, by the mouth 
of Achilles, questions, "but why must the Argives (have to) fight with the Trojans? And why 
an army has he led gathered here, son of Atreus? Was it not for the sake of the fair-haired 
Helen?，，53 But of course, no matter how beautiful Helen was, to wage an enormous war like 
this, the fruit of triumph was much more palatable, as to encourage the combatants to gamble 
their life in the dreadful field of Ares. 
(Nestor): O friends, Danaan warriors, attendants of Ares, let not anyone now 
stay behind desiring for the spoils, so that he might come upon the ships 
carrying great (spoils), but we should slay men; and then at ease you can strip 
off the corpses died over the plain. 
(I) cp【入oi ”pa)e(； Aavaoi, 0£pd7TovT£(； 'Apr|0(；, TK; VUV £vdpa)v erupa入入6[i£V0(； 
(IET:67Tia6£ |ai[IV6TC0，ox; K8 TT入doTct (p£pcov £TTI v f j aq i'KR|Tai, av5pa< ; KTEIVO)-
[iev. eTTeixa 6e KCXI t d 泛 K r | 入 m v£Kpo心c; d|i 7T£6IOV cJuXi^creTe T£0vr|(i)Tac;. 
Homer, Iliad: VI, 66-71 
For the Argives, although Achilles, Menelaus, and Diomedes had dominated the killing 
zone, and were the heroes of war by their audacity, old Nester, being extraordinarily out-
standing for his acquaintance of the nature of warfare, was the only one of the Argive side 
who could be said as a general. Homer intends to tell us through Nestor that the common pur-
pose of waging war — questing for fortune in the battlefield by ransacking the weapons and 
armors from the dead corpses, by vandalizing the cities, and, as shown in some other accounts 
as aforementioned, by extorting the captive for ransoms. Ransacking the corpse and its be-
longings was almost an emblem of Homeric Warfare, and therefore, personal accomplishment 
of an hero included honor, in both term of reputation which he can harangue for and of fort-
“ ( H o r n . II., 9.337-339): [TI 6e 6ei TTO入£|II(e|J£VAI Tpcbeaaiv Apyeiouc;； TI 5e Xaby DVPYAYEV £v6d6' 
DYEIPCIC; AxpaSric;; F) OI)x'EAivr|(； EVEK' QUKOFIOIO;]. 
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une by which he can enjoy a superior materialistic life. The ancient Greek army in this fashion 
was nothing related to the concept of professional military war machine, but it was as organic 
as the nature and a kind of "organized robbery" as raised by McNeill.^^ In addition to this, 
laos (Xadq), the common Greek word for an army in Homer's epics, refers nothing to 
professionals but to a group of people who were temporarily assembled. Seemingly, the major 
purpose of the ancient Greek Warfare was plundering the opponents; however, even given that 
this judgment was correct for the side which initiates the offensive battle, for those of the def-
ensive side, they were forced to be embroiled in war and the purpose of having battle was 
strictly differed from this idea. 
And on the other hand the Trojans had armed themselves throughout the city, 
(though) fewer, but even so they were eager for battle, to fight through need and 
necessity, for the children and for the women (wives). 
Tpci)£(； 5' au0' ei:£pcu0£"V dva TTT6入iv 6TTXL(OVTO, TTaupoxepoi- ^EI^aaav 8k Kal (!)(； 
UAFIIVI | IDX£A0AI XP£IOI DVAYKAIR], Ttpo TE TTai6iov Kal rrpo ^DVAIKTIJV. 
Homer, Iliad.. VIII，55-57 
Hector: "But fight on the ships in throngs; and which of you hurled or thrust, let 
him go for death and fate, and die; not unseemly for him to die defending his 
patria; but his wife safe and his children after him, and the house and the lot of 
land unharmed, if the Achaeans depart with their ships to their dear native land." 
(i入入& HdxeoB ‘ in\ vr|ualv dto入Aie(；. oq K£V u|i£a)v fje TUTidq Gdva-
TOV Kal TTOTfiOV £TT[(JTTf|，TeGvCtTO)- OU Ol dteiKEC； d|iUVO[ieVCp Ttepl TTdTpr|C； T£0vd-
dtAA’ dXoxoc; T£ aor] Kal TTQISEC; OTTiaao), KQI OIKOC; KQI KXfjpoc;^ ^ ctKi^ paToc;, ei 
K£v Axaioi oi'xcovTaL auv vr|ual (pi入qv ec, TraTpi6a yaiav. 
Homer, Iliad-. XV, 494-499 
To the Trojans, being the preys of the warfare, protecting their tenements and chattels, as 
well as their family, and also their dear patria were of the importance that was second to no-
54 William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000, 
2. 
55 Kleros (k入fif)0(；) in here should refer to a share of land as accounted by Lycurgus dividing the Spar-
tan land into lots {kleroi, K入fjpoi), (Plut. Lyc., 7.3). 
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thing. In the contrary to the Argives, rather than stripping off the armors of the corpses, the 
Trojans were mostly eager to defend the place which they were living, resisting the force of 
opponents from sacking the city, mining all their possessions; Homer states that it was chreioi 
(xpeioi) and anagcaie (dvayKaiTi), of need and necessity. 
As Hector had urged, it is so worthy for ones to die for their patria; and in this sense, 
having war and battle was no longer merely a method which pursued for gaining and the 
battlefield was not just a place where men won glory, but, instead of personal, warfare was of 
the shared benefit of a group of people, the ethnos (eGvoc;). The idea of warfare of Homeric 
Period was undergoing a momentous change, which had transferred the heroic segment of 
pre-historic to the communal recognition of the era which poleis were dominating in Greece. 
This change did not solely rooted in the defending side of the war, but it certainly had influ-
enced even the offensive side. 
(Nestor): "O friends, be men, and put shame in your heart before other people, 
and remind yourselves, each of you, of children and wife, and of properties and 
parents (or ancestors), both who are alive and who had died; for the sake of 
those from distant I beseech (you) not to stop from presenting with might, nor to 
turn back in fight." 
cb 9[入01’ dvepec; ea t e , Kal aiSd) 0eo0 ' evl 0u|icp SAAtov dvOptoTicuv, em 68 [ivi^a-
aaGe EKAATOC; naiSwv T]6' dXoxcov Kal KTI^AIOC; TOKT^COV, i]|I£v ORECO (cbouai 
Kal cp KaTaT£0vT]Kaai- tujv ijTiep £v9d5 ‘ eytb Y0uvd(0|iai oi) TiapeovTcuv eordjie-
vai Kpatepox;, |af)6£ TptuTTdaBe cpopovSe. 
Homer, Iliad: XV，661-666 
Again, Nestor of Gerenia demonstrates a similar situation of boasting moral as the Troj-
an's. The example of the saying of Nestor proves how essential was such emphasis of ethnic 
consideration in the battle, for not even the fruit of plundering the possessions of the enemies 
would encourage the those fleeing to have enough valor in standing against the opponents. 
War ethos, thus, had indeed played as the prime driving element in this grand transformation 
of the idea of warfare. To start examining what was the war ethos that played in such a role 
48 
and how it had done so, we must explore the heroic sentiment on the idea of warfare For the 
Heroic Warfare, personal valor was the elementary course of warfare. Surely, we are not in-
formed by any technical evidence on how valor and courage of man would influence his "per-
formance" and fate in the battlefield, by at least we should be aware that the Greeks them-
selves resolutely believed in the symbiosis of valor and battlefield performance. Homer re-
ports quiet frequently for heroes boasting the moral of their comrades by asking them to be 
aneres (dvepec;), men, and also courageous in Greek;^^ and he once also reports that the Troj-
ans were "conquered by (their) feebleness (dva\K£(r|ai 6a|i廷vtec;).”，？ From these accounts, we 
might know that manliness and valor in fighting determined the outcome of battle, while it 
was a shame for those who retreated or did not fight bravely.^^ But the quality of valor is 
somehow individual, and not everyone of the army could acquire audacious and valiant heart 
like Achilles and other heroes in the Homeric epics; and moreover even those with such heart 
could be a trouble bothering the whole, as the battle was not an affair of one but the entire 
group. 
He (Nestor) arrayed the horsemen (charioteers) in the front with their horses and 
chariots, and in behind (or at the rear) the foot soldiers, many and brave, to be a 
fortress of battle; but the cowards he drew into the middle, and so, even being 
unwilling, anyone would fight of necessity. Then the charioteers he then 
commanded first (to charge); for he ordered them not to entangle their horses in 
the throng. 
iHTTfja(； (i£v 7Tpd)Ta ai)v iTTTToioiv KcTi oxeacpi, TT£(ou(； 5' e^ oTTiGe axfjaEv TTO入eac; T£ 
Kal EA0入O心(；，epKOc; EFIEV TTO入由|ioio. KQKOUC; 6' iq jiiooov 爸入 a a a e v ， o c p p a KQI OI)K 
入TOV TIC； DVAYKAIT] TTO入 iTrrreuaiv (IEV TTptbr' ETRETEXXETO- TOI)(； YAP dvtb-
yei a(pouc; I'TTTTOUC; |ir|6£ K入ov£f:o0ai [入cp-
Homer, Iliad: IV, 297-302 
Nestor, being alert of the possible consequence of personal action without consideration 
56 See (Horn. II. 5.529; 15.561, 661) 
“ S e e (Horn. //., 6.74). 
58 See (Horn. II., 5.529-532, 787-790; 8.228-232; 15.561-564, 661-666). 
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of the whole, commanded the Argive army, "neither let anyone, believing in (his) horseman-
ship and valor, be eager to fight with the Trojans alone in the front of others, nor let he retreat; 
for you will be the feebler."^^ Additionally, he made as well an arrangement of the army, 
which, by putting those inferior cowards in the middle, could enforce the whole army to fight 
in better capacity. Therefore, unless someone was like Achilles which could influence the ent-
ire battlefield on alone, the ability of balancing the whole force of arms seemed to be more 
important than the personal a b i l i t y . T h e Homeric Warfare verily reflects that the idea of 
Greek Warfare was shifting the concern of warfare from individual quality of a general benefit 
of the combatants, and, thus, means and essences of the heroic sentiment of warfare were ex-
panded to a synchronic enhancement of each one of the army. The above have comprehended 
how the defense of personal possession was essential in Homeric Warfare, and this eagerness 
of protecting and defending the patria and family gave a solemn and noble reason for those 
combatants in melee. But, besides this, kinship was also one significant force to drive the 
warriors into dreadful fight. 
(Euphorbus): "Now indeed, Menelaus nurtured by Zeus, very surely you will 
pay for my brother (Hyperenor)^' who you slew, and harangue to boast over, 
and you made his wife a widow in the new chamber, and set accursed sorrow 
and grief on his parents." 
vi3v |iev 6f|, MeveXae 6ioTp£(p£(；, FJ 入A xeiaeic; yvcoTov £|i6v, TOV ertecpvec;, erre-
uXO|i£voc; 6' dyopeuEic;, x^ptocrac; 5k yuvaiKa [iuxv 0ciAd|ioio v£oio, dppriTov 
(dpriTov)^^ 58 T0K£i3cTi yoov Kal TT£V0O(； £0riKa(；. 
Homer, Iliad.. XVII, 34-38 
(Horn. //., 4.303-305): [|IR|6£ TIC; I7T7TOCRV)VI;| T£ Kal i^VOPERICPI TTETTOIBWC; oioq npoaO' &入Xorv |I£|IDTCO 
Tpcbeaai [idxecrSai, |ir|6' dvaxtopeiTci)- di入cmaSvbTepoi ydp eaeaSg]. 
60 There is a case that the Argive army makes an exchange of equipment for the common benefit, see 
(Horn., II., 14.381-382): and going through all people they exchanged their equipment of war; then one 
stripped o f f the good for the good one, and one gave the bad to the bad one [oixo|^ £voi 6 ' STTI navTac; 
DPI^IA REUXE‘ a [IEI (3ov eoOXa (iev eaOXoc; E5UV£，XEPEICI 6e XELPOVI Socncev]. 
61 See (Horn.//., 14.516). 
62 It is noted by Murray. A. T. Murray ed. and trans., Iliad, Vol. II, LCL 171 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1999)，231. 
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Brotherhood indeed offered a proper reason for vengeance, however it did not mean 
only that in the Homeric Warfare, for the concern of brotherhood not only cared for one's dea-
th, but also for one's life. Similarly, defending the corpses of comrades was equally eminent 
as revenging. In this sense, it is not astonishing for us to notice that the death of Patroclus had 
thus aroused a din of fighting between the Argives and the Trojans around his corpse.^^ Since 
kinship was so pre-eminent in raising the spirit of the warriors and to encourage them to give 
their full strength in battle, it was as a result being incorporated into the modus operandi of 
warfare. 
(Nestor): "Separate the men into tribes, into clans, Agamemnon, so that clan 
may aid clan and tribes tribes. If you do so, and if the Achaeans obey you, you 
will know then which of the leaders is coward and also which of the men, and 
who is brave; for they will fight for themselves." 
Kpiv' dv6pa(； Kata cpD入a64’ Kara (ppi^Tpac;，AydiiEfivov, cbq (ppi^ xpri (ppT]Tpr|(piv 
apnyri'中入A 6 8 (pi)Aoi(；. ei bi KEV (be, EP^I^C; KCD TOI RREIGCOVTCU AXAIOI, YVCBARI 
e7T£I0' OQ 0’ QYEJIOVTOV KQKOC; bo, re vu 入a d r v , fi6' oc; K' icT0入dc; £F |M. KUTCI acpeac; 
ydp |iax£OVTai-
Homer, Iliad: II, 362-366 
Nestor has so advised Agamemnon to array the army in a fashion that could well employ 
the advantage of kinship in battle. By the above accounts, we can witness the change of the 
idea of warfare in Homeric Warfare, which had transformed the heroic segment to the later 
Greek essences. 
From all those we have studied in this chapter, we can have a much better understanding 
on the pre-historic Greek Warfare. One must notice the profound meaning of the interlocking 
relationship behind the Greek way of war as it was the significant point of conceiving the evo-
lution of the entire Greek idea of warfare. Through scrutinizing the Homeric epics, a vivid ac-
count of the inception of the Archaic hoplite warfare is revealed to us by these ancient texts. 
63 For the defense of the corpse of Patroclus, see (Horn. / / .， 1 6 . 5 6 5 . 5 6 6 ; 17.3-8, 120-122). 
64 For the definition cpii入a, plural from of cpO入ov, see also cpi^ Xi^  of Plutarch, (Plut. Lyc., 6.2). 
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In large extent, the war ethos did not change ideologically and indeed was reinvented so to be 
incorporated in the new style of fighting, which emphasized unity instead of individual. 
Somehow, conception and spiritual beliefs over centuries are not easy to remove from those 
being accustomed to them, and what the Greeks demonstrate to modem people is the ability to 
regenerate the old customs and beliefs in a new practical form of being. 
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Chapter III 
The Emergence of the Greek Way 
Then in every way it is clear to me that Cambyses was greatly mad; else 
he would not put his hand to deride the religion and custom. For if any-
one propose, ordering all men to choose the best customs out of all 
customs, after they have taken examination, each man would take his 
own; each one hold that his own custom to be in much the best. 
Herodotus, Histories: III，38 
The Hoplite Warfare and the Greek Essences 
The previous chapter has depicted the ancient warfare culture of Greece since her High 
Bronze Age to the Age of Homer. With the fall of Mycenaean civilization and the beginning 
of Dorian invasion, the horsemen-oriented military culture had come to an end by the 
century BCE; in response to this, the infantry mass of the army had gradually acquired the 
main position of the army. To replace the deteriorating horsemen-based military system and 
its modus operandi, an improved method of organizing infantry into effective formation, 
which could give them strength in encountering horsemen in melee, was shaped. Aristotle apt-
ly describes the change in his Politics: 
And the first form of polity that came into being after the kings among the 
Greeks [were] of the war-waging [men], for the war had strength and eminence 
in the horsemen, for without organization the use of hoplite is useless, and the 
experience and formation dealing with such had not begun in the ancient time, 
so strength to be in the horsemen, but as the poleis growing and heavy 
armouring becoming stronger, more could share a greater part in the polity. 
Kal r] TTpcoTri 5 e TTO入nrela £v TOI<; "EX\r|aiv eyeveTo |_i£Td xdc; (3amXeiac; ek t c i v 
710入£|iOl3vTCOV，f) (a£V 巧S T(i)V ITTTTEIUV tflV yap【(7}(心V KQI Tf]V UTTepOX^V £V 
TOT(； iTTTTei3aiv 6 TT6入£|iO(； £ixev, dveu [i£v ydp auvTct^ewc; dxpriaxov TO 6TT入 ITIKSV， 
ai 8k TTEpl Td)V TOlOUTtOV £|iTT£ipiai KQI td^eiC； £V TOl(； CipxaiOK； Ol)X UTtfjpXOV, OJax' 
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ev TOIQ iTTTTEuaiv elvai xfiv LAXUV, au^avo|I£vtov 6 E T(I)V 7X6入ECOV KCTI T(I)V EV TOIC; 
diT入0L(； laxuadvTcov [idi入入ov TT入£iou(； [iereixov tfjc; no入iT£[a(； 
Aristotle, Politics: IV，1297b. 16-24 
Aristotle in his comment ascribes the changing of military culture to the growing of pol-
eis and the development of the heavily-armed infantrymen; for he believes well-organized and 
armed infantrymen had gradually replaced the horsemen aristocracy in Mycenaean Period -
as he uses polemountdn (tto入ej^ oCvTcov), war-waging men, to represent the group of profess-
ional soldiers, who had held the upper level of the society and were trained to fought as 
charioteers in combats. These heavily-armed infantrymen are recognized as "hoplites." The 
word is originated from the Greek lexicon hoplites (onXiTric;) - literally meaning armed men; 
and this word comes from another Greek word hoplon (^inXov), which refers to armament. 
Apparently starting from the century BCE, more able farmers in ancient Greece started to 
arm themselves with bronze armaments and iron pointed crushing spear to fight in infantry 
formation; henceforth, the Greeks of Archaic Period had themselves fully adapted to this 
method of fighting until they were finally conquered by Romans. 
It is memorable for the entire hoplite warfare of Archaic Greece that it had a symbiosis 
with the infantry formation recognized as phalanx (cpci入cry� which originally refers to "rank" 
or "line" in Greek. The notion of phalanx formation in Greece was indeed a rectangular 
formation, in which infantrymen were lined orderly in perfect ranks and files, normally in 8 
ranks with 12 files. Infantrymen in such formation would arm themselves in full panoply of 
bronze, including the gyala\ the body armor, the horsehair-crested helmet, greaves, and most 
importantly the big infantry round shield with wooden heart, usually 1 meter in diameter, and 
meanwhile they would have the iron-pointed crushing spear and the short dagger for assault 
weapons. During battle, each hoplite in the formation would point his crushing spear towards 
his front and with his round shield on his left hand, protecting his own left and also the 
‘ S e e chapter II, n. 26. 
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unprotected right hand of whom in his left, and then he would advance towards the enemies 
and crush into their line; if triumph be possible, the formation would destroy the enemy line 
and drive them to retreat. The Greek notion of hoplite warfare was to arrange the hoplites in 
the phalanx formation orderly, and these heavy infantrymen, initially in the country of Greece, 
were to encounter with enemies from other Greek poleis, who were armed and organized in 
an almost homogeneous fashion. When the phalanx was advancing into the enemy phalanx, 
the front of the formation would crush with the enemy just like the collision of two giant 
bronze cubes. Usually the hoplites in the first three ranks would start to crush the enemy by 
their crushing spears, and synchronically they would push forward their shields making press-
ure to the front of their enemy; while the rest of the infantrymen would try hardly to push the 
front ranks and they would have prepared to fill in the vacancy in the front of the file if there 
would be any caused by casualty. 
This modus operandi of heavily-armed infantry formation and the hoplite warfare were 
new, yet, not completely new to the Archaic Greek poleis. Infantry was the most ancient form 
of soldiery and its development had already been evolving since the earliest phrase of human 
civilization. As early as the time of the civilization of Mesopotamia, infantry depicted in the 
famous "Stele of the Vultures" had already been grouped into rigid formation in fighting, so 
as to optimize their advantage of number. For the case of ancient Greece, we have witnessed 
how the Homeric epics have illustrated the Heroic Warfare in the previous chapter, and from 
which we could notice the function of infantry in battle and its indispensable role in fighting. 
The changing of the choice of military unit in Archaic Greece was, therefore, not completely 
an invention, but instead an evolution of the Greek essences in warfare, i.e., a reinvention of 
ancient customs that the war ethos was hence transferred and thus preserved in another 
practical form of being in military operations. 
It is somehow arguable that the emergence of hoplite warfare was a technological revol-
ution, as the dramatic improvement in metallurgy enabled the ancient blacksmiths to craft 
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armaments which were able to endure the attacks of missile and other kinds of melee weapons 
and also body-fitting so that the agility of the warriors would not be hindered. Doubtlessly, 
this statement could illustrate the groundwork and prerequisite of the emergence of hoplite 
warfare; however, inspired by the narrations in Homeric epics, one could with ease observe 
the cultural influence upon such emergence; and if after scrutinizing. 
After the great epics of Homer, we are left with too little written sources for a compre-
hensive study of the early Archaic Greek military culture. The situation gets better by the gift 
of Herodotus, which allow modem scholars to have a better understanding of the Greek mili-
tary culture in the early 5th century BCE through the outbreak of the Greco-Persian Wars. This 
chapter will discuss the importance of these wars in the development of ancient Greek 
military culture. The hoplite-phalanx warfare had been prevailing for three centuries at the 
beginning of the 5th century BCE, which means that the ancient Greeks were already been 
used to such fashion of heavy infantry battles. By this time, essences of ancient military cult-
ure were preserved, yet, in new practical forms, in which various practical military customs 
were established. 
In the aspect of military ethos, the Greeks have been consecrated to maintain a sentiment 
of warlike ethos in their literature. Tyrtaeus gives us a brilliant account of such ethnic of war: 
Doing mighty deeds let him leam to fight, and let him, who has a shield, not stand 
outside [the range] of missiles. But rather everyone should come close and let him 
strike the enemy with long spear or sword; and also, standing leg to leg, pressing 
shield against shield, crest to crest, helmet to helmet, and breast to breast, let him 
fight against a man, seizing the hilt of his sword or long spear. You, O light armed 
men, crouching behind a shield on either side, let fly with huge rocks and hurl 
your smooth javelins at them, standing close to those in full armor. 
ep6a)v 6' 6(3pi|ia epya SiSaaKeaBoo no入e|aU|£IV，[ir|6' EKTOC; peXecov eaxaTco darriS' 
ex⑴V，（k入入dt TIC； eyyuc; iiov auxoaxeSov e-yx i^ [iaKpcu f] ^icpei oi)Td(tov Sqiov dv6p' 
e入£Tco, Kal TToSa Trap TTOSI Gelc; Kal en dani6o(； dan [ 6 ' epeiaac;, £v 5k 入 b c p o v xe 入6-
(po) KQi Kuver|v Kuv£f| Kal a tepvov axepvto i r e n 入 d v 5 p l |iaxea0ai, t^  ^icpeoc; 
Ktbnrjv T] 66pD [iaKpov e入tbv. urjeiq to yurivfiTec;, un' ctaTTiSoc; SAAoSrv dX入oc; 
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TTTcbaaovT£<; [iEyaXoK； PcidXeTe xep^iaSbic; 6oT3paai r e ^eaToiaiv dKovTi(ovT£(； kq 
auToi)c;, Toiai TravbTio入oicriv tt入r|a(ov iaTd|ievoi. 
Tyrtaeus, Fragment 11 
Ancient Greeks, especially the Spartans, who were entirely educated by the sense of 
honor and were living in a way tougher than any other Greeks, had a remarkable passion for 
glory and a stupendous resentment to cowardliness. To the Greeks, to find a level ground and 
then to have a combat of heavy infantry was an honorable and righteous deed to solve any 
dispute. On the other hand, reliance on the usage of archers and missilery troops was consid-
ered as an exposure of cowardliness and lack of integrity. In ancient Greece, the enforcement 
of such war ethos was preeminent in an educational level so as to nourish the sentiment of the 
pursuit of glory; but such war ethos was only esteemed in much sense an ideological level 
with little reference to lawful enactment. Plato, in his discussion in Laws, states "the usages of 
laws around us (in Crete) and those in Lacedaemon are made wholly the effort to those things 
[wars].，，2 His report on the laws concerning warfare suggests that most part of ancient Greece, 
despite Sparta and Crete reported by Clinias, did not have enactment of corresponding laws, 
or customs by the ancient Greek synonymy, for rendering the local society into any kind of 
warlike state. 
Therefore, the warlike ethos of ancient Greece was too fragile to be said as the whole of 
the ancient Greek military culture - at least it was only literally presented as the high-aloft 
goal to enhance the morale of heavily-armed soldiers, so that they could incorporate them-
selves into the formation fighting of phalanx. Practically, we know that nearly every polis in 
the Archaic Period, with only a few exceptions like Sparta, was incapable to have a standing 
army, described as polemountdn by Aristotle. The transformation of military practice between 
Bronze Age and Archaic Period marked a shifting of focus in the ideology of warfare 一 from 
aristocratic horsemen to citizenry infantry - but it had not made any great impact upon the 
2 (Plat. Laws, 628E): [nap' QFIIV v6[II|ia KQI eti xa nepl AaK£6ai|.iova (.irj Tidaav TF]v aTT0u5f]v TOUTCOV 
£V£Ka TTETTOiqrai]. 
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traditional essence of war ethos, which had been organic to the development of ancient Greek 
society since prehistoric. 
The war ethos of ancient Greece was developing in a two fold path. Its sentiment was 
warlike in nature, making it favorable for extending the prehistoric belligerent idiosyncrasy 
into the Archaic Period; but in another perspective, its practical form had changed in order to 
provide a suitable groundwork for the transformation of the primitive society into the Archaic 
society. To the ancient Greeks during in the Archaic Period, it was just convenient for them to 
make use of the antique traditions in their own contemporary situation - they found that it was 
perfectly fine in maintaining a new form of military practice. 
On the other hand, starting from the 6th century BCE, Greece had been increasingly en-
gaged in the communication, including trading and military conflicts, with foreign civilizat-
ions including Persia, Egypt, and Lydia, which in result nourished the sentiment of self-
recognition. Herodotus, though accused by Plutarch of his Hellenocentric sentiment and his 
inaccuracy in accounting some facts, indeed demonstrates to us an interesting scenery, in 
which the realm of Greece was emphasized and also the realm of barbarians in opposition was 
firstly defined. In military practices, the foreign fashions of waging warfare were mostly 
astonishing to the Greeks of that time; Herodotus often arduously spends much of his effort in 
narrating different equipments and fashions of warfare of other foreign tribes. The encounter-
ing between Greeks and foreigners provided an exogenous platform for the Greeks them-
selves to revise their own military practices, which for the last few centuries were mainly in-
fluenced by endogenous elements. 
Therefore, inspiration was not only on practical dimension, but indeed also being cult-
ural; the triumphs in the battles of Persian Wars provided groundwork for the emergence of 
the concept of Greek way of war. Hellenocentrism thus became the core value of the Greek 
philosophy, and, by the experience of the Persian Warfare, primitive war ethos in Homeric 
Age was reinvented into a general shared value among the Greeks, despite to which polis they 
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belonged. The quotation of Herodotus in the beginning of this chapter points to us the core 
intrinsic value of the ancient Greeks, and probably of all other nations - the self-conceited 
sentiment in culture. We have proofs from different cultures in distinctive parts of the world 
that cultural consciousness of any cultural system could overcome various exogenous impacts 
and would develop an evolved form of local socio-economic environment, which is incorpor-
ated in the merged cultural value. It would be fruitful when we explore the modernization of 
countries in the Far East, especially China and Japan, as they have shown strong sentiment of 
cultural consciousness towards the upcoming challenges of Western civilization and the pro-
cess of Westernization. 
In her first step of modernization, the Self-strengthening Movement, the Qing govern-
ment proclaimed to adopt a new policy which was aimed to learn from the West only techno-
logically but never culturally. Although proven a failure in the Sino-Japanese War, the process 
of modernization of China have been influenced by such philosophy, and the preservation of 
Chinese culture indeed continues to be a major concentration of the cultural policy of Chinese 
government, especially during the decades after the Cultural Revolution. On the experience of 
Japan, she demonstrates even better the ideology of cultural consciousness. The Meiji Restor-
ation on the one hand promoted severe Westernization and degraded the traditional samurai 
cultural, however, on another hand, it redirected the national sentiment back to the Emperor, 
Tennou, by re-establishing the emphasis of the relationship between the Emperor and the 
national religion Shintou^ ； therefore retained her national consciousness in the form of Em-
peror-worshipping. Misfortunately, this consciousness was being exploited to nourish the 
affection of xenophobia towards Western countries, and hence, be used as the chief machine 
of driving militarism during WWII. 
3 The power of Japanese Emperor, Tennou, was originated in religion. The Emperors claimed a link-
age with the goddess, Amaterasu Oomikami (天照大神），and traditionally they are considered living 
gods and called O oka mi, the great god. The lexicon of politics in Japanese,政，pronounced as malsii-
rigoto, linguistically is based on the concept of "the affair of worshipping (祭事).” 
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Cultural identity and consciousness, as Herodotus points out to us, has been a main tool 
to differentiate individual cultures from each other. Since the beginning of Archaic Period, the 
ancient Greeks had devoted themselves to invent and then to strengthen the virtue of the 
Greek ethos by differentiating their own Hellenic culture from any other civilization in the 
known world. Although we should put considerable notification on the difference in meaning 
of the Greek barbaros ((3dp(3apoO and the modem English "barbarian", many ancient Greek 
philosophers, for instances Plato in his Republic and Aristotle in his Politics, demonstrates the 
ethnical particularity and superiority of Hellenic culture.* Such belief in the ethnical parti-
cularity and superiority of Hellenic culture hence induced the ancient Greeks to believe they 
were superior to the barbarians and the uncivilized East. It is not surprising that Alexander 
was influenced by his teacher on the dignity of Hellenic culture, and, therefore, "to educate 
the barbarian" then became a noble aim of his anabasis to India. 
The idiosyncratic Greek way of war thence had been noticed as collective consciousness 
among the Greeks and produced a realm of military ethos which had been actively differenti-
ating its own being and alien traditions. Owing to such collective consciousness, the essences 
of Greek military culture were able to be preserved in an outstanding uniqueness during Arch-
aic Period. 
Homeric Tradition and Hoplite Warfare 
The hoplite warfare in ancient Greece was both a tactical and a technological innovate-
ion in its nature. Yet, in current circumstance, we could never say for sure which one had ever 
existed earlier and hence prompted the development of another. From the previous chapter, 
we know that during Dark Age, kinds of technology in metallurgy, including iron-casting and 
4 The original meaning of "pdp(3apo(；" merely refers to a "foreigner" instead of a "savage barbarian." 
but various sources state that a different situation. For instance, Aristotle, recording Euripides" Iphi-
genia in Aulis, reports the belief that slave and barbarian are the same in nature (Aristot. Pol. 1252b). 
Also, Gruen has also worked on the ancient Greek identity and relationship with the "barbarian," Erich 
S. Gruen, "Greeks and Non-Greeks", in Glenn R. Bugh ed. The Cambridge Companion to the 
Hellenistic World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 295-314. 
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improvement in bronze curving, had been developing; and these advancements created the 
fundamental groundwork of hoplite infantrymen, who had armed themselves with bulky 
bronze armaments and iron-pointed crushing spear. With these changes, the "shield bearers" 
(aspistai, damaTaO often used by Homer had gradually replaced by the new vocabulary hop-
lite, literally meaning "armed men" {hoplitai, 67T入[TCU) in usage. It is quite possible that the 
ancient Greeks could maintain their land force in a fashion of infantry monopoly, with super-
ior defensive power towards missiles and endurance in melee, only gifted by the aforesaid ad-
vancements. The sentiment of warfare, which emphasized the spirit of group fighting instead 
of individual audacity, had been gradually developing starting properly from Bronze Age, be-
ing analogous to what Homer delineates. In another perspective, it might be also persuasive 
for us to believe that it was not the advancements in metallurgy which enabled the hoplite 
warfare but instead these advancements only acted as strengthening factor to the well-
developed practice of infantry formation warfare. 
First of all, in the technological dimension, the emergence of the hoplite warfare in the 
beginning of Archaic Period was gifted by the growing communication and trading among 
Greece and other regions. To go further into the question of the technological issue of hoplite 
warfare, we should also keep an eye on the development of military industry in ancient 
Greece. Apart from the spear point, the majority of metal works for the hoplite panoply was 
made by bronze, an alloy of copper and tin; but, unfortunately, both metals for making bronze 
are never native to Greece and were neither easily accessible for ancient Greeks. The natural 
constraint in metal resources had made the essential materials for arm producing extremely 
relying on imported goods - though iron could be found in the Balkan, both copper and tin for 
making bronze were imported from remote areas. Copper should have been traditionally 
imported from Cyprus or Asia mainland, the nearest copper mines to Greece. Herodotus says 
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that "for I hold that from the Egyptians the shield and the helmet reached the Greeks."^ This 
occasional statement might hints, though not very clearly, that the early metallurgy in copper 
and bronze was imported accompanied with the metal itself. As for tin, it was even a harder 
labor for ancient Greeks to get it because it is well known that southern England has been the 
only major tin producing area in the whole Europe. Herodotus says that in the most western 
part of Europe there are the islands Kassiterides (KaaaiT£pi5£(；), literally the tin-islands, 
where the ancient Greeks got the supply of tin. 6 
Since the hoplite warfare demanded a sustainable supply of bronze weaponry, it was 
necessary for the ancient Greeks to have enough supply of copper and tin in the military 
industry. Nevertheless, as highlighted above, copper and tin mines in Greece peninsular was 
by no means sufficient to supply the metallurgy industry, and so the only solution to the de-
mand of metals was to import from overseas. The geographical condition of Greece was a 
two-bladed sword - thought bound by limited resources, Greece was able to develop into a 
pre-eminent trading civilization only because by her maritime location. The ancient Greeks 
were well known as "seafaring men," stated by Thucydides, just like the Carthaginians later 
in the Roman Period; and accompanied with the flourishing sea trading, colonization had 
started to grow in ancient Greece. The earliest account for the colonization of Greeks was 
properly the Ionian cities, as the lonians themselves had claimed; and from archaeological 
discovery, we know that they had begun to colonize coastal areas around the Mediterranean 
Sea, reaching far as Libya, Southern Italy, Southern Spain, and even the Black Sea, since the 
8th century BCE. Many Greeks traveled a long distance to establish trading colony named as 
emporia (£|iTT6pia), which is derived from the meaning of exchange and trading. Indeed, the 
Greeks had begun to have long distant trades as early as prehistoric period and the flourish-
ing commercial activities by all means were favorable to the gathering of materials for metal-
5 (Hdt., 4 . 1 8 0 ) : [CITTO y a p AiyuTTTOU Kcd Tfjv doTiiSa Kai TO Kpdvoc; (prmi d m x 6 a i ec; TO心C;'王入XTiva(；]. 
6 See (Hdt., 3.115). 
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lurgy and military industry. For an instance, Corinth, the mother-city of many Greek 
colonies^, was the paramount center of military industry in ancient Greece, having the style 
of helmet by her name. It was obvious that there was a strong co-relationship between 
colonization and the military industry in Greece. 
Advancement in the protective armament had liberated the fashion of Greek warfare 
from the single combat in the Heroic Age to the hoplite fighting in Archaic Greece. It was 
likely that single combats which often appeared in Homeric epics were the way to show cou-
rage and bravery, but it was properly related to other more concrete reason because courage 
could also be shown in group fighting like hoplite phalanx battles. One more reasonable app-
roach to explain the necessity of single combat is that instead of massive military conflicts, 
single combat could reduce the casualty of warfare to a minimum scale. Warfare is, by nature, 
a way to solve human conflict; and it is no longer necessary for any warfare if the conflict 
which caused it had been solved, in whatever manner. McNeill has given us inspirations by 
pinpointing how the population pressure had influenced the outbreak of the two World Wars;^ 
and it is the counter way to believe that the ancient Greeks, for the sake to preserve their 
limited population, had to have the aristocratic warfare which based on individualism as the 
way to solve conflict, i.e., the modus operandi of warfare. 
Yet improvement in metallurgy and the introduction of various advanced armament had 
changed the situation by giving superior protection to the armed citizenry farmers who were 
basically untrained, so that they might safeguard their own lives in the battlefield. Organized 
in the phalanx formation, these armed hoplites could also offer extra protection to those in the 
back and left, thus resulted in a remarkably low casualty. The rise of the polis sovereignties in 
ancient Greece had made the competition into perplexity and the hoplite phalanx fashion of 
7 See A.J. Graham, Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1964)’ 118-153. 
8 William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 308-317. ‘ 
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fighting allowed each individual polis to raise a larger supply of armed force while restricting 
the casualty so that even frequent warfare would make little hindrance to the socio-economic 
operation of the ancient Greek poleis 勺 
Greece is a hilly peninsular, and the relief of ancient Greece does not vary much from 
the modem terrain. But the natural constraints of Greece seemed contradictory to the hoplite 
battle, which required an open flat land for the combat of two opposing hoplite phalanges. 
However, thinking this way is no less than a misunderstanding on the nature of warfare. 
Firstly, it should be well noted that, in military sense, light troops which are specialized in 
fighting as skirmishers and are well adapted in extreme terrains indeed requires much extra 
efforts in training. Especially in ancient Greece, light troops were highly demanding for 
specific training in using their assault weapons, mainly missile weapons including bow and 
arrow, javelin, and sling, and by the meantime also for the tactical training in acting as skirm-
ishers in battlefield. Most of the ancient Greeks were farmers left untrained and would only 
arm themselves during the occasion of warfare. Therefore, to these Greeks, the most conven-
ient modus operandi of fighting was strictly to find an open ground and to reduce the oppon-
ents to fleeing in a quickest time. 
And more importantly, the confirmation of mustering a superior armed land force during 
wars was inevitable to every Greek polis because most of the ancient Greeks were mainly 
farmers who relied themselves heavily on land. Therefore, it would be lifting ourselves out-
side the whole picture of the history circumstance if we argue that it was not reasonable to 
develope the heavily armed hoplite in ancient Greece. Although the essential parts of a polis, 
including the acropolis, the agora, temples, and other major buildings, could be safeguarded 
by a fortified stone wall, farmlands and yards were bare and venerable to enemies' attack. To 
those farmers, protecting their property, land, and crops was emotionally and practically more 
9 The average mortality of the victorious side is about 5% of their original force, and that of the 
defeated side is about 14%. Peter Krentz, "The Nature of Hoplite Battle,” in Classical Antiquin\ Vol. 4. 
No. 1 (1985), 50-61. ‘ 
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vital to any tactical consideration. On one hand, it was quite sure that hoplite infantry could 
not chase up light troops, yet, it is well illustrated by Xenophon's Anabasis that it was neither 
possible for light troops to defeat phalanx of hoplites on alone, nor even with the assistance of 
light cavalry, owing to the endurance of the full infantry panoply. It was obvious that reliance 
on hoplite infantry could offer the most authentic measure to protect the well beings of the 
citizens - that the same fashion of hoplite formation was thus prevailingly used by all Greek 
poleis starting from early Archaic, despite whatever kinds of tradition and custom they did 
have. 
Not only technologically but socio-economically, the rise of the kind of sovereign called 
as polis in Archaic Greece had created a suitable environment for the notion of hoplite infan-
try. The population of ancient Greece was never plenteous - normally each polis had several 
hundreds to thousands of citizens, and even Athens at her peak did have only 35,000 of 
c i t i zens 10- and consequentially, the burden of maintaining a regular force would be exceed-
ingly heavy for any individual polis to bear. The burden of military service, hence, was distri-
buted in the principle of maximizing quantity, which meant enforced conscription of every 
male adult citizen inter anna in the circumstance of ancient Greece. Although different poleis 
would have their own systems of military services, there was a general behavior that the 
majority of citizens would fought in the battlefield, usually without regular drilling except the 
Doric Spartans, during the time of warfare. 
Based on this ideology, every male adult citizen was supposed to join military service 
when necessary and he was responsible for his own provision of warfare, including weapons, 
food, and logistic. Solon's division of the four classes of wealth suggests to us that the situat-
ion of military conscription: 1) pentakosiomedimnoi (TT£VTaKomo[i£5i|ivoi) and 2) hippeis 
(iTTTTelc;), the upper classes of the state who, supposed by their names, could provide them-
Christian Meier, Robert Kimber & Rita Kimber trans., Athens: A Portrait of the City hi Its Golden 
Age (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1998), 38. 
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selves with more splendid equipments and horses; 3) zeugitai ((euYixai), the middle class of 
the state who could arm themselves with heavy panoply of bronze and fought in the rank of 
phalanx as hoplite; 4) thetes (0fjT£c;), who were the less-provided and might only fought as 
assisting skirmishers in battles. Among these four classes, the third class of zeugitai formed 
the principal section of ancient Greek army — horsemen were by no means effective in ancient 
Greek battlefields, and, therefore, infantry forms had become the stronghold of land force. 
Synchronically, the advancement in metallurgy and the flourishing of sea-affair had favored 
the development of heavy armor for infantry, which had strengthened the power of infantry-
men and had given rise to the superiority of the hoplite fashion of heavy infantry in Archaic 
Greece. 
In early Archaic Period, classic hoplite battle did not require considerable auxiliary units 
such as light infantry, cavalry, and siege weapons. The majority of the hoplite came from the 
relatively well-born middle class land owners. These yeomen, if we are allowed to adopt this 
medieval term, would work busily on their farms in the winter when they were engaged by 
agricultural activities and prepared to prey enemies' farmlands or to defend their own ones 
during summer when they could leave their land. The hoplite phalanx battle originally was 
not raised as a war machine for the expense of any polis, but rather it was a primitive form of 
military tradition emerging with the economic backgrounds of the ancient Greece. Although 
we could say that the hoplite warfare was primitive in term of military tactics, it was the most 
effective and advanced modus operandi, given the circumstances of the ancient Greece; and 
the high mobilization effectiveness of hoplite was at all means effective in mitigating the bur-
den of war. 
In this sense, the practice of hoplite warfare was just suitable to what the ancient Greeks 
demanded. The nature of the hoplite infantry was highly citizenry as they were analogous to 
the polity of polis, with its socio-economic background. The reliance on aristocratic polemou-
ntdn, i.e., the horsemen and charioteers depicted in Homeric epics, was decaying properly 
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starting from Dark Age, and, by early Archaic, able citizens with merging identity of soldier 
and farmer had begun to dominate the battlefield. The hoplite infantry then became the com-
mon fashion of waging warfare for many Greek poleis, especially those in Attica and Pelop-
onnese which were under similar condition and environment. These poleis had been used to 
the same fashion of hoplite experience and gradually accustomed to such way of waging war, 
by which two or even more belligerents would muster phalanges of hoplites and would crush 
toward enemy in rigid formation until the other side were finally collapsed in formation and 
forced to flee. As it was citizenry, the hoplite infantry thus had a high affiliation with the 
concept of polis\ and this affiliation made the hoplite warfare more vivid to the ancient Greek 
society. 
In such manner, the resentment towards enforced conscription was seasoned by the 
sentiment of home-protecting, and the lack of proper drilling was alleviated by the military 
ethos. In the previous chapter, we leam that the Greek war ethos was evolving from empha-
sizing personal glory and courage towards the collaboration in group. We could consider such 
war ethos as the prologue and inception of hoplite fashion of warfare, and more importantly it 
nonetheless had significantly influenced the effectiveness of maintain the untrained hosts of 
heavily armed infantrymen. And this war ethos was the fundamental engine behind the whole 
concept of hoplite warfare as it enabled and reinforced the notion of hoplite warfare, both 
emotionally and operationally. 
The war ethos of ancient Greece was a tradition which had been successively evolving 
plausibly since the very beginning of warfare itself. If we are discussing about military ethos 
which, generally, is a collective idea on enhancing the actually performance of soldiers, it is 
appropriate for us to believe that it should be promoting warlike sentiment and, on the oppo-
site side, mitigating the resentment towards dreadful wars. With this purpose, it is understand-
able that war ethos would usually emphasize the courage and valor in battlefield so as to 
optimize the potential power of individuals in fighting and then overcoming the natural fright 
6 7 
towards the black fate of thanatos. This kind of military ethos is now considered as militari-
istic and inhuman, and be the cradle of extreme forms of philosophy and polity, yet, it was the 
essential value of not only Greeks but also many other peoples who found themselves unpre-
ventable of engaging into warfare, some actively and others passively. We know that death is 
fearful, and many famous myths and fables in every comer of the world stress this fright by 
telling the pursuits of everlasting life by many persons, like the Sumerian Gilgamesh and the 
Chinese Qin Shi-huang (秦始皇）；owing to this, commanders must search for a way to op-
press the psychological panic of soldiers, persuading them to hold themselves firm in the 
killing fields, and in advance to amplify their eagerness of killing. 
The ancient Greek war ethos was such ordinary in this sense - it shaped the fundamental 
concept of warlike culture of ancient Greeks with prosperous depictions on manly valor, en-
nobling the process of killing and dreadful death. From the very beginning of our available 
textual accounts, we know that the Greek authors were constructing an atmosphere in which 
audacity of heroes was topped to a supreme level, only little behind the divine power. But, if 
the Greek war ethos was only in this manner, then it would be no such worthy for any special 
attention. Even the figures of Achilles, Hector, and many other bold-hearted heroes in Homer 
are unique, but the praising of them was no less than a common behavior of any warlike cult-
ure. This praising was seen in almost every culture that abundant pieces of literature have put 
an eye on. However, the ancient Greek war ethos was not a just machine for achieving the 
goal of military success; it was not crafted, but it was indigenous to the Greek history, the 
land, the people, and the culture. The war ethos of ancient Greece was part of the develop-
ment of military culture and practice - it was symbiotic to the actually military practice, and 
the both have reciprocal relationship to the transformation of each other. 
In the previous chapter, we have studied how the concept of modus operandi of warfare 
was transforming in Late Bronze Age. The rising awareness of the potential of multitude had 
started to replace the elite warring professionals; and, in response, the war ethos had to incor-
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porate one new element, which itself was buoyed from the emphasis of the group. We have 
not much written resources to study the uprising of such new element after Homer, but, at 
least, we could judge it surely that it had undergone a positive process during early Archaic. 
Its development was a parallel symbiosis to the hoplite warfare which we have discussed 
above; and it had consolidated the hoplite ideology from cultural and psychological dimens-
ion. 
But one be manly not because of necessity, but because [it is] noble. 
6£I 5k ov 6r AVDYKRIV dvSpeiov eivai, diAA’ OTI KCX入(!rv. 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics: 1116b 
Aristotle concludes the nature of "courage" in this simple sentence by quoting his anci-
ent writer Tyrtaeus, by whom the notion of warfare is ennobled and delineated plenteously as 
the ideal place of manhood. Tyrtaeus, a pro-Sparta poet, is the most outstanding figure repre-
senting the early stage of the idealization of warfare of ancient Greeks in the historical period. 
This laud of manliness shows that the ancient Greeks had, in this stage, developed the primit-
ive form of rationalization of warfare, which, by shifting quality of courage from mere secu-
lar obligation to the realm of virtue, had rendered the sentiment and passion of warfare into a 
new form. The poet also writes to stimulate the sense of virtue in warfare: 
It is a noble thing for a brave man to fall fighting among the front rank, doing 
battle for his fatherland let us fight with spirit for this land and let us die for 
our children, no longer sparing our lives. O young men, fight shoulder to should-
er and do not begin shameful flight or be afraid; but make your heart great and 
brave, but do not be in love with your life when you are fighting; do not abandon 
or run away from elders, whose knees are no longer nimble, men revered. It is a 
disgrace for an old man to fall fighting in the van and lie there in front of the you-
ng men, his hair white and his beard gray, breathing out his brave soul in the dust 
and holding his bloody genitals — this is a shame and brings indignation to be-
hold - his body naked. But for the young man, while he has the bloom of youth; 
while alive, men marvel at the sight of him and women feel desire, and when he 
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has fallen among the front ranks, he is fair. Come, let everyone stand with legs set 
well apart and both feet fixed firmly on the ground, biting his lip with his teeth. 
T£0v(!i[i£vcu y a p KaXov evl Trpo|idxoiai Tteaovra dv6p ' dyaBov rrepl fl naTpiSi ^lap-
v(ifievov’……Qv\x(b 你 rrepi Tf jaSe [iaxcb[i£0a Kai rrepl [iaiScov 0vT](;Kco|i£v \|/uxecov 
lirjKeTi (peiSo^ievoi. d) veoi, &入入^1 |idx£a9£ Ttap' &入A Y ]入 o i m |iEvovT£<;, firiSe (puyfjc; 
aiaxpfjc; apxere |ir|6£ cpoPou, (i入AA [ieyav TToieiaBe Kai dXKifiov ev cppeal 6u|i6v, 
|ir|6£ 9p(piA.o\|/ux£iT' dvSpctai |aapvd|ievoi- t o u a 5k TtaXaiotepouc;, (Lv oi)K£Ti 
youva t ' £Xa(pp(i，^f] Kcnra入djiovTec; (peuyeTe, Touq yepaiouc;. aiaxpov yap Sf] TO-
UTO, [i£Td TTpo[_idxoiai TteaovTa KEIOGQI TipoaGe VECOV dvSpa Tta入auyrepov, FJ6R| 
XEGKOV EXOVTA Kdpr| npo入i6v re yevEiov, 0ufi6v DTTOTIVEIOVT' &入 K i j i o v ev Kovirj, 
aif^aTOEVT' a l So i a cp(入aic; ev x^p^^lv exovxa - aicrxpa Tct y' 6(p0aA|ioT(； Kai v£|i£ar|-
Tov iSeiv - Kccl xpo a Y0|iva)0£VTa- v£oia i 6e Tiavr' £7T£oik£v, 6(pp' epaTfjc; f](3r|c; 
dyXadv dvBoc; exn, dv6pda i jiev 0r|r|T6<; iSeiv, £paT6<; Se ^BvaiCi Ca)6(； eojv, ica入 
5 ’ £v 7ipo|idxoLat Tieacbv. ( i 入 T K ; ev 5ia^aq jieveTO) TTOC;IV d|i(poTepoiai atripi-
X0£ic； enl yfjc;, x^i^oc; oSoua i 6aKcbv. 
Tyrtaeus, Fragment 10 
The above two paragraphs have shown how the concept of courage had been changing 
during early Archaic. In the concept of ancient Greece, anagke (dvayKri) is a kind of consen-
sus created between the nature, the gods, and the human, and having been created with a vast 
base, it is given the nature of inalterable because the thwarting or breaking down of this rule 
would be chaotic - in brief, the meaning of anagke is forced acceptance. But the Greeks add-
ed upon this forced acceptance the idea of virtue, which itself was not forced but an imple-
mentation of beauty and righteousness, a much deeper intrinsic consciousness than just 
extrinsic enforcement; and thus the sense of shame had enriched the concept of courage. The 
virtue of warfare was a two-fold concept - one to encourage the sentiment of manly valor by 
positive reinforcement; one to discourage the action of unmanliness through the emphasis of 
the sense of shame - both sides shaping the essence of Greek war ethos. But, this character-
istic was not the only side of Greek war ethos. Apart from ennobling the virtue of courage in 
warfare, amplifying it vertically, the Greeks had also widened the scope of this sentiment of 
courage, expanding it horizontally. 
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We have acquaintance with the individualism in Homeric warfare that personal accomp-
lishment was the core value and ethic guiding the nature of warfare. However, accompanied 
with the rising of hoplite warfare, the heroic tradition had been decaying because, though 
being excellent in rendering cowardice into valor and boosting morale, it could not satisfy the 
demand generated by the new modus operandi in hoplite warfare. As aforesaid, the strength 
of hoplite, putting aside the advancement in the armament, was on the phalanx formation, 
which had an inseparable relationship with the notion of group fighting. Introduced as a react-
ion to the warfare ideology of the Heroic Age, the hoplite warfare bore a distinctive modus 
operandi comparing to the notion of antibios machomai, which itself was conducted through 
one-to-one challenge. 
When someone asked why they visited [the Spartans] disgrace those among them 
who abandoned their shields but not those who abandoned their breastplates or 
helmets, he said, "because these they put on for their own sakes but the shield for 
the common good of the whole line." 
'EpcoTi^ aavToc; xivoc; 6ia ti TOUC; [lev tdc; daniSac; nap' autoic; (inopa入(WTCIC; dti-
[louai, Toi)c; 6E xd Kpdvr) KQI TOUC; ScopaKac; OUKETI, OTI, ecprj，"xauTa [i£v eautcBv 
Xdpiv 7TepiTi0£VTai, Tfjv 5i darTiSa tfjc; Koivfjc; TQ^ ECOC; evEKa." 
Plutarch, Moralia: 220A 
The record of Plutarch is memorable in revealing this nature of hoplite infantrymen by 
putting attention on their shields. The Spartan practice of disgracing "those who abandoned 
their shields but not those who abandoned their breastplates or helmets" suggests how essent-
ial was the spirit of group fighting superior to individual strength - the round shield of hoplite 
was not only used to protect his very self, but also, by its design, to protect another person. In 
this case, personal accomplishment and safety was subjected to the common glory of the 
entire army; therefore, the war ethos did not only focus on how a single warrior should do in 
the battlefield for his own sake, but instead how each warrior should contribute to the group 
in order to achieve a common benefit. Under such atmosphere, individualism was oppressed 
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in the Archaic military ideology and, in response, collaborationism in fighting was esteemed. 
Demaratus: "And truly it is with the Lacedaemonians, fighting alone they are 
worse than no one, and together the best men of all. For they being free but are not 
totally free; for law is their master, which they stand awe of much more than your 
men to you. The proof is that they do what their law bids; and its bidding is ever 
the same - not to flee being the mass of men from the battle, but remain at [their] 
post, to conquer or to die." 
&<; Se Kal AaK£6ai|a6vioi Kara |i£v eva |iax6|a£voi oi)6a|id)v eiai KaKiovec; dv6pd)v, 
(iAi£(； 8k dp i a t o i dvSpcov dTtavTcuv. S入ei36epoi yap eovrec; oi) TidvTa e入e\30epoi £’id. 
£TT£cnri -ydp acpi 6£aTT6Tr|(； v6|ioc;, T O V I)7To6£I|iaivouai no入入(：^ E T I [ ID入入OV F] oi aol a£. 
TTOieuai ywv la dv EKETVOC; dvcoyri- dvibyEi 8k TcbuTo aiei, OTJK ewv (peuyeiv ouSev 
TT入fjSoc; dv0pd)7Ta)v £K [^^^ ！^^’ 入入 & |i£vovTa(； £v Tfj Td^i eTTiKpateeiv T] CITTO-
AAua6ai. 
Herodotus, Histories: VII, 104 
The speech of Demaratus to Xerxes does not show only that the Spartans were militar-
ily superior but also demonstrates how distinctive were the Spartans fighting together. The 
practice of hoplite warfare in phalanx formation had regulated, or even we could say that it 
had constrained, the role of individual participants in the formation, making them to sacrifice 
their own identity and inclinations and be agglomerated into a unit. This created the most fun-
damental ground for organizing and strengthening the phalanx formation and thus we should 
acknowledge that the most essential element of hoplite warfare was how to maintain everyone 
in the formation in their own post, as illustrated by Demaratus. The role of an individual hop-
lite was simply to remain at his post, advancing together with his comrades, holding his spear 
hardly pointing his enemies and shield tightly for the sake of himself and the man in his left. 
And moreover, practically speaking, group or formation formed by close kinsmen would 
definitely offer psychological comfort to soften war panic and nerve to soldiers, and also it 
could optimize the coherent force among the rankers in the phalanx formation, supposing that 
each man knows each other well. The coherent or the cohesive force within the formation was 
the essential spirit of maintaining the line as it was the only power to repulse collision from 
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opposing army. This statement is well illustrated even in the Persian Wars that Herodotus 
reports "the Greeks were arraying according to battle order and people, and each of them were 
fighting in turns"" in the Battle of Thermopylae 480 BCE, showing how important was 
kinship in classical Greek war ethos. 
Under this circumstance, the scope of courage was expanded from personal to the com-
mon sentiment of the whole group. It would not be laborious for us to relate this kind of war 
ethos in actual warfare — the collaboration of peers and the tight formation would boost the 
morale of the entire phalanx so that even cowards would be forced to advance bravely with 
his comrades, holding his shield firm so as to maintain the whole line. 
The evolution of Greek war ethos during early Archaic had interlocking and reciprocal 
relationship with the military practice of hoplite warfare. The advancement of technology in 
metallurgy and the development of the polity of poleis had provided favorable condition for 
the rapid development of infantry in warfare so as to replace the chariot-aristocratic dominat-
ion of pre-historical period. Unlike hero with chariot, infantry was in mass and thus had to be 
organized in order to optimize their strength in warfare. The modus operandi of hoplites and 
phalanx formation hence provided a suitable solution to the new rising infantry warfare that it 
ensured even untrained farmers could fight probably in the mass of infantry inter arm a and 
also increased the effectiveness in the organization of infantry mass. On the other hand, the 
war ethos had been changing to satisfy the new fashion of mass infantry warfare that it had 
expanded the sentiment of courage vertically that it ennobled courage and more importantly 
horizontally that it rendered personal valor to the collaborative form. The Greek war ethos of 
early Archaic was sculptured by the rising of hoplite warfare and later it had become the main 
driving machine of Greek ideology of warfare and in return had inspired military practices. 
The Spartan war ethos as depicted by the above comments of Plutarch and Herodotus is 
‘‘(Hdt., 7.212): [oi SfE入入R|V£(； Kara td^ic; TE KQI Kaxa e6vea K£Koa|ir||I£voi qaav, Kal ev [.igpei EKaaxoi 
£|idxOVTo]. 
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the milestone of such evolution. Embodied in the form of nomos^^, it represents a very strict 
enforcement of war ethos which later transformed as the element of discipline had then been 
the essence of the whole of Classical Period. The Spartan fashion of war ethic was surely not 
an oddity as it, which have put courage and discipline the paramount of all kinds of virtue, 
had been the esteemed stereotype of the entire Greek war ethos; thus, although no individual 
polis had followed the governmental and social system, nor the extraordinary disciplined mili-
tary training of Sparta, all those called themselves Hellenes were seeking for the similar kind 
of war ethos as it was mostly appropriate for the situation of Archaic Greece. 
Encountering the Foreigners 
Being the most effective and reasonable way to resolve warfare question, the hoplite 
fashion of infantry organization had been repeatedly practiced, making itself the dominating 
idea among the Greek Peninsular. Such absence of stimulation outside had nourished the mak-
ing of hoplite warfare as the paradigm and sole tradition of military manipulation, to which 
the Greeks had accustomed. We could say that the hoplite tradition of Archaic Greece was a 
monopoly of infantry mass as the war machine, and its development in the early period, from 
the S'h to the 6* century BCE, had been undergoing a process of endogenous consolidation, 
having not the presence of major interference of exogenous elements. The Greek fashion of 
warfare, therefore, was a closed one. Yet, a serious of military conflicts in the century BCE 
had broken such closure and had added new inspiration to the Greek military culture. The out-
break of Greco-Persian Wars, initiated by the invasions of the Persian king Darius and his 
successor Xerxes, had caused tremendous impact on the military tradition of Greece by offer-
ing chances for this mono-fashioned tradition to experience other military variations, both 
12 The translation of nomos (vojioO into English is always complicated because, in ancient Greece, the 
concept of nomos had a different intrinsic meaning to the parallel concept of lex in Latin. In Classical 
Greek, both the concepts of "custom" and "law" are incorporated into the single word nomos and they 
have the same origins. Comparing to the Latin division of consuetudo and lex, the Greek nomos 
represents a deeper affiliation of written regulation and idiosyncratic ethos. Nomos has been later 
adopted by the Ptolemaic Dynasty of Egypt in naming local provinces and even the modern Greek 
provinces. 
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technologically and ideologically. 
Comparing to the Greek fashion of army, the Persian army was more versatile - apart 
from having infantry as the main force, it also employed a considerable portion of cavalry and 
archery. If the account of Herodotus is correct, half of the Persian army under Xerxes' com-
mand was mounted soldiers;'^ while in opposite the records of Herodotus account no appear-
ance of horsemen in the Greek army, here let alone the Boeotians, the Thessalians, and the 
Macedonians in the northern part of the Peninsular, who were under strong influence of 
nomadic life, as they either on the side of the Persians or not fighting with the Greeks for the 
defense of their freedom. Of course we can not thus argue that the Greeks in the Persian Wars 
employed completely no horsemen, nor missile troops in their army, and even other evidences 
might suggests that there were horsemen for the Greeks, but every major account, both for 
Athenians or Lacedaemonians, suggests that the horsemen have not yet played a major role in 
the Persian Wars. Even if these pieces of ancient evidence were all failing to describe the 
actual situation of ancient Greek army, they still present how infantry had dominated the 
major role of warfare in the century Greece as aforesaid. 
We could say in this way that the Persian Wars were the stage for the competition of the 
Greek fashion of warfare and the Persian one, in terms of arms and military organization; and 
thus an evaluation of the two would offer us with inspiration in exploring how the wars had 
impacted the Greeks. To begin with, the infantry masses of two sides were properly fighting 
in a similar way which was the most suitable one for foot soldiers in the contemporary world. 
We know that the Greek infantrymen were fighting as hoplites in the phalanx formation; and, 
plausibly, the Persian infantrymen would have been organized in a rigid formation in battle 
array and would have a similar modus operandi as the Greeks had. 
Herodotus mentions that the Persian infantrymen near the king armed themselves with 
13 Herodotus reports the array of the Persian army was organized in this fashion: the king at the middle, 
and around him the 1,000 spearmen of golden apple, and then the 1,000 picked horsemen, and then 
10,000 foot soldiers, and then 10,000 horsemen. (Hdt, 7.41) 
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spears which suggests that they were unlikely to fight as individuals''^ - since spear was not 
an ideal weapon for close melee especially the bearer had to reserve a hand to hold himself a 
shield, if not he would be unprotected under attack. Herodotus does not tell us anything fur-
ther about how the Persian foot soldiers had fought during the Persian Wars; and therefore, we 
have to employ evidence from archeology of Ancient Near East in order to have a clearer 
image on the Persian modus operandi of infantry. The Stele of Vultures, dated to the middle of 
the millennium BCE commemorating the victory of King Eannatum of Lagash over Umma, 
has illuminated us on the warfare tradition of infantry in ancient Mesopotamia. 
The Stele of Vultures resembles how the Sumerian infantry had fought - the infantrymen 
form a neat and tight formation and hold their battle position, pointing their spears towards 
the front and carrying their big shields of man's height. This image of infantrymen and their 
battle position resembles the Greek notion of hoplite warfare - Soden even calls this Sumer-
ian infantry formation in the Greek term phalanx.'^ Later, the drawing from the palace of the 
Assyrian warrior King Ashurbanipal at Nineveh, dated to the first half of the V^  millennium 
BCE, illustrates a similar image to that in the Stele of Vultures - it demonstrates several infan-
trymen, who are addressed as the king's guards, carrying shields tall as the Sumerian ones and 
spears taller than their own height. The archeological evidence suggests that the Persian infan-
try in the century BCE might have fought in formation analogous to the Greek hoplites in 
warfare, and, moreover, to form rigid and tight formation with walls of spears was a regular 
method for infantry to fought, withstanding the charges of cavalry and chariots and the 
volleys of missiles. 
See (Hdt. 7.41). 
15 Wolfram von Soden,. Donald G. Schley trans., The Ancient Orient: An Introduction to the Study of 
the Ancient Near East (Leominster: Gracewing, 1994), 82. 
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W 巧 Resemblance of Sumerian infantry in an-
=:二：二 l _ _ i 』 
The Greek modus operandi of infantry warfare, therefore, was not idiosyncratic inas-
much as the Greeks had fought on foot with the phalanx formation alone, but it gains its glory 
with other factors, differentiating itself with that of Persia, and other cultures. 
Aristogoras: "Now then by the gods of Hellas you should save the Ionian kins-
men from slavery. These things are easy for you to go on well; for the foreigners 
are not valiant, and you [go] into the battle you have come up the greatest of ex-
cellence, and this is the way of their battle, bows and short spears; they go into the 
battles having the anaxurides and kurbasiai^^ upon their heads. This is easy to 
overcome." 
vOv (Lv TTpoc; 0£d)v T(Irv'E入入rivicov puaaaGe'ltovac; EK 6ou\oai)vr|c; dv6pac; 6|ial|io-
va(；. EUTTETetoq bz u[itv Tauxa old T£ xtopgeiv EATI- OUT£ ^ ap oi (3dp(3apoi & 入 K I | i o i 
£iai, ij|iei(； T£ td £(； TOV 7x6入ejiov iq id [ieyiaTa dvi^KEte dpetfic; rcepi, f] re |idxr| au-
Td)v ea r l toii^Se, xo^a Kal aixi^f] (3paxea- ctva^upiSac; 6e exovxec; epxov t a i ec; Td(； 
jidxac; Kal Kup(3aaiac; ETTI r f j a i K£(pa入fjai. oi3Tco £1)tt£T££(； x£ipti^0nvai £iai. 
Herodotus, Histories: V, 49 
The persuasion of Aristogoras to ask the Spartans for helping the lonians includes two 
major superiorities of the Greeks over the Persians - 1) valor; and 2) armaments. Besides ad-
dressing the Persians as not valiant, the statement of Aristogoras also suggests that the Persi-
an infantry was consisted of mainly light-armed soldiers, who were equipped with beeches 
16 Anaxurides (dva^upiSec;) and kurbasia (Ki)p(3aaia) are Persian dressing; they refer to the kind of 
breeches and turban respectively that the Persians wore, as illustrated in many pieces of Persian art. 
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and turbans but not greaves and helmets like the Greeks. While for assault weaponry, Aristo-
goras distains the usage of bows and short spears by the Persians and obviously has a high 
recommendation to the Greek style of long spears and even the absent of properly trained 
archers. 
The reliability of the speech of Aristogoras is worth criticizing as his words are probably 
eulogy to lure the Spartans for fighting, but nonetheless, his major ideas are basically true 
although the scale might be exaggerated. Herodotus in his delineations of the battles of Ther-
mopylae and Plataea approves the comment of Aristogoras on the inferiorities of Persian inf-
antry. It is very obvious that Herodotus put specific emphasis on the length of the spears as he 
mentions that the Persians elite troop immortals "fared not greater than the Median army but 
the same, as in a narrow space, fighting and using shorter spears than the Greeks, and not hav-
ing the advantage of multitude"'^ in the Battle of Thermopylae 480 BCE, which indicates the 
spear of Greek hoplites infantry had advantage in fighting over the Persian one because of its 
length. And in the Battle of Plataea in the next year he reports that "the foreigners laid hold of 
the spears [of the Greeks], breaking them shor t , "which suggests that the Persians were be-
coming aware of the advantage of the Greek spears and so trying to break them short. 
Apart from the difference in spears, Herodotus also states how decisive armor in battle 
was by commenting on the final defeat of the Persians in Plataea. He says that "for the great-
est that has hurt them was [their] raiment being deserted of armors."'^ Comparing to the kind 
of infantry without metal helmet and greaves mentioned by Aristogoras, Herodotus in here 
even depicts the Persian infantry as bare-armed militia. But quite to the contrary, he, when 
making a full account of how different tribes under Xerxes were equipped, says that the 
17 (Hdt., 7.211): [OUSEV TtXiov ecpepovTo tfiq OTpaTifjc; Tfjc; MriSiKfjc; diAAdi td auTci, dte iv aTeivoTToptu 
te X山PV nax6|i£voi Kal 66paai (3paxDT£poiai xpetu|ievoi f] nep of'EXA.rivec;, Kal OUK exovxec; TT入 XPH-
aaaBai]. 
�8 (Hdt., 9.62): [td Yctp Sopaxa 亡 t u 入 a | i ( 3 a v 6 | i £ v o i KaxEKXwv oi pdp(3apoi]. 
19 (Hdt., 9.63): [TT入EKJTOV yap acpeac; ESF)入eeto f) ea0fic; Epr|[JO<; eouaa i^rrXiov. npoc; yap onXiTac; EOVTEC; 
YUFIVFITEC; D Y ^ V A ETTOIEUVTO]. 
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Persian and Median foot soldiers wore "on body sleeved tunics in many colors, with scale[s] 
of iron in appearance fish-like."^® The meaning of Herodotus is obscure. The possible explan-
ation to this problem is that he believes that the lepis sideree (Xertic; mSrip胡)，scale of iron, 
was not comparable to the Greek notion of hopon or hoplites in offering protection to the 
bearer. And moreover, another seeming reason to his judgment is that only a portion of the 
elite foot soldiers bore this kind of scaled tunics. Therefore, Herodotus judges that the Persian 
and Median foot soldiers were generally light-armed, or even naked in exaggeration. 
In addition to melee weapons, the Persian foot soldiers were also equipped with missile 
weapon - long bows^'. Ordinary Greek army might employ a considerable size of light troop, 
including slingers, archers, and javelin throwers, but the main force of hoplite infantry bore 
no missile weapons. The Greeks obviously despised the usage of missiles as Aristogoras de-
monstrated; but practically, the Persian missiles had done great harm to the Greeks^^ and the 
effect of missile weapons might be undermined, mainly due to the influence of Greek war 
ethos, which considered close melee as the indication of valor and missiles as unmanly. Such 
influence from the Greek war ethos does hinder us from understanding the real situation, but, 
to a great extend, the affected comments of missile weapons in Herodotus have proper gro-
und for judgment. Even the Persians could seek advantage over the Greeks in distance, but 
they inevitably have to abandon their missile weapons when they were to face the Greek hop-
lites in melee;23 while under this circumstance, the Persian light-armed infantry would no 
longer be advantageous but was definitely incomparable to the Greek hoplite infantry. 
In spite of the aspect of equipment, Aristogoras also highlights the importance of valor. 
Herodotus reports the Persian army in fighting with the Leonidas and the Greeks as "many 
20 (Hdt . , 6 .61) : [Tiepi 5t TO au) | ia KiOtovac; X£ipi6arro心(；TTOIK(入OUC;’ 入eniSoc; ai6rip£r|(； O\|/iv�X6UO£i-
6eoc;]. 
See (Hdt., 6.61). 
For example, Herodotus reports that many were slain and many more than that were wounded by the 
volleys of the Persian archers (Hdt., 9.61). 
23 Herodotus also resembles this idea as he reports that the Persians had thrown away their bows when 
they received the Lacedaemonians in melee (Hdt., 9.62). 
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human beings, but few to be men,"^^ accusing the Persian and Median flocks to be base sub-
jects to the Greeks, especially the Spartans. And he even records the Persian Artabanus praises 
the Greeks as "men to be said the best by sea and land"25 and Tigranes praises the Spartans as 
"they make contest not for wealth but for e x c e l l e n c e , b o t h being astonished by the Greek 
war ethos. However, unlike the description on armaments, there could never be a proper 
measure for manliness; alternatively, in a clearer aspect, Herodotus has illustrated the skillful-
ness of the Spartans over the Persians. For both the Battles of Thermopylae and Plataea, he, 
by comparing the Spartans and the Persians, commemorates how professional the Spartans as 
soldiers: 1) "but the Lacedaemonians fought worthy of recording, they were well-skilled dis-
playing to fight against unskilled;，’�？ and 2) "now not inferior in valor and strength were the 
Persians, but being without armor and they were unskillful and can not be liken in skill with 
their opponents, but running out from the rank in one and in tens, or in formation of greater 
and lesser, they fell into the Spartans and perished"^^ respectively. 
The records of Herodotus on the two battles aforementioned are basically for the service 
of commemorating the deeds of Sparta. Among the many poleis of ancient Greece, Sparta was 
the only one which promoted military professionalism and thus, gifted by this, the Spartans 
could be well-skilled in fighting. However, even that other Greeks might not be professional 
warriors like the Spartans, discipline of the Persian men was apparently unsatisfactory. Ac-
cording to the narrations of Herodotus, the Persians were driven into the trap of the Spartans^^ 
and had rushed out from the formation to charge their opponents disorderly.^® To have a more 
comprehensive image on the issue, we could take reference to how the Athenians had fought 
24 (Hdt., 7 . 2 1 0 ) : [OTI TTOXAOI |iev dvOpwnoi ekv, oXiyoi 6E dvSpec;]. 
(Hdt., 7 . 1 0 ) : [OI KARA GdXaaadv te dpiaxoi Kal KARA YFIV 入 E Y O V T C U eivai]. 
26 (Hdt., 8.26): [oi 01) 7T£pl xprif^ ifiTcov TOV dywva noieuvxai (iXX^ x nepi ctpexfic;]. 
27 (Hdt., 7 .211): [AaK£6ai|i6vioi 6E e^ DXOVXO D^ ITOC;入6701)，&入入A TE DKOSEIKVUFIEVOI ev OUK £7TiaTa|I£v-
oiai [idxEaSai £;^£7TiaTd|ievoi]. 
28 (Hdt., 9.62):[入riiicra [lev vuv Kal PU)|if| OI)K f^ AAOVEC; qaav oi Ilepaai, DVORR入01 SE EOVTEC; Kal npoc; 
dv£7TiaTii|IOVE(； fjaav Kal OUK 6|ioioi TOIOI evavtioioi ao(pir|v, Kpoe^aiaaovTEc; 6E KCT' eva Kal SEKQ, Kal 
TT入eijvtc; TE Kal eXctaaovEc; auaTp£(p6|IEVOI, eaertiTTTov zc, TOUC; STrapxiTiTac; KQI 6I£(p9£ipovTo]. 
See (Hdt.，7.211). 
30 See (Hdt., 9.62). 
8 0 
against Darius' army in the Battle of Marathon in 490 BCE, the expedition of Xerxes ten years 
before. 
And this arrayed them and the sacrifices became good, then the Athenians were let 
go and charged towards the foreigners in a run. There were not less than eight 
furlongs between the two armies. And the Persians, seeing them approaching in a 
run, prepared to receive them, accusing madness and total destruction upon the 
Athenians, seeing them so few and charging, without horsemen and archers. The-
se things now the foreigners imagined; and when the Athenians engaged altoget-
her the foreigners, they fought worthy of recording. For we know [they were] the 
first of all Greeks who charged the enemies in a run, and the first endured the 
Median raiment and the men clad inside; and till then, the name of the Medes was 
fear to hear the Greeks. 
cb<; 8i a(pi 6i£T£TaKTo Kal rd acpdyia eyiveTo KaXd, evBauta wc, dneiGriaav oi A6r|-
vaioi 6p6[icp I'evTo ic, TOUC; pap(3dpou(；. i^aav 8e cn:d5ioi O U K e入(iacrovec; T O |i£Taix-
|iLov auT(I)v f] OKTCO. o'l Sz riepaai opeovrec; 6p6[icp emovTac; 7Tap£aK£i)d(ovTo cbc; 
5£€6|i£voi，|^avir|v Te Tolm A0r|vaioiai £TTe(pepov Kal Trd^xu 6入£0p[r|v，opeovTEc; 
auTouc; oXiyoix; Kal TOIJTOU(； SPOFICP ETTEIYOJIEVODC;, oute ITITTOU UTRAPXCUARJC; acpi 
OI3T£ To^8i)|idTa)v. Tauxa [liv vuv oi (3dppapoi KaT£iKa(ov- A9r|vaL0i 5k endre 
dSpooi TTpoa£|ii^av toiai (3appdpoiai, £[idxovTo d^itoc;入6701). irpclrroi |i£v ydp 
'EAAi^ vcov TTdvTcov Td)v i^ i-ieic; i'6|iev 6p6|iq) iq 710入£|i[ouc; expi^aavTo, Tipd)Toi 5k dv-
EOXOVTO eaSfiTd te MriSiKfjv opeovtec; KQI TOUC; dv6pa(； TauTrjv £a0r||i£voD(；- ricoq 
6e r|v ToIai"E入入r|M Kal TO ouvojia TO MT]5IOV (P6PO(； ciKouaai. 
Herodotus, Histories: VI’ 112 
The Athenians were ordinary in fighting, leaving alone that they charged the Persians in 
a run at Marathon. The result of the battle obviously displays the triumph of Athenians, with 
the middle collapsed but the two wings overwhelming the opponents, "worthy of recording" 
(妳⑴(；入6YOU) as Herodotus described. Herodotus does not remark the Athenians as skillful 
like the Spartans; for the one of the major reason contributing to the victory was plausibly the 
armament of the soldiers. Although there is an occasional record of a Median hoplite, armed-
men,^' the majority of the Medians probably wore no metal armors but only esthes (£G0t](；), a 
certain degree of protective clothing made of leather or wool. 
31 See (Hdt., 6.117). 
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We could perceive the difference in the Greek and the Persian infantry during the early 
century BCE from the empirical evidence. The Greeks hoplites had better equipments to 
the Persian - they had longer spears so that they could attack preemptively before they were 
attacked, and they were heavily-clad with bronze armors so that they, while encountering the 
Persian light infantry, could reduce casualty and endure prolonged battles. And furthermore, 
organization and discipline of maintaining infantry formation of the Persian army were also 
questionable. Both the weaknesses of the Persian infantry were fatal in military sense. Alth-
ough the Persian infantry could press the Greek infantry by arrows, the Persian infantry mass 
in the Persian Wars could hardly be the counterpart to that of Greece in melee; i.e. the Pers-
ian infantrymen were highly venerable to attack because of their inferiority in equipments, 
and as well because of their disorder, which had made them unguarded and into riots as the 
infantry formation was decaying. 
The glory of Persian Wars was, nevertheless, not simply “victoria facilis ex difficillimis 
rebu严 like Caesar puts in his Alexandrian War, even though the Greeks could overcome 
easily the massive infantry of Persia - eupetees cheirdthenai (euTTExeec; x£ip�Qi^vai) stated by 
Aristogoras. What indeed distressed the Greeks was not the infantry but the Persian cavalry 
force. Of course the Greeks were not completely unknown to horsemanship, but the develop-
ment of usage and tactic relating to cavalry in early Archaic Greece was doubtlessly insuffi-
cient and backward, not even for smaller scale of cavalry battles. Greeks were never excellent 
riders — the charioteers of the Heroic Age were not horseback riders and even early horsemen 
were never skilled cavalry but just skirmishers; and more seriously, the Greeks of Archaic 
Period had not experienced cavalry or chariot charges for centuries since the end of the Heroic 
Age, making them maladroit in encountering horsemen. Wherefore, it is not surprising for us 
to know that horsemen had brought quite a repercussion to the Greeks, who had themselves 
already accustomed to infantry warfare. 
32 See (Caes. Alex., 77). 
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The kind of Persian horsemen was apparently light cavalry. Herodotus says that the 
Persian horsemen were equipped like the foot with some also had helmet of beaten bronze or 
iron;" in addition to these 10,000 Persians, there were also 8,000 Sagartians, who had no 
armor but were only equipped with daggers and ropes, fighting together with the main force 
of Persian cavalry. 34 The Persian horsemen were not mounted infantry, which would dis-
mount in fight, but instead they were real cavalry in military sense^^ - they would charge and 
fight on horseback. 36 Additionally, these Persian cavalrymen, at least part of them, were 
equipped with missile weapons, making them kind of cavalry archers. In the Battle of Plataea, 
Herodotus records the tactics of the Persian cavalry with vivid narrations: 1) "and when the 
horsemen encircled them [the thousand Phocian hoplites], they charged as they were going to 
slay [them], and they had drawn out the arrows as they were going to shoot;’’�？ and 2) "the 
horsemen charged, [and] preyed the whole Greek army, throwing javelins and shooting 
arrows, inasmuch as they were mounted archers and impossible to attack."^^ These accounts 
of Persian cavalry give us the fundamental concept of its characteristics and modus oper-
andi -the horsemen served in the Persian cavalry force were kind of light-armed cavalry with 
composite functions: firstly they would use volleys of missiles to and oppress and to confuse 
their opponent; and secondly, likely if there be suitable chance for crushing into the enemy's 
“ S e e (Hdt., 7.84). 
34 See (Hdt., 7.85). Herodotus puts a note that the ropes of Sagartians had the function similar to that 
used by American cowboys. 
35 The nature of the Greek horsemen had varied throughout ages. We have plenty of discussion in ch-
apter I that the charioteers in Heroic Age had characteristics of both "cavalry" and "mounted infantry." 
And in the early Archaic, hippeis also referred to the second class of Athenians in Solon's reform, as 
mentioned earlier; and it suggests that horse-riding class had emerged in early Archaic Greece. These 
early horsemen were not very active in warfare and were mainly skirmishers, who seldom did charge 
their enemy on horseback. 
The ancient Greek ideology certainly did not pay considerable attention to this later classification on 
"cavalry" and "mounted infantry." Classical Greek writers use hippeis (iHTteic;), literally the ones riding 
on horse, or even hippos (I'TTTTOC;), the animal itself, to refer to the concept of horsemen. Herodotus and 
later writers like Xenophon use also the verb hippeud (bTTT£i3co)’ to serve as horsemen, to present the 
notion of horsemen. 
36 See (Hdt., 5.63; 6.29; 9.20, 22). 
37 (Hdt., 9.18): [oi SE ITTTTEEC; enei ACPEAC; EKUKXCBAAVTO, ETTT^ 入auvov D)(； DTTOXEOVTEC;, KCTL 6f) SIETEIVOVTO 
Tdt (3圣入£01 (be; don^aovTSc;]. 
38 (Hdt., 9.49): [(b(； 6e ETTT^入aaav oi innoTai, E Q I V O V T O Ttdaav Tfjv aTpaTir]v Tf)v'E入入R|viKf]"v £aaK0VTi(-
ovTEc; T£ Kal To^ ETJovxec; iboxz iTtTTOTo^ oTai T£ EovTEc; KCIL Kpoa(p£p£a6ai dnopoi]. 
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formation, they would charge on horseback. 
The frequent accounts of the Persian horsemen are the best illustration to how these 
horsemen had threatened the Greeks and also inspired the writer to commemorate them. 
Ancient horsemen were definitely superior to their foot counterparts owing to the strength of 
the horse, which on one hand would give speed and on the other hand advantageous elevation 
to the rider. Riders on horseback had high mobility, making them able to participate in more 
tactical variations like skirmishing, flank or rear attack, and reconnoitering, which could hard-
ly be conducted by the mobility of infantry; and furthermore, they could charge the enemy 
with the aid of the inertia generated by running horses, which by all means outclassed that of 
running men. Moreover, riders on horseback also had a better elevation than infantry and thus 
they could attack the foot with advantage. Not quite later after the Persian Wars, Xenophon 
writes in his the Art of Horsemanship stating that "as to harm the opponents, we command the 
saber rather than the sword; for with the aid of lofty position, being upon the horse, the saber 
[is] better than the thrust of the s w o r d . T h i s recommendation illustrates how the horseman 
was able to use the advantage from elevation to attack the infantry with saber. 
Cavalry force had played an active and significant role in battlefield of early Archaic 
Period. The horsemen were powerful weapon to deal with the Greek infantry, even the infan-
trymen were heavily-clad with armors. 
Artybius rode the horse trained to fight against hoplite in rearing up 
Onesilus: "I leam the horse of Artybius [is] reared up fighting and to conquer with 
kicks and bites against whom it would attack." 
f^ 入al)V£ 6e iTTTTov 6 ApxujBioc; 6e6i5aY|^evov rrpoc; 6tt入hrrjv I'ataaBai 6p06v 
7Tuv6dvo|iai T O V ApTuptou I'TTTTOV iaTd|i£vov 6p66v Kal TTOOI K Q I axofiaxi KaTepya-
(ea6a i Tipoc; TOV OLV TTpoaeveixQfj-
Herodotus, Histories: V, 111 
39 (Xen. Horse., 12.11): [cbc; 6E TOUC; evavxiouq (3入drcTeiv，|adxaipav [I£v (ad入入ov f] i^cpoc; ETRAIVOOFIEV- ecp' 
{)\|/RI入oi) yap O V T I TO) ITTTTEI KOTTISOC; [ I D A A O V FJ TT入RJY^L F] ^I(pou(； apKeaei]. 
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The rearing up of the horse of Persian Artybius demonstrates how horsemen could 
overwhelm heavy infantry by trampling - for even with the armors to protect himself, a foot 
soldier could not withstand the charge and the crushing of horse, which might weight several 
times more than himself. Artybius might be an exceptional case as he, including also his hor-
se, plausibly was clad with exquisite armors, owing to his status, the Persian general to sup-
press the revolt of lonians over the Persian rule; however, the ability of horsemen to deal with 
infantry was still distinguishing. Herodotus records how cavalry had contributed to the victory 
of the suppression of lonians by stating "as the Greeks were fighting with the Persians in 
Malene of the country of Atameus, they were engaged for much time, and later the cavalry, 
being set in motion, fell upon the Greeks. Truly the deed of the cavalry became this 
[victory].”4o These cavalry in Malene had likely given fatal damage to the Greek force, which 
was still mangling with the Persian infantry, by flanking. 
This is well explained that cavalry could be a very potential means to deal with infantry 
mass even like the Greek hoplites by the ancient narrations and as well later by the fact that 
cavalry had attracted increasing attention of the Greeks. Due to its tactical value, the cavalry 
force had received special attention in term of army management by the Persians. Being dif-
ferentiated from the infantry, the cavalry was commanded separately^'; the battle formation of 
horsemen was kata telea (Katd 入 £ a ) 4 2 ， h i n t i n g that the Persians had already developed a 
commending system of cavalry, which divided the cavalry into units like squadrons. Even 
Mardonius, the chief commander of Xerxes' expedition after the king himself had retreated, 
had to adjust the military planning with reference to the service of the cavalry as Herodotus 
states that "Attica was not horse-fitting land."'^ ^ Although some would justify the reason of his 
40 (Hdt., 6.29): [cbq £[idxovTo orEAAr|V£(； Tolai Hspafiai ev xfi Ma入livn Tf|(； AxapveiTiSoc; xtopqc;, oi |i£v 
aDveataaav xpovov em TTO入入6v, f\ 6 E ITTTTOC; xjaxepov 6p|iri0£i(Ja ETTiTTiTTTei ToIai''E入入rjai. TO TE Sf) epyov 
trie; iKTTou T O C T O E Y E V E T O ] . 
“ S e e (Hdt., 9.32). 
See (Hdt., 9.20,22,23). 
43 (Hdt., 9.13): [ouTE iTTTTamiari f] xwpn riv f) AxxiKq]. 
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strategic draw back as due to his pusillanimity in generalship, this argument is merely an 
assumption without any proper proofs, while, on the contrary, the explanation of Herodotus is 
persuasive and compelling in regards to the Persian cavalry force - we know that the cavalry 
force was one of the most essential part of the Persian army in the Persian Wars, and hence 
ensuring its proper functioning would be inevitably the core consideration of the Persians. 
Horse needs plain or flat land to work on; and so to guarantee a suitable ground for the 
cavalry to fight on was an important duty of any cavalry commander , Herodotus also re-
cords that "in chance the Megarians had the lot to be arranged in that which was the openest 
to attack of all the place.”々， 
The above military decision of Mardonius, however, also reveals the defects of cavalry. 
We could understand how the Persian cavalry had contributed to the Persian army from the 
above accounts, but it was not that superior - it was sometimes impotent in tackling heavily-
armed infantry. The battle of Spartans against the Athenian despot Pisistratus has illustrated to 
what extend horsemen could stand against infantry. 
And [the cavalry] charged and slew many others of Lacedaemonians and Anchi-
molius; and drove the survived to the ships 
And after the Lacedaemonians made ready and send out a greater army upon 
Athens, appointed king Cleomenes son of Anaxandrides the general of the army, 
sending no longer by sea but by land; when they went in advance, for breaking 
into Attica, the cavalry of Thessaly [was] the first to meet [them] and not much 
later it fled, and over forty men fell; and those survived had gone off by the strai-
ght way they had to Thessaly. 
£[ITT£AOUAA SE 6i£(P9£ip£ SI入入OU(； re TTO入入O{)(； T(I)V AAKE6AI |IOVIA)V xal 6f] KQI TOV 
入 l o v . Touc; 56 7T£piY£vo[i£vou(； auT(I)v £c; Tac; veac; Kateip^av 
|i£Ta 6k AaK£6ai[^6vioi [iE^ co ot6入ov crreiXavTec; dTr£TT£|i\|/av enl tdc; AGqvac;, axp-
A T R I Y O V TF^C; aTpaTifjc; D N O 6 £ ^ A V T E C ; p a a i 入 K 入 £ 0 [ I & V E A T O V A V A ^ A V S P I S E O ) , O U K E -
TI KQTd 6(i入aoaav crr£[入A\nr£c; di入入& KQT' qiTEipov- Toiai £a(3a\ouai £q Tf]v AT T I K -
f]v x^^Pqv n Tt^ v^ 0£aoaX(I)v i'TTTTOC; rrpcoTq TTpo(T^ :|ii€£ Kai ou |i£Ta noAAdv etpaTTETo, 
See also (Xen. Cav., 5.1-2). 
(Hdt., 9.21): [Kara auvTuxin"v 5e Meyapeec; etuxov taxOevTEc; Tfj te £7Ti[iaxu)TaTov fjv tou x^opiou 
rravToc;, kqI TTp6ao6o(； (id入icrra TauTji eyiveTo xfj I'Ttncp]. 
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Kal acpetuv ETteaov urrep TeaaepdKovta dvSpac;- oi 5k TT£piYev6|i£voL dmcx入入dicraov-
To tb(； £ixov £u0i)c; enl ©£(7aa入(r|(；. 
Herodotus, Histories: V, 63-64 
The thousand Thessalian horsemen had successfully repelled the Spartans, who were be-
lieved to be the most valiant and mighty warriors in ancient Greece. The Spartan troop in the 
first contact with the Thessalian horsemen was very likely to be in small number as Herodotus 
reports later the Spartan in revenge mustered a much greater force with their king as leader to 
assist the Athenians again. The final defeat of the Thessalians reveals the dilemma of cavalry 
in fighting against infantry - it had though powerful tactical value, but it would be quite to the 
austerity if it had to encounter outnumbering massive infantry force, especially that which 
was trained and well-prepared like the Spartans. The retreat of Persian cavalry in attacking the 
thousand Phocians as aforementioned illustrates how infantry could encounter the charge of 
cavalry: "they set in opposition in all directions, having themselves drawn and closed together 
to their greatest [effort]. Then the horsemen turned back and drove away.""^^ 
So, with these supports, we could conclude the value of horsemen in the era of the Pers-
ian Wars, and how the introduction of cavalry in battlefield would have inspired the Greeks 
on their military ideology; and this would give us a more comprehensive understanding on the 
development of Greek military culture in early Archaic. In brief, cavalry, without doubts, was 
a powerful and potential kind of military units, which in many dimensions was superior to 
infantry; yet, practically, the usage of cavalry in this era had faced several problems, mainly, 
the disadvantages in number and equipment. Horsemen could easily suppress infantry by vol-
leying arrows and javelins and by doing so they could destroy the infantry line by charging, in 
case if there would be flaws for them to take chance. Having this advantage, horsemen, how-
ever, could never work alone but had to depends on their own infantry force. Horsemen could 
46 (Hdt., 9.18): [KQI OI dvTioi earrjaav ndvip auaTpe\|/avTe(； iwvxovc, KQI TuuKvcbaavxec; toe; (.idXiata. 
evOauxa oi ITTTTOTQI uneatpecpov xai (im^Xauvov OTRIAO)]. 
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hardly challenge massive and well-prepared infantry formation, especially when themselves 
were only light-armed; in order to flank the enemy infantry mass, they must have the assist-
ance of their own infantry, which would engage the opposite infantry in close melee. 
The final defeat of Persians in Plataea marked a great triumph of the Greeks, and beyond 
this, also the triumph of infantry oriented military culture over the complex military culture. 
The modus operandi of Greek phalanx warfare and its military ethos behind had put the 
Persians into test and in result had proven the Greek way to be the prime of the world - the 
world seen from the eyes of the Greeks. The opposition of the Greeks and the barbawi, none-
theless, had also established a proper ground for the Greeks to justify and to evaluate their 
own military culture, and thus this had become the cornerstone of the development of Greek 
military culture in the century BCE. 
The Greek Way of War 
The encountering of the two fashions of military culture, which were rather different in 
many dimensions, aroused a din of arguments in between the two parties, both resolutely be-
lieving in her own custom. Cicero states that ''consuetudine quasi alteram quandam naturam 
effici广 but, by about five centuries before him, Herodotus, being aware of such idea, had 
already aptly put this concept in his famous work. 
For if anyone propose, ordering all men to choose the best customs out of all cus-
toms, after they have taken examination, each man would choose his own; each 
one hold that his own custom to be in much the best. 
d ydp TI(； TTpo0eir| T IDAI dvSptoTToioi £K入EgaaGai KE X EU IOV v6[iou(； TOU(； KaAAtcrrouc; 
EK T(I)v TTcivTcov voficuv, 5iaaK£\f/d|i£voi dv e入oiato EKaatoi xoix; £touTd)v- oiko) 
vo|i((ouai TTO入入(Sv Ti KaAAicrrouc; TO心q eonroLv vofiouc; eKaatoi eivai. 
Herodotus, Histories: III，38 
In the same manner, it was not unconventional that each nation or culture would be 
confident of her own military practice; in the case of war among two different cultures, this 
47 See (Cic. Fin., 5.74). 
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kind of confidence would then sculptured the foundation of the modus operandi of warfare. In 
other words, the outbreak of Persian Wars was the stage on which the Greeks and the Per-
sians had put their own fashion of warfare in against each other side. However, this comment 
of Herodotus, who himself had enjoyed the legacy of the victory of the Persian Wars, yet ref-
lects not the whole of the ideological and psychological circumstance of the Greeks in the 
early century. Greece, as a relatively late-bom civilization in the Mediterranean, did not 
have flourishing historical legacy and prestigious reputation equal to her counterparts around 
the coast of Aegean Sea, namely Egypt and Mesopotamia; and in term of power, she, being 
only a collection of individual poleis in a small peninsular, could hardly be comparable to the 
gigantic Persian Empire. Under this circumstance, it is quite a difficult task for us to image 
that Greeks had much confidence in their own practice of warfare when they were to fight 
against the Persian army. Herodotus records that before the Battle of Marathon was fought, "it 
had been a panic for the Greece to hear the name of M e d i a n s , a n d this reveals the 
contemporary emotion of the Greeks before the Persian Wars more reasonably - it is by all 
means normal for the Greeks to fear an army which outnumbered them and was equipped 
with much diversified arms. The abnormal running of the Athenians in Marathon and like-
wise the changing of wings by Pausanias before the Battle of Plataea'^^ was probably caused 
by such panic of the Persian army. Indeed, from the view of those barbaroi, the Greeks were 
no less than absurd. 
Mardonius: "Yet the Greeks were accustomed, as 1 myself learn, to wage war most 
inconsiderably under folly and awkwardness. For whenever they would have 
declared war to each other, having found out the fairest and smoothest place, they 
fight coming down to this, so that the victors resolved in great harm; and for the 
vanquished I would not say the beginning, for they become utterly destroyed. It is 
necessary, being speaking the same language, they should use constantly heralds 
and envoys and by any means rather than fighting; but if in all way it is necessary 
48 (Hdt., 6.112): [T£CO(； 6e f)v ToTar'E入入R|(n K Q I TO ouvojia TO MpScov (p6(3o(； ciKouaai]. 
See (Hdt., 9.46) as Pausanias asked the Athenians to change their position with the Spartans with the 
reason that the Spartans had never put the Persians into test. 
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for them to fight with each other, both are in need to discover the toughest part 
and make trial of this. Then what the Greeks are used to is not good, of my 
marching to as far as the land of Macedonia, they came not into their though to 
fight." 
KQITOL ye etI)6AAI"EAAr|VE(；，cbc; TTuv0dvo|iai, DTPOU入(SiraTa NO入d[IOU(； laxaaBai UTTO T£ 
dYva)|IOAUVR|<; KQI AKAIOXRITOC;. ETiedv Y^p AXXR^XOIAI 7:6入e|_IOV TTpoeiTicooi, 
povTec; TO Kd入入icnrov x � P ( o KQI 入 e i d m r r o v ， I C , TOUTO Katiovtec; [idxovTai, toate 
(Ti)v KQKcp |i£Yd入cj) o'l viKd)VT£(； diTta入入(iaaovTcu. Ttepl 6e Td)v eaaou|i£vtov oij6e 
入 d p x i i v - £ t^b\££<; yap Sf] Yivovtai- TOU(； XPH^' eovxac; 入C [ ) ( I O O U C ; Ki^ PU i^ T£ 
5IAXPETO|I£vou(； KQI dyYeXoiai KCTTA入A|I(3dv£iv xdc; 6La(popac; Kal Travxl [id入Xov f] 
jiaxnci- £�TTctvTioc; ISze no入£；|1 红 i v TTpoq diXXi^ Xouc;, £^£upiaK£iv xpfjv rf\ eKaxep-
0 1 £ial S D C R X E I P C O T O T A T O I Kal T A U T F I Tieipdv. TPOTTCP T O I ' V U V oi) 6ia-
Xpeto|i£voi, e|i£o sXcicTavToc; [lexpi MaK£5oviq(； yfjc;, O U K 入 Q O V ec; TOTJTOI)入dyov 
&ore [ictxecrBai. 
Herodotus, Histories: VII, 9 
Just mirroring the accusation of "madness" to the Greeks in Marathon,亏。the speech of 
Mardonius shows the disdainful attitude of Persians towards the Greek military practice. But, 
what had challenged these expectations and shocked the Persians and plausibly the Greeks 
was the triumph of Greeks in the Persian Wars. We are not difficult to image how the Greeks 
had been surprised by their extraordinary victory as even the Spartan general Pausanias excl-
aimed at how luxurious was provision of Xerxes' meal, which remarked the huge difference 
in wealth in between the Greeks and the Persians.^' As to serve the purpose of persuasion, 
nothing can be more powerful than a fact itself. Herodotus records another event saying that 
"for the Egyptians, having not put the Greeks into test before and despised [them], were ut-
terly destroyed there and only few of them returned to E g y p t . T h i s event tells an analogous 
idea to the inspiration of the Persian Wars 一 despite how strong is this confidence, the result 
of the fighting would always give a great shock to the people and the military practice itself. 
So, in brief, instead of harangue in words, the experience of encountering is the best proof for 
(Hdt., 6.112): [|iavir|v xe xoiai A0r|va(oiai E7TE9£POV KQI nay\v 6入£6p�r|v]. 
51 See (Hdt., 9.82). 
52 (Hdt., 4.159): [dT£ ydp ou nEneiprmevoi Kpotepov oi A�Yi3TrTioi ‘EXXt^ vcuv Kal 7Tapaxp£ci)|.ievoi 6ie-
(p6dpr|aav 0x3x0) toate 6入�YOI TIVEC; auTtov dTTEVoaxiiaav £c; AiyuTTTov]. 
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any culture and practice. 
The usage oipeirad (Txeipdo)), which means to put another into test or trial, in Herodotus 
would be the best illustration of such importance of experience. The experience of wining or 
losing would, thus, guide the mentality of military decision and also the emotion and psycho-
logy of soldiers. Aristides, using of the experience from the victory in Marathon, persuaded 
the Athenians to face the Persians and the Medians directly again by telling the Athenians that 
"the enemies send not better armor nor braver spirit than those fought in Marathon, but with 
the same bows and the same broidery clothing and gold upon [their] soft bodies and unmanly 
m i n d s . T h e Battle of Marathon had become a kind of positive reinforcement to encourage 
the Greeks, and further, the continuous military successes in Salamis, 480 BCE, and Plataea 
had strengthened this sentiment; so that the Greeks, by the end of the Persian Wars, achieved 
accomplishment greater ever, shocking the whole known well and underlying the foundation 
of the Hellenocentric ideology. 
The conflict in between the Greeks and the Persians generated intense disparity. The dis-
parity in culture and practice thus became the cornerstone for differentiating each other; and 
the conflict of disparity was not merely cultural consciousness towards "aliens," but had be-
come the actual philosophical basis for warfare when eventually two cultures were engaged in 
military conflict. Therefore, such kind of philosophical basis had regulated the actual process 
and performance in military conflict, which we have adopted the term modus operandi for it. 
In other words, the outbreak of the Persian Wars was the chance given to both the Greeks and 
the Persians to develop their own kind of centrism by which each nation would put her own 
culture and practice as the paramount of all. Given the triumph of the wars, the Greeks were 
able to develop Hellenocentrism, especially in military sense; and with this, the long adapted 
military fashion of heavy infantry warfare, which was proven to be superior to that of the Per-
(Plut. ArisL, 1 6 . 4 ) : [cbc; OUTE onXa PEXXICO 入A(36V"R£(； ouxe D[i£ivoi)c; oi 7TOAI [ I IO I TCDV EV Mapa-
6u)vi npoaiaaiv, &入入& xaurd [lev eKeivoic; to^a, t a u t a 5 ’ eaGfiToc; Ticnid入|iaTa Kal xpuaoc; ETTI acofiaai 
fia入aKoIc; Kal \|/uxai(； dvdvSpoic;]. 
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sians, continued to hold the firm seat in the Greek military culture. The Hellenocentric idea 
was prevailing in driving the Greeks to deepen their own kind of military ethos and to retain 
the modus operandi of hoplite warfare; and so the next half of the century BCE marked the 
golden period on the development of Greek military culture. 
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Chapter IV 
The Transformation of Greek Warfare 
Anyone might justly be puzzled about the mind, standing upon the in-
consistency among human life; for nothing of esteemed goods is found 
perfect, having given to human, nor any of evils ending itself without 
any good use. 
Diodorus Siculus, The Library of History: XII, 1.1 
The Legacy of the Persian Wars 
The development of the military culture in Greece throughout the century BCE is just 
appropriate to be described as the response to the Persian Wars. The Greeks were occupied 
bitterly in encountering the armies of two Persian expeditions made by Darius and Xerxes in 
the first two decades of the century; and they, in return, apart from putting the Persians into 
trial by their own arms, had also been inspired by the Persian ideology of military practice. So, 
after 479 BCE, the transformation of Greek military culture was to a large extent the legacy of 
the Persian Wars, including the memory and experience of the Greeks thus made and the prac-
tice therefore incurred. 
Although it seems that the Greeks were relatively peaceful in the era after the Persian 
Wars, the Greek military culture was replenished by the war experience against the Persians. 
Loose and primitive warfare sentiment, having much the same nature with that of tribal socie-
ty, had been under dynamic changes. The rhetra of Lycurgus was set "preventing [the Lace-
daemonians] to war often against the same enemies, so not accustoming [them] to defend 
often themselves [and thus] becoming warlike."' This presents the utmost conservative nat-
ure of the law of Lycurgus and the early Spartan governing center, the gerousia (yepouaia) 
‘(Plut . Lyc., 13.5): [xfiv KCO入Oiouacrv em TOUC; auxouc; TTO入£|iiou(； no入入dxic; aTpaxeueiv, iva |jri noWaKK； 
d|iuv£o6ai aiiv£0i(6|iEvoi no入£|iiKoi yevcovTai]. 
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and the 48 ephors. It, on the other hand, suggests the non-expansionist nature of early Greek 
warfare ideology, which considered warfare an ad hoc method to settle quarrels among states 
but seldom a complicated measure with ambition in conquering and expanding of national 
territory and power. In the early society, violence in simple form of raiding and counter-
raiding was prevailing just as Hanson states that "most Hellenes were farmers, war was ende-
mic, and the energy of the citizens were largely consumed with either working, protecting, or 
attacking cropland."^ And indeed, the Greeks had good acquaintance to warfare and had it 
already incorporated into their daily life early before the history. Thucydides reveals this sim-
plicity of warfare in his book, saying: 
For all of the Greece has been wearing arms as the habitation unfortified and [it is] 
not secure for a contact with others, and had strained the way of life of arms [that] 
they did with arms just as the foreigners. And a proof to these is that many of 
Greece still maintained in this manner and at once in everywhere of the similar 
way of living. 
ndoa -yap I^'E入入〜EAI5R|po(p6p£I 6 I D TCK; dcpctpKrouc; T£ oiKi^ AEIC; Kal OUK DA(PAX£I(； 
Trap’ 1^入入1^入01)(； £(p66oi)(；, KQI ^uvqGri Tfjv Siaixav |i£0' ^WiXtov gTTOiqaavTo ajanep oi 
Pdp(3apoi. ari|i£iov 6' eat l t a uxa Tfj<;'E入入(i5o(； exi O(3T⑴ v£[i6|i£va T(I)V TUOTE Kai £(； 
HdvTa(； ojioicuv 6iaiTr||idTcov. 
Thucydides, The Histories of the Peloponnesian War: I, 6.1-2 
Warfare to the early Greeks had been familiar and they had to prepare for it in everyday 
life. The practice of wearing arms, as a means to protect their own life and property, was ne-
cessary in countryside because raiding from hostile outsiders was not uncommon. The origins 
of this raiding-based warfare were to serve the temporary and superficial of human desire. As 
the pole is, which emerged as walled cities with sovereign, were developing, the raiding-based 
warfare in small scattered scale had taken a form in grouping citizens to march out for either 
invading other's territories or defending their own ones. This kind of warfare was waged in 
the form of citizenry hoplite battles as aforesaid. The hoplite warfare employed the majority 
2 Victor Davis Hanson, Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece, 1. 
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of the well-to-do class in the poleis, who equipped themselves with heavy armors and round 
shields so that they could, as though with training, fought in the ranks with their kinsmen. 
Short summer campaign and flash battles had dominated Greek warfare or if otherwise those 
men who served as hoplites would be deserted from their own lands and suffering from starv-
ation. 
Nevertheless, the Persian Wars had brought this simplicity into rapid mutation. Not only 
the Greeks had leamt from their experience of battling with the barbarians, who were equipp-
ed and fighting in a very different fashion to their own, the alarm of possible foreign invas-
ions also had driven the Greeks into alert, preparing themselves for further warfare. This had 
nurtured the bases for the rising bellicosity of the Greeks. The foremost example of this was 
the seafaring of the Athenians, who defeated the Persian fleet at Salamis and thus became the 
leader of the sea by creating an alliance inclined with many peoples in the coasts of all over 
the Aegean Sea, which now named as the Delian League by modem scholars. Hermocrates 
the Syracusan describes that the Athenians had "neither the ancestral experience nor which 
everlasting of the sea, but being more of the land than the Syracusans and compelled to be 
seafaring under the Medians."^ The prolongation of Delian League into military alliance for 
the enemies other than the Persians indicated the sign of the transformation of Greek military 
culture, from the form of simple battles into complicated warfare. 
The unique infantry warfare and its culture, what Mardonius the Persian general had 
wondered/ had shown great mutation in the later part of the century BCE, the period after 
the fall of Mardonius in Plataea had been the cradle for the changing in military culture. The 
Greeks retained their own distinctive fashion of hoplite warfare as the core of military proto-
cols, but, synchronically, transformation in the whole military culture, which included the 
3 (Thuc., 7.21.3): � V oi)6' EKEIVOUC ; Trdxpiov TRJV £|I7T£ipiav O I J 6 " diSiov trie; 0a\dacn-|c; EXEIV, a W 
LITTEIPCOTAC; FJFII入入ov Td)v SupaKoaicov ovTac; K Q I dvayKaaOevTac; UTTO MT^SCOV VQUTIKOUC; ysvEaOai]. For 
similar narration, see also (Thuc., 1.18.2). 
4 See (Hdt., 7.9). 
95 
practice and the idiosyncratic war ethos, had been conducted in a vast scale. One of the most 
eye-catching examples was the development of the Athenians into a thalassic supremacy. In-
stead of the ordinary assembly of hoplites from the well-to-do farmers, the Athenians, as it 
was impossible to occupy them for long-term service in line nor to persuade them to join batt-
les overseas, had to pay for hiring men to serve in military positions, something unfamiliar to 
the Greeks afore. So an elemental shift in the idea of warfare had taken place 一 military ser-
vice, which traditionally considered the duty of every male citizen, was now deposed upon the 
shoulders of some selected ones; and war behavior had been inclined towards a business of 
expansion and a measure of development from the primitive defending and ravaging attitude. 
In Athens, oarsmen, steersmen, and trireme crews, who were usually thetes at the lowest 
socio-economic position, had gained their status by the business of warfare. Such transforma-
tion had created a special phenomenon in the war practice - the emergence of mercenary, a 
group of professional soldiers or sometimes raiders. These mercenaries had a very different 
nature to the polemountdn of Bronze Age, neither they were similar to the citizenry soldiers. 
They were by nature not aristocratic but in contrary plausibly landless paupers or outcasts and, 
instead of participating in the phalanx, they were trained for skirmishing by javelins and 
arrows in land or oarsmen in sea; and above all, their service was not for the sake of the polis 
but money. The uprising of mercenary indicated the changing in the socio-economic environ-
ment in Greece and furthermore had diversified the military culture by adding new elements 
into warfare. 
Amongst these, the most prominent change was the growing importance of light-armed 
infantry and horsemen. For light-armed infantry, they did not fight in ranks and order as the 
hoplite but instead, making use of the agility in foot, skirmished from the flanks of the phal-
anx, keeping the hoplites in check with their missiles, mainly, arrows and javelins and slings. 
One popular form of light-armed infantry had risen in the period after the Persian Wars — the 
peltast {peltastes, rue入Tacm c^;)’ which, like hoplite, got the name from the shield the soldier 
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bearing, called pelte (TreXtri), a crescent light shield covered with hides. The new tactic of 
light-armed infantry then employed a reliance on hilly relief naturally and fortification artifi-
cially; this tactical modification thus caused an elemental changing in many corresponding 
military practice. Ordinary army of hoplites without the assistance of light-armed troops was 
difficult in reacting to complicated battle situation and in some cases so incompetent that it 
could but perform nothing even the hoplites were audacious in heart and well disciplined. 
Just being similar to light-armed infantry, horsemen were also employed to flank the 
hoplite phalanx and moreover to counter the threat made by light-armed troops. By the swift-
ness of the animals, cavalry could easily chase up light-armed men, and harm them severely 
as these foot soldiers were in scattered position and were not equipped with spears to reproach 
cavalry charges. Other than this, the high mobility of cavalry made it multifunctional - horse-
men could escort the phalanx in its marching; they could kept engaged the caution of enemies, 
making them neither able to chase so smoothly or flight so easily; and if haply chance appear-
ed, they could advance within the shortest time. The writing of the two pieces on the art of 
cavalry by Xenophon, the Cavalry Commander and on Horsemanship, are the best illustrat-
ions of the importance of cavalry at that time. 
While the Athenians were building their maritime empire on sea, the Lacedaemonians, 
being eager to kept them in check of the increasing power, had fought, as they proclaimed, to 
liberate the Greek states from rendering into servitude by the Athenians. This war, being 
known as the Peloponnesian War from the prospective of the great author of the Histories 
after Herodotus, was protracted into a long term warfare of 27 years; and owing to this leng-
thy duration, which yet never known before, it had brought so much impact on the entire hist-
ory and of course especially the military culture. Thucydides brilliantly concludes the era of 
great transformation in the prologue of his Histories: 
By a common [deed] the foreigner being repelled, and not much later the Greeks 
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having revolted from the King and having allied into the war, were separated 
towards the Athenians and Lacedaemonians. For these states were proven with the 
most power, for the one had been strong by land and the [other] one by sea. And 
little time the alliance had kept together; thereupon the Lacedaemonians and the 
Athenians went into war with their allies towards each other; and of the other 
Greeks if anyway would have stood apart, they have already made way for them-
selves. Just from the Medians ever into this war^, these making peace, those 
fighting with each other or with their own revolted allies, they prepared them-
selves well in warfare and became more experienced, making their practices in 
dangers. 
Koivf] T£ dTitoad|ievoi TOV pdp(3apov, i3cn:£pov ou roX入(；^  6i£Kpi0r|oav Tipoc; TE A0-
r|vaioi)c; KQI AaK£6ai[i0vi0U(； oi xe dTToaxdvTEc; (3aai入乏locf'E入入r|V£(； KQI ol €u|iTroX£-
^i]aavT£c;. 6uvd|i£i ydp xaura [iEyiaTa 6i£(pdvr|- I'axuov ydp oi |i£v Kaxa yfjv, o[ 8k 
vauaiv. Kal 6入lyov |i£v xpovov ^uve|ieiv£v ^ 6(iaix|iia, erreiTa oi Aa-
K£6ai[i6vioi Kal A6rivaToi i:noAi|ir|CTav [iexd xtuv ^u[i[idxtov npoq (iAAi^ Xouc;. Kal 
Td)v i^AAtoVEAAi^ vorv £i' xivec; rrou Siaaxaiev, npoc; TOUTOUC; f]5r| E X T B P O U V . W A T E DTTO 
T(I)v Mr|5iKd)v tq T6V6£ a id TOV Tr6Xe|iov t a |i£v ATT£V66II£VOI, rd 5k rroXeiiouvTEc; T] 
diXXi^ Xoic; f] Toic; eauT(I)v ^i)[i[idxoic; dcpiataiievoic; eu TtapeaKeudaavTo TO. no入会[iia 
Kal EfiTTeipoTepoi eyevovto |i£"rdi KivSuvtov xac; [i£A.£Tac; TT0I0I) | i£V0I. 
Thucydides, The Histories of the Peloponnesian War: I, 18.2-3 
Here the legacy of the Persian Wars had been brought to later part of the century, and so 
well had the Archaic Greece reached her peak in development. The casus belli of the Pelopon-
nesian War was the problem of Corinth and Magara, yet, it was the warfare sentiment thence 
after the Persian Wars had created the groundwork for this "world war" of ancient Greece. 
The extensive length of 27 years of almost continuous warfare made it far greater than the 
legendary Trojan War under Homer's depiction. Thucydides comments "for never so many 
cities were desolated after taken, some under the foreigners, and some under themselves urg-
ing for war, and several captured underwent a change in habitants; never so many fugitives 
and so much blood shed of human, whether by the war itself or through the revolution."^ 
5 "Medians" refers to the Persian Wars; and "this war" obviously to the Peloponnesian War. 
6 (Thuc.，1.23.2): [oure yap 7x6入EIQ TOOQISE 入R|(p0£LCTAI fipr|[icbGr|aav, ai |IEV UTCO pappdpcov, a � 5 ’ UTTO 
acpojv ai)T(I)v (ivTino入e[iO\3vTu)v (eiai 6' ai Kal oiKqxopac; |a£Tipa入ov (i入iaK6[j£"vai), oute (puyal xoaaiSe 
dvOpcbncov Kal (p6vo(；, 6 JIEV K Q T ' auxov TOV N O X E I I O V , 6 SE 5 I A TO A T A A I D C E I V ] . 
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Besides, continuous warfare had re-sculptured the war ethos and memory among the Greeks 
as Thucydides accounts that "for reckless boldness was regarded as faithful manliness, and 
provident delay as well-decorated cowardice, and sound mind as cloak of unmanliness, and 
all-understanding as doing naught in everything; stunning keenness was accounted as a part of 
man, but caution to plan as well-sensed pretext of shirking.，口 The re-shaping of psychology of 
the Greeks had underlain their war behaviors. The era of the Peloponnesian War was said to 
be the golden age of hoplite warfare, yet, the transformation taken place in this period was 
altering the Greek way of warfare from her own idiosyncratic culture. 
The Introduction of New Elements 
The poleis in southern Greece, mainly those which joined the wars against the Persians, 
had maintained a strong prevailing sentiment in infantry tradition after 490 BCE. The defeat of 
the Persians, thus, did not bring immediate challenge to the hoplite supremacy in warfare. The 
citizenry hoplite had been still dominating in the southern Greece, where was geographically 
remote from outer influence and had maintained a more sedentary agrarian culture, and the 
socio-economic circumstance of the Greek military culture had remained relatively unaffected 
in the several decades of quasi pax after the Persian Wars. By this time, the vocabulary of 
hoplites had attained an intrinsic meaning far more than its original content as a heavily-
armed man, but a name belonged to a class of well-to-do farmers, who were fighting in a 
fashion of phalanx battle, and an integration of the socio-economic and the military aspects.^ 
7 (Thuc., 3.82.4): [T6入[icc [iev yap d入6yujtoc; dv6p£ia (pi入j;T:aipoc; £vo|i[a0ri, [aeWriaK； Se 7Tpofir|Gfi(； Sei-
入(a £UTTp£7TT]C;, TO 5会 a(I)(ppov Tou dvdvSpou TTp6crxr||ia, Kai TO Ttpoc; anav ^DVETOV ETTI Tidv ctpyov- TO 5’ 
EfiTiXi^ KTcoc; 6^ 1) dvSpoc; jioipa Ttpoa£TE6R|, dacpaXsia 6E TO ;^ni(3ouX£{)aaa0m dTtOTpoTrfic; npocpaaic; £u-
入 cryoc;]. 
8 There are several pieces of evidence by the classical writers hinting to this Judgment. The most out-
standing example is in the Constitution of the Athenians, pseudo work of Xenophon: "right here the 
poor and the people [are] just to have [more] than the high-born and the wealthy for that the people is 
the driver of ships and the one conferring the power to the polls, and the steersmen and the boatswains 
and the 50 men-commanders and the look-out men and the shipwrights - these are the ones conferring 
the power to the polis much more than the hoplites and the high-born and the good men. (oxi SiKaioi 
auxoGi Kal oi nevriTEc; KCD 6 6fi|ioc; TT入£ov exeiv T(I)V yevvaicov Kal T(I)V TrXouaicov 6id x68e, OTI 6 6i][.i6(； 
ecjTiv 6 e入cn3vcov TCK; vauc; Kai 6 Trjv 6uva|iiv nepiTiBeic; rfj 7x6入£i, Kal oi Ku(3£pvfiTai Kai oi KeXeucrral Kal 
01 TTEVTriKovTapxoi Kai oi nptppdTai Kal oi vauTuriyoi, —OUTOI Eiaiv oi TI]V 6uva|iiv nEpixiOh'TEc; Tf| TTOXEI 
TTO入{) [id入Xov q 01 oTiXixai Kal oi yevvaioi Kai oi Xen. Const. Ath., 1.2).,, This writer 
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The term hoplite indicated an enrollment of able citizens in list and the polis would expect 
these citizens to participate in warfare armed as heavy infantry and to follow the modus oper-
andi of the phalanx warfare. Owing to the enrollment of citizens, "hoplite" in many cases was 
adopted as an indication of military power, just similar to the "chariot (cheng,乘广，in Spring 
and Autumn Period (春秋時代）in Chinese history]� 
The Battle of Tanagra in 456 BCE" , 34 years after the Battle of Marathon, the Lacedae-
monians and the Athenians, with their respective allies, had demonstrated the ordinary pure 
hoplite warfare described by Herodotus.'^ However, 25 more years later in 431 BCE, when 
the Peloponnesian War, as it was called on the Athenian side, broke out, the oration of Pericles 
states that the Athenians had already organized a force on their own with 1,200 horsemen, 
including mounted archers, and 1,600 archers.'^ The statement of Pericles by all means refl-
ects the transitional mark in the Greek military history. We know that there was not a consid-
erable cavalry force being ready in any Greek polis in the peninsular; and for light troops, 
though with a record,‘斗 was not a main armament in Greek warfare. So, it is proper to con-
clude that the whole of Greek military culture, including the ideology and the practice of war-
fare as well the bases which had forged them, had been transmitted without significant chang-
obviously suggests that hoplite was not only a soldier but also a group of well-to-do persons in 
opposition to the poor. 
9 Cheng (乘）was originally a counting unit of Chinese chariots and was often used in representing the 
number of chariots. E.g., "a country with a thousand of cheng (千乘之國)•，’ 
Most obvious examples are in Thucydides, such as (Thuc., 2.13.6) and (2.31.2). 
” C o m m o n dating states that the Battle of Tanagra was fought on 457 BCE. However, Sir William 
Mitford has pointed out that the initial preparation of the war was in the end of 457 BCE but the actual 
battle probably was fought in the spring of 456 BCE. See n. 11 of chapter 12 in his book: William Mit-
ford, The History of Greece, vol. 2 (London: Whitefriars, 1829), 260-261. 
12 For the Battle of Marathon, the Greeks charged "without horsemen and archers," see (Hdt., 6.112). 
For the Battle of Tanagra, Thucydides records that the Lacedaemonians were in total 1,500 hoplites and 
with them 10,000 more from allies and the Athenians were in total 14,000 hoplites (Thuc., 1.107.2, 5-6), 
with the assistance of Thessalian horsemen (1.107.7). The account of Diodorus repeats the former 
record (Diod., 11.79.6; 80.1). 
13 See (Thuc., 2.13.8). Later Thucydides also states that the Athenians had “throng of light-armed men 
not little"[如I入oc; \|/i入(I)v OUK OXIYOC;] (Thuc . , 2 .31.2) . 
" ( T h u c . , 1.106.2): and the Athenians learning shut off the entrance by the hoplites and stationed the 
light in circle stoning all those entered, and this became a great calamity to the Corithians [oi 6e A0r|-
vaioi yvovxec; Kara npoacoTTov T£ elpyov TOTC; 67T入[TCUC; KQI nepiaTqaavTec; KUKXCO TOU(； \|/i\ouc; KciTd入-
euaav Kavxac; xouc; eaeXBovTac;, Kal ndSoc; LIEYCI TOUTO KopivOioic; EYEVETO]. 
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es from the older segment of history into the post-Persian Wars period. The shifting of arma-
ments and the respective tactics in this period were slow; and, the development of cavalry, 
which had driven circumspective attention from the Greeks in the Persian Wars, is especially 
noteworthy for its backwardness - for nearly after 60 years from the Persian Wars the deve-
lopment of cavalry force in southern Greece was left blank in the record. 
The most obvious answer that we could come up is the insufficient encouraging factors 
for the establishment of cavalry. Toynbee in his masterpiece A Study of History, which is 
employed by Fairbank's China: Tradition and Transformation, initiates the remarkable theory 
of "Challenge and Response."'^ Toynbee suggests that the interactions among "challenge," 
like foreign invasion of climate, and the "response" of a civilization would be a main cause to 
her rise and fall; while Fairbank uses it for explaining the history of modem China - how the 
arrival of Europeans as challenge had stimulated the response of Chinese government. In a re-
verse application, the absence or fail of exogenous challenges before the Peloponnesian War 
did not stimulate endogenous metamorphosis and notable response from the Greeks. The 
Greek military culture had retained in its old sentiment, and, therefore, the development of 
cavalry in southern Greece had been in a slow pace. And, if we adopt the idea of the econom-
ists, applying the most fundamental concept of cost, the cost of changing, which means the 
establishment of cavalry, had been greater than the benefit of changing, which was restrained 
by the dominating hoplite warfare. However, the basic assumptions of "human as an econo-
mic animal" and "maximization" of economics, both supposing that human beings act and 
decide trying to maximize their gain, are unilateral in explaining human behaviors. Probably, 
the discipline of psychology reinforces our understanding on the issue. "The Theory of rea-
soned action" supposed by Fishbein and AJzen explains that the "behavioral intentions" are 
composed of attitude and subjective norms, which refers to personal idea and environmental 
Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1962-63). 
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influence respectively. Humans sometimes, and especially those in ancient period, are con-
servative, and thus intention of changing is somehow passively more than actively triggered. 
Combining these theories from different disciplines, we are able to have an attempt in crack-
ing the factors driving the development of Greek military culture. 
The cost of changing — the introduction of new elements into military culture - was ini-
tially high, and particularly the cost for equipping a cavalry force was even severely high for 
the Greeks. Greece was a sedentary civilization and most of the Greeks living in the penin-
sular were farmers working on their own plot of land. In a result, they were not nomadic in 
life and being alien to horse-taming like Persians, Thessalians, Thracians and other Greeks in 
the northern peninsular and the Balkan. Although words like hippodamos (i7TTTo6d|iO(；) and 
hippobotos (I7T7T6(3OTO(；) are found in Homer honoring individuals and places for horse-tam-
ing and horse-breeding respectively, the Greeks were nonetheless poor riders. To ride upon 
horseback requires much more sophisticated technique than to control a chariot; and thus 
excellent cavalry had been the privilege of nomadic peoples, who had practiced horse-riding 
as part of the modus vivendi. Xenophon in his Cavalry Commander stresses that the first train-
ing for riders is to let them acquire a firm seat: 
Then the first they must be able to leap upon the horses; for to many before now 
the security was made about this; and the second they must be able to ride on all 
lands; for the battles at another time happen on other places. 
TTpd)TOV |I£V OTTCOC； £TTL TOUC； 'ITTTCOUC； CtVaTTriSdv SuVtOVTai- TToAAol!c； yap f]6r| V] acOTT]-
pia Tiapa TOUTO eyeveTo- 6euTepov 6e orrcoc; ev TravToiOK； x⑴piou; 
vqaovxai- KQI yap o i Tib入£|IOI ^iAAoT£ ev di入入oknc; TOTTOIC; yiyvovTai. 
Xenophon, Cavalry Commander.. I, 5 
Unlike infantry throng which could be mustered easily from the populace, cavalry cru-
cially demanded for training as Xenophon puts that "for having carelessly to these [trainings], 
16 Martin Fishbein & Icek Ajzen, Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior: an Introduction to Theory 
and Research, esp. 1-11. 
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horses and men would naturally like women competing against men."'^ Apart from taking a 
firm seat, horsemen needed to train themselves on using their weapons. The primary weapon 
of horsemen was the javelin, which allowed them to skirmish with a suitable distance from 
enemy's infantry. Xenophon recommends that horsemen should train themselves in throwing 
javelins as the second task'^ and so that "each of them would be eager [to be] as many dis-
players of javelin-throwing as possible for the polis ”、勺 Moreover, the horsemen must also be 
able to handle their melee weapons on horseback; for it demands the riders especially for 
body balance? 
Other than the training demanded for cavalry, the extraordinary cost of equipping horse-
men had contributed to the late development of the cavalry. Being very different to level 
country like Thessalia, Greece was little known to nomadic culture. To sedentary Greeks, 
possession of horses was a tremendous burden to ordinary households working on their plot 
of land, limited resource as it was in hilly and infertile country like Greece. The praise of 
Homer as hippobotos to land such as Argolid was seemingly a mere history of the past and no 
longer valid to the Archaic period. Land pressure had been rising and most of the arable land 
had gone to the purpose of either grain producing or other cash crop cultivation. Although we 
are not given a clear account on how much have to be spent on owning a horse, it was obvi-
ously not an affordable task for ordinary persons. Both the name hippeis (InTreic;), the second 
class of Athenian citizens classified by Solon, and hippees (ITUTTEEC;), the 300 picked Spartans 
for their king, supposes that only the upper class of the society could own a horse. Xenophon 
records that some people had to rely on others for keeping their horses.^' And thus we know 
17 (Xen. Cav., 8.2): [o[ yap Ttpoc; tauta (i|_i£X(I)c; exovtec; Kal ITTTTOi Kal dvSpec; EIKOTIOC; dv coanep YIJVAL-
KEc; 7Tp6(； dv6pa(； dycovi^oivTo]. 
18 See (Xen. Cav., 1.6). 
19 (Xen. Cav., 1.21): [cpi入OTI|IOIVTO ydp dv, fj EIKOC;, (be; TT入£[aTou(； eKaaxoc; ciTToSeT^ ai dKovTiatac; xfj 
tt6 入 £1]. 
Xenophon says that saber was much more preferable than long spear (Xen. Horse., 12.11-12). Add-
itionally, for those unskilled riders like Greeks, long weapons were definitely not handsome to use on 
horseback as the rider could use only one hand to hold the weapon while another hand holding the rein. 
“ S e e (Xen. Cav., 1.11-12). ^ 
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that horse-owning, as derived from the unfavorable modus vivendi of the Greeks, was the 
fundamental problem to hinder the poleis from organizing cavalry. Xenophon concludes how 
great the effort had to be put on organizing cavalry in Agesilaus: 
However he (Agesilaus) had not been able to march over the plains in Phrygia due 
to the cavalry of Pharabazus, and he thought he must be having the cavalry 
prepared for himself, as it was necessary for himself to war, not running away. So 
then he chose out the richest from all the poleis there to breed horses. And he 
proclaimed that whoever could provide a horse and equipments and an approved 
man could be allowed not to fight on himself; and in this way he made each one 
willing to perform these things, just as he would search for the one willing to die 
for him. And he examined the poleis from which were necessary to furnish horse-
men, the practicer from the horse-breeding poleis to be forthcoming and con-
fident about the horsemanship in greatest sense. And this he though admirable, 
after he had furnished the cavalry that was vigorous and in work for himself. 
£7T£l |ievToi civd TQ 7T£6ia oi!)6e ev xfj Opvy i a eSuvaxo aTpateueoBai 6id Tfjv Oap-
va(3d(ou iTTTTEiav, eSo^ev autto ITTTTIKOV KaTaaKEuaaxeov eivai, cbc; |if] SparreTEu-
OVTQ TTO入e|i£Tv 6£Ol QUTOV. TOUC； flEV OUV 7T入OUCJlCUTciTOUC； £K TTaa(i)V T(I)V £K£l 7X6入£-
tov iTTTTOTpocpeiv KCTti入TTpoeiTTe 68, oatic; TiapexoiTo iTTTiov Kal ^^ rrXa Kal dv6pa 
56Ki|iov, cb<; e^eaoiTo aurto |if] atpaTeuEaBai- Kcd enoh^cJEv ouTtO(； EKaaxov Ttpo-
0I3[ITOC; T A U T Q TTpctTTeiv, wonzp dv T K ; T O V UTTEP auTou d7TO0avoij|I£vov npoGufitoc; 
[iaaTEUoi. £Ta^£ 6e KQI n6入eic;, (I)v SEOI TOUC; [Tureac; TTapacTKeD(i(£IV’ vo[II(a)v EK 
ta3v iTTTTOTpocpcov 7x6入£cov £i)6U(； KCTL 9povr||iaTia(； 入 l o r a otv ETTI Tfj buuKfj yi\>i-
cj6ai. KQI TOUT' OUV DYAATOJC; ESOGE TIPDIFAI’ OTI KATEOKEUAAXO TO ITTTTIKOV QUTW KQI 
£U9I)(； eppa)|i£vov f]v KQI evepyov. 
Xenophon, Agesilaus: I, 23-24 
Furthermore, although cavalry required so much investment, it was still militarily incap-
able to stand at the same footing with hoplites. The example of the Battles of Marathon and 
Plataea approved the superiority of the strength of Greek hoplites in melee against cavalry. 
And moreover, counting on number, cavalry was always thinner than the throngs of infantry; 
thus horsemen could not charge the phalanx of hoplites directly in front. The defeat of Thess-
alian horsemen recorded in Herodotus suggests that horsemen were advantageous in skirm-
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ishes, but never to deal with well prepared army尸 The late account of century BCE shows 
that the situation had not changed for century: 
And for a time he (Agesilaus) had lead the army in a square, on the other hand 
having one half of the horsemen in the front and one half at the rear; but when the 
Thessalians had hindered [his] way, charging those behind, he was sending upon 
the rear the vanguard cavalry accept of those with himself. And then they drew up 
in battle order against each other, while the Thessalians, practiced [it] to be not 
right to fight on horseback against the hoplites, turned round slowly and had 
withdrawn. 
6 5t ricoq |i£v f|7£v ev TiXaiaicp TO aTpateujia, TOUQ fniiaeic; |IEV e|_mpoa0ev，TOI)C; 
fi|iiaei(； 6 ' £71' ovpq £ x � v TCLV iTiTtecov- ETTEI 5' eKcbXvov Tfjq TTopdaq oi ©erra入ol 
£T[£Xai3vovT£c; Toi<; 6TTIO0£V, TTapaT[£|iT[£i in' oupdv Kai TO and TOU axofiaxoc; itt-
niKov TrXfjv Td)v Ttepl au tov . coc; 5e rrapetd^avTo diXXi^Xoic;，oi |i£v ©ETtaXol vo|ii-
aavT£(； ouK ev KaXto dvai TTPOQ TOUC; 6TT入[TCU; ITTTTO|IAX£IV, atpexj/avTec; (3D6R|v dTt£-
Xcupouv. 
Xenophon, Hellenica: IV, 3.4-5 
Cavalry, as Xenophon recommends "the cavalry commander [is] to teach the polis how 
weak the cavalry desolated with infantry to that having one"^^ must have foot soldiers attend-
ed to it - ones like the hippodwmoipsiloi (iTT7To6p6|ioi \|A入o[) said by Herodotus.二斗 As a result, 
the benefit of adopting cavalry force into military system was limited in the environment of 
early Archaic Greece; thus it gave little motivation to the Greeks to replenish their practice of 
warfare. 
Comparing to cavalry, light-troops, as the most basic form of infantry, was more native 
to the soil of Greece. The Greeks, as all other peoples of early civilizations, had adopted the 
use of archery and other missile weapons as ancient as the pre-historical period. Arrow-
22 See (Hdt., 5.63-64). 
23 (Xen. Cav., 5 . 1 3 ) : [IRRTRAPXIKOV 6 E xai TO 6 I 6 D A K £ I V TFJV 7X6入IV, COC; DOSEVEC; TO tteCwv EPRNIOV�TimKdv 
Ttpoc； TO d}li7TH0UC； TTe(oVC； EXOv]. 
24 See (Hdt., 7.158). Hippodromoi comes from combining hippos, horse, and dromos. running together. 
The only account of the usage with psilioi, making the sense of "light-armed soldiers which could catch 
up with horsemen" is this record of Herodotus. And commonly the word refers to the sense of 
"horse-racing" later in classical authors. 
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shooting, javelin- and stone-throwing are acquainted to the heroes in the epics of Homer. And 
to be more accurate, the use of light-armed was indeed earlier than the domination of hoplite 
as main armament in warfare. The term "light," psilos (\|/iA.6(；) in Greek, was, nonetheless, 
ambiguous in meaning. In general sense, the term psilos was used as the opposition to the 
heavily-armed hoplites or hoplitikon ( 6 7 1 入 I T I K 6 V ) . SO, the most fundamental meaning of light-
armed, as used in Herodotus, referred to infantry which was lightly- or even bare-armed, not 
necessarily with the implication of troops trained to fight as light, running scattered and dis-
tracting enemies with missiles. Herodotus remarkably records that each hoplite of the Spart-
ans had 7 light-armed helots attended to him, while that from other places of Greece 1 to each 
hoplite in the Battle of Plataea; and so the total number of light-armed men reached 69,000, 
almost double of the hoplites. ^ ^ Yet, these 69,000 light-armed men were evidently not the 
kind of trained light-troops that had risen to stage later. They were probably originally not 
fighting attendants to the hoplites but were equipped to satisfy the immense demand of fight-
ers to encounter the Persians as Herodotus reports that they were "prepared to fit for war"^^ 
and so to be “fighters”之？. With this conclusion, we know that light-armed infantry, as the most 
basic form, certainly had a role in the Archaic Greek warfare; however, specialization of such 
arts of fighting was still unknown to the Greeks in the southern peninsular. On the other hand, 
although hoplite tradition had dominated Greek warfare since the beginning of the Archaic 
period, some areas of Greece still maintained an influential tradition of light-armed infantry as 
Plato states through the factional character Clinias: 
Clinias: "For you may notice the nature of the land of the whole Crete, as is not, 
like that of the Thessalians, level, and so they are used greatly on horses, but we 
on running; for on the contrary this [is] uneven and more suitable for the practice 
of running on foot." 
25 See (Hdt., 9.28-30). 35,000 as the helots attended to the 5,000 Spartans and 34,500 to other Greeks. 
The ratio of hoplites to light-armed men was 387 to 695, approximately 1 to 1.8. 
26 (Hdt., 9.29): [Kal TOUTWV TTGC; TIC; napiiptriTo LUC; EC; 7T6入£|IOV]. 
27 (Hdt., 9.30): [\|n入(I)v |I£v 6r) tibv dTxdvxwv TOJV |IAXI|IA)v]. 
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tfiv ycip Tfjq xJpac; 7TDAR|(； KpT]Tr|(； (puaiv opate, tb(； OUK eaxi, KaGdrrep Tdrv 0£-
TTaXd)v, TT£6id(；, 5i6 SF] Kal roiq [LEV ITTTTOIC; EKAVOI XP^VTAI 入入 O V , 6p6[ioiai 5k 
ni^ eic;- f^Se yap dtvcbj^ a入oc; au Kal Tipoc; xr\y T(i)v TTeCfj 6p6|icov daKr|aiv iiSi入入ov ai)|i-
lieTpo(；. 
Plato, Laws: I, 625C-D 
The example of Crete suggests that light-armed infantry was preferred by some island-
ers; the explanation of Plato on the specialization of this ancient tradition of light-armed 
infantry in Crete is, however, over-simplified. The most obvious problem of this statement is 
that the whole Greek Peninsular, except for a certain part in the southern Peloponnesus near 
Laconia, was hilly country similar to Crete. So in the sense of Clinias, many peoples in the 
southern peninsular, probably excluding the Spartans and theirperioikoi, would be good runn-
ers to fight as javelin-throwers. The reality proves it to be wrong, or at least incomplete. The 
development of hoplites was symbiosis with the socio-economic situation - hoplite was not 
only a military unit, but was an embodiment of the social development of an able middle class, 
which consisted of a majority of well-to-do free farmers and economic consideration of pro-
perty. In this category, Crete was much different to other poleis in the peninsular. As the pseu-
do piece of Xenophon, the Constitution of the Athenians, argues that "for if the Athenians 
were thalassocrats, it would have happened for them to make evils, if they wish, and to suffer 
nothing, as long as they have mastered the sea, neither their land to be cut nor to expect for 
the wars.,’28 So, as the former chapter has explained, although the relief of Greece was hilly, 
hoplite was still relied as a main armament for the country farmers, who had little military 
training, to protect their own homeland, but instead of light-armed infantry because they were 
incapable of fighting against hoplites directly. The Cretans, being free from foreign raiding, 
were able to keep themselves adapted to light-armed infantry. Plato reports in the Laws that 
the customs of the Cretans "and those in Lacedaemon were made in all the effort for these 
28 (ps. Xen. Const. Ath., 2.14): [d ydp vfjaov oiKouvtec; 0aXaaaoKp(iTop£(； qaav A0r|vaioi, i)Kfipx£v dv 
auToic; Tuoieiv ^ev KaKtoc;, ei ePouAovxo, rrdaxeiv 8k |ari6ev, ecoc; rfjc; 6a入(iTTqc; f]pxov, |.ir|6e T(.ir|6fivai ti^v 
eauTU)v YHV [iriSe npooSexeaSai roue; no入£|iiou(；]. 
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(wars)."29 Therefore, for most islanders, being isolated from the mainland, they had either to 
render themselves into thalassocrats or to militarize their society as means to gain resources 
outside their own islands. In this case, many of them like the Cretans, had specialized 
themselves on the arts of using missile weapons and had trained to fight as light instead of 
ordinary hoplites. Herodotus also records that Gelon of Sicily could muster "2,000 archers 
and 2,000 slingers and 2,000 horse-running light-armed men.，’〕。These light-armed infantry 
found in Hellenic islands were obviously trained men to fight as skirmishers, making use of 
the agility to prevent themselves from engaged to hoplites. 
And other than this, peoples in the northern peninsular which was mountainous also nur-
tured the usage of light-armed infantry. For example, the Aetolians in the northern coast of the 
Gulf of Corinth had developed the usage of light infantry of javelin-throwers and respective 
modus operandi of fighting.^' This development was owed to their difficult geographic relief 
and also their remote location to the southern peninsular. Indeed, having engaged more often 
to encounter peoples of the northern peninsular, like the Thessalians and Macedonians who 
were not fully sedentary, they were more acquainted to the fighting method of nomadic riders 
and mountainous light-troops. So, just being similar to the islanders, the Aetolians were 
rendered war- l ike�� and much less influenced by the hoplite tradition in the southern penin-
sular. 
At the opening of the 460s BCE, by the record we know that the Athenians had already 
light-armed troops in their army.^^ If Herodotus is right, the use of light-armed infantry was 
29 (Plat. Laws, 1.628E): [0au|id(co ye |if)v ei xd T£ nap ' q|ilv v6|ii|ia Kai eti xd TIE pi AaK£6ai|iova [ir] 
Tudaav triv arTou6f]v TOUTCOV evsKa 7TeK0ir|Tai]. 
(Hdt., 7.158): [5iaxi入loDc; To^otac; Kai Sioxi入iou<; ocpevSovqTac; Kal 6iaxiXiou(； i7Tno6p6|iouc; \|/i\oi)c;]. 
For the explanation of iTT7To6p6|ioi)(；, see n. 23. 
31 See (Thuc., 3.94-98): the Athenian expedition to Aetolia and the defeat of the Athenians by the Ae-
tolian light troops. 
32 (Thuc., 3.94.4): [TO yap eSvoq [ IEYA |j£V sivai TO TCOV AITO)入CIW Kal fidxi|Jov]. 
“ S e e (Thuc., 1.106.2) and n. 13. The exact year of this event was not sure. The Battle of Haliae was in 
459 BCE, at the meantime to the outbreak of Egyptian War by the Athenians (Thuc. 1.105.1). Thu-
cydides just puts iJOTcpov for the coming Battle of Aegina, which was 12 days before this event. While 
Diodorus reports that the event of the siege of Aegina was in the year after Haliae (Diod.. 11.79). If 
Diodorus is correct, the event was probably in the spring or the summer of 458 BCE; and this would be 
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blank to the Athenians in the early century BCE and probably to other poleis in the south-
ern peninsular which had an analogous composition of socio-economic background for the 
uprising of hoplite domination. But, even if he is exaggerating, the situation was not much 
altered. We might not have a comprehensive account of why and when exactly light-armed 
infantry had come into the stage of Greek warfare, but it was plausibly stimulated by the Per-
sian Wars as the Greeks, though being victory, were harmed greatly by the alien modus oper-
andi of the Persians. And later, the rise of the maritime supremacy of Athens initiated a new 
form of military practice in the southern peninsular, which, as time went on, had eventually 
undermined the composition of hoplite warfare and aroused rapid mutation in the ethos and 
practice of Greek warfare. 
The adoption of light-armed troops by the Athenians was mostly an inspiration made by 
the usage of them in the experience of sea-faring and successive war experience. Reasonably, 
marines of triremes were to fight as archers on-board.^^ Light-armed infantry was more ad-
apted to sea fighting and more suitable to the mode of maritime powers - the illustration of 
the islanders above was a strong proof of this. Maritime development of Athens required 
excessive investment on naval power; therefore, there was an increasing demand on man-
power - t h e oarsmen, the steersmen, the boatswains, and the shipwrights, besides capital. The 
landed farmers, who composed the hoplite class, were stuck to their land and had no incentive 
more reasonable for the Athenians to raise an army (Thuc. 1.105.4). 
34 For earlier time, Thucydides quotes Homer saying that all oarsmen fought as archers (Thuc., 1.10.4). 
For during the Peloponnesian War, the problem is complicating. Firstly, the disproportional figures of 
"men on each ship" recorded by Thucydides suggests that those men recorded were additional on-board 
marines or loads of transportation. For example, one record reports that Pericles equipped 100 ships 
with 4,000 hoplites and 300 horsemen on them; and this figure suggests that "43 men on each ship” 
(Thuc., 2.56.1-3; the horses were carried by ships made of old-triremes). While if we take another 
account from the Peloponnesians, the figure is "10 men on each ships" (Thuc., 2.66.2). This extremity 
reveals that the triremes were often used as transportation vessels (and so the verb emTtAico is used to 
indicate on-board transportation). 
So, if not given special addition, the usual fighting on sea was carried by a group of on-board soldiers 
called epibatai (eTTipdrai). Thucydides reports that Demosthenes brought with him 300 epibatai but 
their method of fighting on land was not clear - might be bowmen or hoplites. In another case, Plutarch 
states that the ships were equipped with shields (I] TE doTric; drro T(I)V ve(I)v) and it suggests evidently 
that the epibatai were fighting as light-armed infantry, at least on ships (Plut. Lys., 11.2). There is also 
example showing the rowers and ship crews directly Joined land fighting armed as light-armed infantry 
(Thuc., 4.32.2). ‘ 
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to join venturous navigation with their land and property abandoned, nor to change their 
modus vivendi. So, these thalassocrats were from the lower class of the polis, the thetes, who 
were willing to see things changing. These paupers were of course unable to afford them-
selves with splendor armors and to fight as hoplites; and meanwhile, the swift foots and missi-
les of light-armed infantry were required in sea battles. As a result, the gravity of the military 
strength had shifted from the hoplites/well-to-do farmers to the light-armed/ populace. 
However, this was only the early stage of development of light-armed infantry in the 
Greek warfare. The light-armed troops of the Athenians were weak, both in term of quantity 
and quality. In the Battle of Aegitium in 426 BCE, the Athenians were greatly running out of 
sufficient able light troops as the Athenian general Demosthenes "was in the greatest need of 
light javelin-throwers.，’35 So at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, light-armed infantry 
was still not yet developed mature for the Greek poleis. The Athenians apparently had a con-
siderable amount of light troops, mainly as archers,^^ but these light troops were less mobile 
to fight as skirmishers. Unlike javelin-throwers, the Athenian archers fought stood together, if 
not in formation," making not agile enough to be a great threat to ordinary hoplites. For the 
hoplites, having formed the phalanx, could defend themselves with ease toward enemies from 
one side - as they would hold their shields towards their front, reproaching charges and 
guarding missiles; but they, if having no flank- or rearguard, were incompetent to encounter 
enemies attacking from every sides.^^ And moreover, being still deeply influenced by the 
(Thuc.’ 3 . 9 7 . 2 ) : [vjn入(I)v (!iKovTicrr(I)v ivSefjc; fjv 入 i c n r a ] . 
36 See the statement of Pericles (Thuc., 2.13.8) 
37 (Thuc., 3.98.1): "these men (archers) scattered of the die of the commander of the archers" [eneiSf] 
5e TOIJ TE TO^dpxou dnoSavovroc; OUTOI 5ieaK£6da6r|aav]. This suggests that the archers were normal-
ly fighting in rigid array or even in formation. 
38 The Battle of Pylos (the calamity of the Lacedaemonians on the island of Sphacteria) in 425 BCE 
was an excellent example of this statement. Thucydides records that the Athenians "as of what ordered 
by Demosthenes they separated [the men] into 200 [parts] and more, and in less，having taken the 
highest of the places, in order that most desperation [be] to the enemies by surrounding in all direct-
ions and they would not defend against which [and know not] how to fight, but would become attack-
ed on all sides by the throng — if they go for the front, be thrown [by missiles] by the back, and if the 
flank, by those arrayed at the other side, they would be always in rear to them, wherever they moved, 
there would be the enemies light-armed men, and the most difficult [to deal with]’ having battle with 
arrows and javelins and stones and slings out of many; as they were not to come to them; for they were 
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positive psychological reinforcement made by the triumph of the Persian Wars, many Greeks 
still had more confident on the hoplite tradition. The Messenians persuaded Demosthenes to 
attack the Aetolians by the reason that "they are used in light arms and not difficult to subdue, 
before they joined-together"^^ and Demosthenes had also placed his trust on this judgment, 
finally resulted in this mishap. 
The experience of the Battle of Aegitium had stimulated the Athenians to improve the 
quality of their light troops. At the Battle of Pylos in next year, 425 BCE, the Athenians had 
mustered on-board troops with light-armed troops including archers and peltasts in total of 
1,600 and other light-armed, while the traditional hoplites were absent/® Through learning 
from the experience, the Athenians had improved their light-armed infantry, having made it a 
reliable arm for consolidating their maritime supremacy. By this time, a new term had emerg-
ed in Greek military history - the peltast. The peltasts had modus operandi much similar to 
that of javelin-throwers, but in addition each of them bore a light shield, crescent in shape. 
The word pelte first appears in the work of Herodotus, describing the fashion of Thracian 
infantry as "with javelins and peltai and small draggers."^' Probably, the Greeks adopted the 
usage of the pelte from the Thracians and had emulated their modus operandi-, and later the 
word peltastes thus had become a Greek word for a special form of light-armed infantry. The 
superior in retreating and to go pursuit as [their enemies] retreating" [ArnioaBevouc; SE td^avToc; 
SiEOTriaav K a t d S iaKomouc; Kal TTXEIOUC;, eaxi 5 ’ f\ ^Adaoouq , T(I)V xtopicov xd [iETEcopoxaxa Xa(36vT£(；, 
OTTCOC； OTl 7T入£�CnT| ClTTOpia f| TOIC； TTO入£|i[OlC； 7TaVTax60£V K£KUK入CO|li;VOl<； Kol [ir] TipOC； O Tl 
dvTiTd^covTai, diXA’ （ ! i | i ( p i ( 3 o入 o i "yiYv�VTCU T(U TtXiiSei, £i |iev xolc; npoaOev ETiioiev, iJTro TCOV KaTomv 
(3a入入6|i£vcn’ ei 6e TOIC; T:入cryioic;, vnb TWV £KaT£pco0£v KapaTexaYfievcuv. Kaxd vcuxou TE a id EjisWov 
aiJToIc;, fi x^pi^aeiav, oi 7ToAi|iicn EaeaOai \|/iXol, Kal oi dTToptbTaxoi, TO^eu|iaai Kal dKOvxioic; Kal 入 [ 0 o u ; 
Kal (J(pev66vaic; EK TTO入入oi3 EXOVIREC; dAK^V- oiq |IRI6E eTieXOelv oiov TE rjv- (PEUYOVTSC; re ydp eKpdtouv Kal 
dvaxcopouaiv eneKeivTo] (Thuc., 4.32.3-4). And later the Lacedaemonians were "easier than before, 
themselves being not in surround from the flank" [paov 5’ oi AaK£6AIII6VIOI QJIUVOVTO T] EV TCO npiv, 
oi)K ouar|c; acpwv xfjc; KUKXCOOECOC; EC; XA TT入DVICI] (Thuc., 4.35.3). 
39 (Thuc., 3.94.4): [xal OKeufj 入fj o心 xaXe^bv dnecpaivov, Ttplv ^U|i(3ori0fioai, Kcrracrrpa-
(pfjvai], 
4° (Thuc., 4.32.2): "each of them (the Athenian soldiers) equipped [in their own ways], and eight 
hundred archers and peltasts no less than these." [coc; EKaaxoi eaKEuaa^ievoi, xo^oxai Se oKtaKoaioi Kal 
TreXxaaTal OI)K E入(ICJOOUC; TOUTCUV]. The later evident states these men included also slingers (Thuc” 
4.32.3). 
41 (Hdt., 7.75): [rrpoc; 8e dKovTid te xai rr以TCU; Kal eyxEipiSia [aiKpd]. Diodorus adopts pelte in de-
scribing the shields of the Persian army in the Battle of Thermopylae (Diod.，11.7.3). 
Ill 
peltasts had driven special attention from the Greek authors, especially Thucydides, and often 
they were distinguished from general light troops or even aoploi (dorr入m), literally men with-
out armors.42 Apparently, they were at the middle of the hoplite and the light-armed infantry 
regarding to the level of armament. In contemporary sense, "peltast" was commonly referred 
to javelin-thrower with pelte, nevertheless, Plato suggests that it had later become a general 
reference to light-armed troops equipped with different kinds of missile weapon /� Hence-
forth, as the rise of maritime supremacy of the Athenians, light-armed troops had developed 
into an inseparable part in the Greek warfare. 
It was not only light-armed infantry had risen to be noted, cavalry, by the chance of the 
Peloponnesian Wars, had attracted the attention of the Greeks, extracting their memory of the 
Persian Wars after so many years. To the Greeks in the southern peninsular, who were origin-
ally not adapted to horsemanship, their initiatives of adopting cavalry was to employ its mul-
tifunctional tactical value. Cavalry, unlike infantry, were more tactical unit than a thong; 
therefore, instead of number, it made use of their speed to perform many tactical functions. 
However, he (Pericles) constantly sent out horsemen attacking those fore-runners 
of the army to ravage the fields near the polis\ and a short cavalry fighting hap-
pened in Phrygia of a squadron of Athenian horsemen with them the Thessalians 
against the Boeotian horsemen, in this, the Athenians and Thessalians held not in-
ferior as far as it happened to turn because of the coming to the aid of their hop-
lite to the Boeotians. 
l7T7T£a(； jieVTOl £^ £7T£[ITT£V aiEl TOU |if] 7Tpo6p6|iOU(； CCTIO tfjc； aTpatldc； garriTTTOVTaC； 
£<; Touq dYpou(； T0U(； eyyuc; Tfj<; TioXeioc; KaKoupyeiv- KQI iTiTTO^axia TI<; — S V E T O Pp-
axeia ev OpuytoK； TD)v T E AOrivaicov TE XE I evl TCOV IHTTECOV KQI €)£aact入OI(； |a£T, av-
T(i)v TTpoc; TOUC； BoitoTtbv�TTTTSC^’ £V f], OUK eXaaGov eaxov oi A0r|vaioi KQI ©eaaa-
入 o i [aexpi ou 7TpoaPor|0r|advTa)v TOIC; Boitutoic; Td)v OTrXixajv Tponf] eyevETo au-
T D ) V . . . 
42 For Thucydides, see (Thuc., 4.93.3; 129.2); and for Xenophon, see (Xen. Hell., 2.4.12). 
43 (Plat. Laws, 8.834A): "to the whole of the peltast it [is] necessary for a match in the fighting of 
pancratium, of completing by arrows and peltai and javelins and stones by hands and slings" 
[TT£入TacjTiKfiv 6E 6入r|V avTiaxqaavrac; 6ei rfj TOU NAYKPATIOI) |IDXN> TO^OK; KQI 入TCUC; Kai dKovxioic; Kai 
入(6cp £K XEipoc; T£ Kai a(p£v66vai(； <i|ii入入⑴fi6vtov]. 
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Thucydides, The Histories of the Peloponnesian War. II, 22.2 
Pericles had shown how the horsemen could do in fulfilling this kind of military mission. 
Working alone, horsemen could be the vanguard and the scout of the army or they could take 
the chance to attack those small parties of infantry. They were also skirmishers like the light-
armed infantry; they could keep the infantry of the opponents in check by their javelins or 
arrows and simultaneously could be a great threat to the scattered foot soldiers if chance be 
given. Cavalry, so, was an ideal arm to deal with infantry, both heavy and light. For hoplites, 
although horsemen could not challenge phalanx in the front, they would be an excellent auxi-
liary arm to the main army by flanking and rearing the enemy phalanx; horsemen, with their 
attached infantry bearing shield, would easily advance towards light troops with their swift-
ness. While the usage of light-armed infantry was becoming more frequent, the value of cava-
lry was increasing analogously. One of the main functions of cavalry was to guard the flank 
and the rear of the phalanx, preventing these positions from the attack of enemies - to free 
their allied hoplites from the distraction of light troops. 
For the horsemen of the Syracusans being many [were] to do harmed in great 
degree their light and crowd, of them not having ready the horsemen; so that they 
[were] to take the place where they will not be harmed under the horsemen worthy 
of recording. 
Toi)c; ydp dv \|/i入0心(；roue; 09tov KQI TOV OXAOV Td)v ZupaKoaiwv TOUC; iTTTteac; TTO-
入Xo{)c; ovTac;, a(piai 5’ ou rrapovrtov ITTTTECOV, pXarrteiv dv fieydXa- oi3Ta) Se 
9ai X T O P I O V 69ev U T T O T(I)V M N G T O V ou (3入cinj/ovTai d^IA Xoyou 
Thucydides, The Histories of the Peloponnesian War: VI, 64.1 
As the example of the Athenians in their Sicilian Expedition shows, army without the 
support of cavalry against army with adequate support of it would be so inferior. Not only the 
Athenians had to spend extra attention to their place of encampment, as Hermocrates the 
Syracusan says that the Athenians were not worth of frightening because "no horsemen would 
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be following them."'^^ The lack of horsemen was proved a great distress to the Athenians as 
even they were victorious at the hoplites and light troops, they could not pursue the Syra-
cusans because of their horsemen/^ 
The Greek battle environment had been changing in the entire century. The introduct-
ion of different new elements into the battlefield had disfavored the original balance of hoplite 
supremacy. As to encounter the more complicating battlefield, the Greeks had gradually ad-
opted the usage of light-armed infantry and cavalry. Xenophon records that "wishing to train 
it, he (Agesilaus) offered prizes for the cavalry squadrons, which ride best, and for the hoplite 
battalions, which has the best of bodies; and he offered prizes for peltasts and archers, who 
are appeared reaching the best works.”46 The impact of the Persian Wars was tremendous; 
thus, even though the triumph had favored the Greeks to maintain their idiosyncratic military 
culture, its aftermath had brought the whole Greece into unstable circumstance. Henceforth, 
the military culture of ancient Greece had been transforming from the older segment into the 
new era. 
Response of the Hoplite Tradition 
The calamity of the Lacedaemonians on the island of Sphacteria in 425 BCE was by all 
means astonishing as Thucydides describes "throughout the war this became the greatest of all 
that beyond thinking to the G r e e k s . T h e defeat of the Lacedaemonians, who were most 
famous of their war-like ethos had marked an enormous challenge shocking the entire hoplite 
tradition. To the Lacedaemonians, its direct impact was tremendous and painful as after this 
Thucydides records that "so beyond the custom they (the Lacedaemonians) organized 400 
horsemen and archers, and in the war-matters, they now became more timid than any time, 
44 (Thuc., 6.37.1): [oiq Y ' ETRIATA^ AI ou9' ITTTTOUC; DKO入OU6IIAOVTA(；]. 
See (Thuc., 6.70). 
46 (Xen. Ages., 1.25): [daKfjaai 6e auTo (3ou入6|_i£voc; &6入a Trpou6qKe Kal xaic; 'iTXTTiKaic; xd^eaiv, 
qxic; KpctTiata iTTTTEuoi, Kal taic; 6TT入ITIKALC;，f]Tic; d p i a r a ATDFIDXCOV EXOI- KQI TTEXtaoxaic; 6£ Kal 
To^otaK； 入 a TTpou0r|Kev, oitivec; KpdTiatoi t a TrpoaqKOVxa epya (paivoivTo]. 
47 (Thuc., 4.40.1): [rrapa yvcbjiriv re Sr; 入 i cn ra TWV KARA TOV TOUTO TOT(;''EAAr|(jiv EY^'ETO]. 
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having been involved in a naval struggle beside their existing form of armament, and in that 
against the Athenians, with whom the attempt was not always lacking of credit to fulfill. 
However, the military ethos which bound with the hoplite tradition was too strong to be 
overpowered; and being so organic a form rooted in the Greek military history, it had shown 
vivacious ingenuity towards the challenges. Indeed, this single case was dramatic to the mind 
of every Greek - for not even the Athenians had faith to achieve such a victory. About the 
time the Athenians being landed on the island, their light troops still had no confident in their 
own as Thucydides says that "at first they had turned away from the mind and were subjected 
to the Lacedaemonians.’，49 And later, despite light-armed infantry and cavalry were gradually 
becoming essential in Greek warfare, the usage of hoplite was still indispensably pivotal. First, 
the hoplite as heavy infantry was fundamentally used to provide the mass of men for combat 
in general situation - as gifted by their number and heavy armor, they could endure military 
hardship in battle, or in special cases for any decisive battle among two powers. Numerous 
later accounts still demonstrate the strength of hoplites. Although light troops could distract 
the hoplite, however, being the same as what we had mentioned, they could not prevent the 
hostile phalanx from entering their own territory and thus ravage on their land. For instance, 
as when King Agesilaus was leading the Lacedaemonians into the territory of the Corinthians, 
Xenophon records that "at first the no-armor soldiers of the adversary had made great harm, 
throwing and shooting at them from upon the right. But as they went down to the sea, they 
advanced in this way through the plain, and ravaging and burning the land."^° So, in spite of 
the tactical value of light-troops and cavalry, the modus vivendi of the Greeks as a sedentary 
48 (Thuc., 4.55.2): [toare napd TO eicoGoc; iTiTTEac; XETpaKoalouc; KaxeaTi^aavTo KQI xo^oxac;, eq re r a 
Tto入£|_UKd, EiTTEp TTOTE, |i(i入lOTct Sfj OKvripoTepol EyEvovTo u^v£aT(i)T£c; Kapa xrjv uKdpxouaav a(pd)v 
�5eav Tfjc; TrapaaKEufjc; vauTiKO) dytovi, Kal TOUTIO rrpoc; A0r|vaiouc;, ok; T O jif] eKix£ipoi)[i£vov aiel 
e入入iTi(； f|v Tfjc; 6oKT]aed)(； xi npa^eiv]. 
49 (Thuc., 4.34.1): [toanep OT£ npwTov d7Te(3aivov xfj SeSou入cofiSvoi coc; £TTI AaK£6ai|iovioi)<;]. 
And this was not much changed even later in the Battle of Lachaeum in 391 BCE during the Corinthian 
War(Xen. / / e / / . , 4.4.16). 
(Xen. Hell., 4.2.14-15): [TO [iev TRPAJTOV EK TCOV unepSe^ICOV (3(IXAOVT£<; AUTOUC; Kal TO^EUOVTEC; [ID入A 
KaK(I)(； EKoiouv oi "yu|JvfiT£c; T(I)v drvTmd入(ov. cbc; 5k KaTe(3r|aav eni 6(i入crrrav，xauTfi npofjaav 6id xou 
TTESIOU, Te|ivovTe(； Kal KCXOVTEC; Tr]V X^OPAV-]. 
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people did not allow them to abandon their defense, leaving their crops ravaged and their 
homes and trees cut down just like the Macedonians once did.^' For continuous ravage of the 
land would definitely starve the people, and, as a result, not a polis, even with wall, could 
defend herself without safeguarding her own land.^^ Even for the Athenians, they had but to 
surrender themselves to the Lacedaemonians after being cut off from overseas supply of 
food.53 So, under such circumstance, a reliable number of hoplites, who were most eager to 
participate in the defending of their own country lands and fields, was still necessary. And 
there is no wonder to comprehend the illustrations of providing armors to the light troops so 
as to arm them as hoplites during the Peloponnesian War. Hermocrates recommended to the 
Syracusans after their defeat in the Battle of Olympieium in 415 BCE saying that "in this 
winter they should get ready the hoplite, providing armors to whom is not [a hoplite], so they 
will be the most in number."^'^ As in the same manner, Thucydides records that Salaethus the 
Mytilenaean provided armors for the commons as the urgent measure to encounter the 
Athenians;55 and similarly the 500 Argive hoplites whom the Athenians equipped.^^ 
While the mutation of Greek military culture had been initiated, the hoplite tradition, 
being greatly challenged, had shown its tenacity towards this and, on the other hand, had pre-
served the Greek ethos of warfare through proving itself essential in battles. The hoplite tradi-
tion in Greek military culture was resolute in reacting to the upcoming challenges from the 
changing battle environment. In poleis which had not participated in the Archidamian War, the 
influence of new elements in warfare was by no means significant. For example, the Argives, 
who were completely isolated from the previous war by being the ally of both the Athenians 
51 See (Thuc., 2.100.5-6). 
52 For instance, the fall of Plataea in 427 BCE (Thuc., 3.52.1), and some cases during the Corinthian 
War, such as the turning of the Corinthians towards the Lacedaemonians (Xen. Hell., 4.4.1). 
“ S e e the stratagem of Lysander of starving the Athenians (Xen. Hell., 2.2.2) and the submission of the 
Athenians (Xen. Hell., 2.2.10, 21). 
(Thuc., 6.72.4): [Kai iv TCO x e i f J ^V I TOUTCO TiapaaKEudatoai T O 6TT入ITIK(!)V，oiq te ^^ nXa [.IR] saxiv £K7TO-
pi(oVT£C；, OTTCOC； d)C； TT入EkTTOL EaOVTCU]. 
55 See (Thuc.，3.37.2). 
56 See (Thuc., 8.25.1). 
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and the Lacedaemonians, had no conscious to the changing in the warfare; thus, as a result, 
their army was not accompanied by cavalry when they were making hostile to the Lacedae-
monians at the peace period." And finally, by the triumph in the Battle of Argos in 418 BCE, 
the Lacedaemonians were able to recover the fame and honor which they had lost on the isle -
they had shown how beneficial was their military training and obedience to order in 
hand-to-hand fighting. "The Lacedaemonians [exhorting] one by another with the war-songs 
among themselves, they held of what they had learnt the admonition of the memory that to 
those being brave, knowing that practice of deeds out of many [was] greater saving than short 
admonition of words, however well they were spoken."^^ And after they had overwhelmed the 
Argives and their allies, the Lacedaemonians regained their supremacy in land. 
And the blame by the Greeks that time charging of the cowardice because of the 
calamity on the island (Sphacteria) and of other ill-advisedness and dilatoriness, 
they wiped out by this single deed, they thought indeed by ill-fortune that they 
were made coward, but they being still [the same] in mind. 
Kal Tfjv UTTO T(I)v'EAAT^ VCOV T6T£ eTri(p£po[i£vriv aiTiav ec; T£ [la入aidav 6ia Tf]v £v xfj 
VT^ACP ^uficpopdv Kal ec; TFJV &入入R|V (I(3ou入[av T £ xal P P A F I U T F J T A evi E P Y C P T O U T W 
(bieXijacrvTro，xuxn toe; £66KOI)V KaKi(6|ievoi, yvtbiiri 8k oi auxoi eti ovtec;. 
Thucydides, The Histories of the Peloponnesian War: V, 75.3 
Hence the traditional military value and ethos built in the Heroic Age and consolidated 
by the continuous practice of hoplite warfare in the early Archaic period was retained in their 
form. Practically, regular phalanx of hoplites had employed light troops and horsemen as 
auxiliary arms or in an opposite sense, the light-troops and horsemen had to rely on the sup-
port of allied phalanx to optimize their functions. Light-armed infantry was more vulnerable 
to attack and especially fragile to the charge of horsemen. Therefore, the best way to protect 
them from being routed before they would get the best chance to play their role was to stat-
“ I n 418 BCE, see (Thuc., 5.59.3). 
58 (Thuc., 5.69.2): [AaKe6ai|i6vioi bi. KQO' EKctaTouc; re Kal [IETQ TCOV TTO入£[IIK(I)v v6|.IA)v EV acpiaiv aux-
oic; d)v T^ TTiaTavTo Tf]v napani入£umv Tf|(； [ivqiirjc; dyaSoic; ouaiv enoiouvTo, eiSorec; epycov ek tto入XoO 
|a£XETr|v TT入£[10 acp(ouaav f ] 入 6 i ' oXiyou Ka入(!)(； piiGelaav napaiveaiv]. 
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ion them with the array of the hoplites. For instance, Agesilaus had arrayed his light troops 
inside the square of the phalanx so as to prevent them from the attack of the Thessalian horse-
men;59 and during the rebellion of the Athenians towards the rule of the oligarchic Thirty, 
Thrasybulus, the commander of the rebels, had stationed the peltasts and the light-troops be-
hind the phalanx, and behind this the slingers^® - on one hand to cover them, and on the other 
to dissimulate that the rebellion army was merely composed of hoplites. Consequentially, 
hoplites were still the ruler of land even to the time of Theban supremacy. Epaminondas, who 
is thought to be the one contributing most to the Theban supremacy, had paid special attention 
to the organization of hoplites. 
He (Epaminondas) used to declare it is necessary that the body of the hoplites to 
be trained not only in athletic but also in military affair; because of this he was 
hostile to the fat ones, and he expelled any such man from the army saying that 
three or four shields would not even scarcely protect his belly, because of this he 
was not to see his lower part. 
Tcov 6k 671 入 i T d r v 6£Tv ctKecpaivev eivai TO OLOfda 7£YU|ivaa|i£vov OUK d0A.r|TiK(I)c; |i6-
vov di入入& Kal aTpaTia)TIKD)(；- 6i6 Kal xoic; no入uodpKoic; ejio入印£I，KQI rrva T O I O U T O V 
DITTT^ Axiae xfjc; axpaxidc; eirrtov o n 入u; aurou CNCETTOM xfjv Y A A X E P A CIOTTISEC; xpeic; F] 
riooapeq, 8i' T]V A U X ecopaKev auxou T O aiSoiov. 
Plutarch, Moralia: 192C-D 
The military specialization of Epaminondas was meaningful to the development of the 
hoplite tactics because it indicates the increasing demand for the military drilling of hoplites, 
who in the past had been conscripted peasantry soldiers, to cope with the more complicating 
battlefield. Simple war sentiment and practice had proved to be insufficient, while the drill-
ing like that of the Spartans was esteemed as presented by many contemporary writers like 
Plato and Xenophon, who had his own son trained in the Spartan fashion. The Greeks were 
aspired by the continuous warfare since the end of the Persian Wars to renovate the hoplite 
' ' S e e (Xen. f/e//., 4.3.4-5). 
See (Xen. Hell., 2.4.12). 
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warfare. Plutarch reports that "this the greatest they had accused Agesilaus the king, on ac-
count of his rendering the Boeotians matching to the Lacedaemonians by the continuous and 
frequent expedition breaking into Boeotia."^' By chiefly the experience of the Battle of Nem-
ea and the Battle of Coronea in 394 BCE, in which the Lacedaemonians had shown their sup-
eriority in land,62 Epaminondas had modified the traditional tactics of phalanx warfare some-
times known as the "diagonal phalanx" - in the manner that the focus of the formation had 
shifted from the right to the left, so as to encounter and then to defeat the strong right wing of 
the opposing enemies. 
However, more importantly, the spiritual essence of hoplite warfare was remained as the 
dominating military ethos in Greek warfare. The nature of hoplite warfare required courage 
far more than others, as the endurance of the infantry formation was the determinative factor 
of the entire battle. After the calamity of the Lacedaemonians on the island of Sphacteria, Bra-
sidas the Spartan had led an army for an expedition outside the southern peninsular, and as to 
exhort his men for the lost courage, he reiterated the importance of courage as: "for it is pro-
per to be in the war-matters with bravery not because of the presence of allies each time, but 
because of intrinsic excellence, nor to fear the mass of the other one, you who are not coming 
from such kind of polities, but in which not the many rule the few, but rather the minority 
[rule] the majority, having acquired the power by not other means but to be superior in 
fighting.，’63 This admonition of Brasidas was by all means traditional and familiar to the 
Greeks, emphasizing on the virtue of courage and manliness like the poems of Tyrtaeus. 
Although politically, Athens and Sparta were hostile to each other, virtually, they had shared 
61 (Plut. Lyc., 13.6): [KQI TO I JTO ye [idXiata K A T R I Y O P O O A I V AyriaiXdou TOU PaaiAicoc; uaxEpov, cbc; talc; 
CRUVEXEAI KCD NUKVALC; eic; TF]V Boicoxiav £|I(3o\aic; KCD axpaxeiaic; TOI)(； 0R|(3aiouc; DIVTIRRD入OUC; TOIC; ACCKE-
Saifiovioic; KataaKeudaavToc;]. 
62 For the Battle ofNemea, see (Xen. Hell., 4.2.18-23); and for the Battle of Coronea, see (Xen. Hell., 
4.3.15-20). In both battles the Lacedaemonians defeated the opposite left wing with their strong right 
wing, so, though their own left was defeated, they won the final victory by outflanking the enemies. 
63 (Thuc., 4.126.2): [dYciQoic; yap eivai u|ilv TTpoaqKEi t a 7ToAi[iia ov 6ia ^u[j|idxcov Trapouaiav £Kda-
TOTE, (^ 入入 1^ 6i' oiKEiav dp£TT]v, KCD |IR|5ev TtXiiOoc; TTE(PO(3iia0ai erepcov, oiye 会 ano TTOXITEIWV TOIOU-
Tiov f^ K£T£, £v olc; 01) TTO入入oi (!)入["ytov dp^ouoiv, ixXkh TTAEOVCOV [id入XOV eXdaaouc;, O U K d入入(p xivl KTi]ad-
^levoi Tfjv 6uvaaTe(av f] xw |iax6|i£voi Kpatdv]. 
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the same esteem of courage as the prime virtue of manliness. Pericles, in his immortal Fune-
ral Oration, praised those who had died for Athens saying that "for it [is] right to put forth the 
manly virtue [to go] into the wars for the fatherland for to those more inferior; for removing 
evil by the common goodness, they helped greater than what they did wrong out of private. 
And until the later period when the Thebans had the hegemony, the similar laud was still 
present: 
He (Epaminondas) used to say the death in war is the most beautiful. 
£入eys 58 TOV £v rroAijitp Odvarov dvai KdAAicrrov. 
Plutarch, Moralia: 192C 
Being very different to the nature of light-armed infantry and horsemen, manly valor 
and courage were crucial for maintaining the phalanx formation. The modus operandi of light 
troops and horsemen was very opposite to that of hoplites. They were skirmishers and thus 
they fought in scattered position instead of formation. Being not formed in rigid formation, 
they were by nature free to flee, making good use of their agility in locomotion. And even in 
the view of the commander, their endurance in battle was not severely needed, or in another 
sense, they were better to flee for tactical purpose so as to minimize the casualty - for they 
were more vulnerable to attack both by hands and missiles and to retreat while hard pressed 
was a reasonable measure for this. And in addition, as the light troops and horsemen some-
times being mercenaries, it was unpreventable that they had little faith in fighting and dimin-
ished endurance as they would unlikely to risk their own lives so easily for money. On the 
opposite manner, the nature of hoplite warfare had much more motive to maintain the war 
ethos which they had inherited from as early as the Heroic Period. Since private action would 
affect all others in the infantry formation, fleeing of individual hoplite in the line was causal 
(Thuc., 2.42.3): [Kai yap TOIC; 入入a xeipooi SiKaiov TF]v ic, Touq noXeiaoix; unep xfjc; TrarpiSoc; 
dvSpayaGiav TTpoT(0£a0ai- dyaOcu yap KaKov dcpaviaavrec; KOIVCOC; [id入入OV cbcpd入qaav f] EK TIOV i6ituv 
耿 a\|/av]. 
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to the decline of the entire formation; as a result, the courage to endure hardship and keep in 
line was vital for the whole army. In order to maximize the strength of the phalanx, the com-
mander had to make exhortation to strengthen the volition of the hoplites to hold their line 
and to reproach the enemy. Therefore, before the collision of two armies, hoplites of both 
sides were often exhorted by various reasons, all aiming to urge them to fight with valor. 
(Brasidas): "And these have the fearful threatening to those inexperienced; for the 
mass is terrible by sight and intolerable to the loudness of the cry, and because the 
idle brandishing of arms has any sign of threat. But to meet in battle against them 
they will not remain the same in these; for having no order they would have been 
dishonored to leave any place hard-pressed, and the flight and the attack of them, 
having equal expectation of beauty, has the courage unproven (and most of all 
fighting as one is his own master would provide an excuse of the one to save 
himself becomingly), and of this they believe to frighten you more trustworthy 
than to risk to go into hands; for if so they have taken that before this." 
ouToi 8k Tfjv 入 入 r | a i v |i£v exouai toic; ciTTeipoic; cpopepdv- Kal ydp rrAiiQei oxj/eioc; 
6eivol Kal Pofjc; [iEyeSei dcpopriToi, f] T£ 5id KEvfjc; enavdoeioiq rajv onXcov ix^i ri-
vd 6T]Atoaiv (irrei入fjc;. 7Tpoa|i£T^ai Se roiq ijTio|i£vouaiv autd oi)}( ofioioi- ouxe yap 
Tci^iv e}(ovTe<; a iaxuvGekv dv Xineiv xivd x^opciv Pia(6[i£voi, f] T£ (puyr] Kal £(po-
6o(； ai!)T(I)v TAR]V E X O U A A 6 6 ^ A V T O U KCX入OO d v e ^ E X E Y K T O V Kal t o dvSpgiov £ X £ I (au-
TOKPCTTCOP 6e [ IDXRI (I( I入 ICTT’ dv K Q I Tipocpaaiv T O U A C P ( £ A 0 A I T I V I TTPETIOVTIOC; Kopio-
£i£)’ TOU T£ ec; x^^pac; e\0£iv n ia toTepov TO £K(po(3Tiaeiv ujidc; dKivSuvtoc; T^Youviai-
EKELVTP ydp dv Tipo T O U T O U E X P W V T O . 
Thucydides, The Histories of the Peloponnesian War: IV, 126.5 
The speech of Brasidas to his men doubtlessly presents this sentiment of warfare. And 
the success of Brasidas had again invigorated the Lacedaemonians of their entrusted way of 
war, and had driven away the disconsolation of questioning their long-practiced customs in 
waging war. Throughout the entire Peloponnesian War and extending to its aftermath, in spite 
of the mutation in the Greek military practice, the hoplite tradition could still vigorously res-
ponse to the upcoming challenges initiated by the Persian Wars. Pure hoplite battle in the old 
fashion had come to distinct because the introduction of new arms had proven this to be dis-
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satisfying for winning. Instead, the hoplite warfare had affiliated with the usage of light-
armed infantry and horsemen, the new elements having introduced into Greek military culture 
during this period, making itself more adaptable to the mutating battlefield. Spiritually, the 
identical emphasis of audacity inherited from the origins of Greek warfare was further inter-
nalized, becoming the most fundamental core of the Greek military ethos. 
The remaking of the new modus operandi with new elements and the idiosyncratic had 
inspired the later development of Greek military culture, giving the primitive foundation to 
the Macedonian fashion of warfare; however, the foundation for the emergence of the hoplite 
warfare had been undermined by the prolongation of warfare since the century BCE, which 
in times had re-sculptured the idiosyncrasy of Greek warfare. 
Militarization of the Greek Way 
The most perspicuous and influential changing in the idiosyncrasy of Greek warfare 
during the 5* century BCE was its militarization, which had transformed the nature of warfare 
from primitive behaviors in the earlier period into the mechanism of driving military expan-
sion, founding the prerequisite for warmongers and favoring the development of warfare into 
the root of mandating the composition of different aspects in the human society. Although, the 
military practice had not changed much in form - for the hoplite warfare, though challenged, 
was still the core of all arms, the internal elements of warfare had undergone fundamental 
deformation. This deformation began with the deteriorating of citizenry conscription in the 
enrollment system and the uprising of mercenaries. For centuries before the Peloponnesian 
War, Greek soldiers were self-sustained citizens - they prepared their own provision of 
materials and manpower and armed themselves with accordance to their economic ability. 
And most importantly, military service was considered a duty for all citizens. For instance, 
Athens had divided her citizens into 4 classes under Solon, stratifying different groups of the 
citizens to provide different military services - the first two classes, the wealthiest of the polis, 
were enrolled as horsemen, the third as the core hoplites, and the fourth as simple fashion of 
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light- or even bare-armed infantry. At this time, the participation of army was mostly volunt-
ary since for most cases the purpose of mustering an army was either defensive or revenging. 
However, the prolonged warfare, which incepted with the aftermath of the Persian Wars, ext-
ending into the Peloponnesian War and the 4出 century BCE, had given rise to an alien kind of 
military service to the Greeks. In contrast to the citizenry service, the misthophoroi ([iia0o(p6-
poi), which originally means "those paid," had henceforth become the group of professional 
soldiers who fought as mercenaries, and thus, instead of the duty to state and people, they en-
deavored for money and individual selves. 
Although the practice of paying men for military service was not alien to the contemp-
orary world,65 its flourishing in southern Greek Peninsular was largely the product of the sea-
faring of the Athenians. Aristophanes hints such relationship by putting the verse "mercenary 
triremes”66 in the laud to Poseidon in his play Knight. Military service in triremes as either 
crews or marines was extracurricular to the ordinary ideology of warfare. The sailors had to 
leave their native land, venturing themselves to the dark sea; and moreover, the work of oars-
men, especially the upper row of the trireme, was extremely toilsome. ^ ^ Maritime service was 
a heavy burden for the hoplites, whom the state traditionally conscripted to fulfill military ser-
vice, because they would have to abandon their property to join the adventurous overseas ex-
peditions while the return was not promised. Therefore, this form of service was greatly irrit-
ating to the agrarian society, which found the environment for hoplite warfare; as a result, 
those from the lower class who were not landed filled up these vacancies, taking this opport-
unity to change their lives. Payment to them was necessary as they were naked in property, 
making them not possible to be self-sustainable like the hoplites, and they were those who had 
the least incentive to serve the state, owing to the fact that they had no possessions for them to 
65 E.g., Diodorus reports that Gelon of Sicily had 10,000 of mercenaries (Diod., 11.72.3). 
66 ( A r i s t o p h . Kn., 555 ) : [|iiaGo(p6poi xpqpEic;]. 
67 Oarsmen were hard laborers with low payment (see n. 69). And the oar for the upper row was the 
longest among the three of a trireme, making it the heaviest of all. 
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defend. Payment to ship crews was the prologue to Hellenic mercenaries. During the Pelopon-
nesian War, employment of ship crews to enlarge the army for inland expedition of fleets was 
a common practice to the Athenians. For example, Demosthenes employed all crews of 70 
triremes to be fighting men in assaulting the Lacedaemonians on the island of Sphacteria^® 
and Thrasyllus had equipped 5,000 ship crews as peltasts， 
Thucydides says that there were 250 triremes in service for the Athenians at the begin-
ning of the Peloponnesian War,?�which was a mark for the enormous business of the Athen-
ians in using money to wage war. Indeed, the payment for military service was not only limit-
ed to ship crews, yet, it extended to be a general trend for employing soldiers. The transmar-
ine warfare in the Peloponnesian War was disfavoring to ordinary method of conscription, and, 
therefore, the burdensome campaigns required reward of money to encourage the participa-
tion of citizens, especially the hoplite class. As Thucydides records, the Athenians had to pay 
2 Attic drachmas to each hoplite, 1 for the hoplite himself and 1 for his attendant, in the siege 
of Potidaea in Chalcidice.^' Despite paying citizens for military service, states also employed 
foreign mercenaries, both Greeks and barbarians, to strengthen their own military power. The 
mercenaries were mainly auxiliary light-armed infantry and cavalry since most Greek poleis 
could not train these arms on their own. For instance, the warfare of the Lacedaemonians, led 
by Brasidas, and the Athenians in the northern peninsular and the Balkan from 423 to 422 
68 See (Thuc., 4.32.2). 
69 See (Xen. Hell., 1.2.1). 
70 See (Thuc., 3.17.1). 
71 See (Thuc., 3.17.4). The wage of 2 drachmas for each hoplite, including his attendant, in Potidaea 
was obvious extraordinary high as Thucydides comments. It seems that the wage for military service in 
the 5'h century BCE was standardized. For hoplite or other light troops, Thucydides records that in the 
treaty in between the Athenians and the Argives that the daily wage of each hoplite was 3 Aeginetan 
obols, nearly 1 Attic drachma (Thuc., 5.47.6). The wage purposed by the Lacedaemonians in their 
treaty with their allies to go against the Thebans suggests the same wage for hoplite (Xen. Hell., 5.2.21). 
For ship crews, Xenophon suggests that 3 Attic obols for each sailor per day, about half of that for 
hoplites at the end of the Peloponnesian War (Xen. Hell. 1.5.7). For horsemen, the wage was double of 
hoplite's (1 Aeginetan drachma) in the aforesaid treaty recorded by Thucydides (Thuc., 5.47.6), while 
Xenophon states that it was four times of it (2 Aeginetan drachmas). This instant increasing of the wage 
of horsemen might be a reflection to the urgent demand of the Lacedaemonians for cavalry to 
encounter their war against the Thebans. 
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BCE engaged active employment of non-citizenry mercenaries for both sides.^^ 
Money, thence, was the power of driving the machine of war; lack of money meant in-
capable of refueling its engine. The incapability of paying the soldiers or the ship crews was 
perilous. Xenophon suggests the situation would be even worse if the provision was cut dur-
ing campaign if sailors and mercenaries were not pa id .?�So it is conspicuous that continuous 
warfare would drain up the wealth of any polis. The Athenians, after their prodigious spend-
ing in the siege of Potidaea, had to send out fleets, sailing around the islands for collecting tax 
from their allies.^^ And Nicias as Thucydides reports said "if they (the Syracusans) now fail-
ed whatsoever troop by not to give maintenance, their affair will be ruined, as assistant troops 
[demand] greater than necessity even being their own."^^ Pericles states clearly the import-
ance of wealth in his speech: 
(Pericles): "for the Peloponnesians are self-sufficient and to them there are pro-
perties neither in private nor in public, besides they [are] inexperienced of pro-
longed and transmarine wars because they themselves wage the one in brief under 
the poverty. And such men are able neither in manning ships nor to sent out 
frequent expedition on foot, being away far from [their] private matters while at 
the same time spending on their own and besides being shut off from the sea; but 
the surpluses sustain the war greater than the forced taxes." 
auToupYoi T£ ydp ekri neXoTiovvi^AIOI KQI OI3T£【5[g oi3T' ev Koivcp [aaTcit eativ 
auToIc;, ETTEita xpovicov T T o 入 K a l Sianovticov direipoi 6ia TO (3PAX&⑴(；auTol i n 
<51入入?^入01)(； UTTO Tieviac; gTricpepeiv. Kal oi T O I O U T O I OI3T£ vauc; TT入r|p)oi3vT£c; O U T £ TTE^CIC; 
axpatiac; TTO入入CITKK； EK7TE|IT[£ IV Suvavxai, CITTO T D ) V tSitov T £ D [ I A ( I N 6 V T £ C ; K Q I CITTO 
Td)v auTd)v 6a7Tav(I)VT£C; KQI TtpoaeTi KQI SaXctaarjc; eipYOjAEvoi- a[ SE Trepiouaiai 
TOUC； 7ToAi}iou(； [i^ L入Xov T] Qi (3(01101 EGcpopal dvexouaiv. 
Thucydides, The Histories of the Peloponnesian War\ I，141.3-5 
72 Both sides employed considerable size of Thracian mercenaries. 1,000 for the Athenians, see (Thuc.， 
4.129.2); and 1,500 for the Lacedaemonians, see (Thuc., 5.6.4). 
73 The sailors of the Lacedaemonian fleet refused to set sail (Xen. Hell., 5.1.13); and the mercenaries 
serving Mnasippus was not obedient (Xen. Hell., 6.2.18). 
74 See (Thuc., 3.17). 
75 (Thuc., 7.48.5): [F^ v re Kal O T I O U V TRIE; vuv RRAPAAKSUFIC; TCO [IF] 6i66vai xpocpqv, (p0£P£LA6AI 
auTujv xa TTpdyiiaTa, ETTiKoupiKcx 入入 o v i] 6i' dvayKric; wanep xa acpetepa ovra]. 
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Pericles stressed how essential wealth was in protracted and prolonged warfare. The us-
age of money in military service, which later became popular practice in Greek warfare, had 
enabled a new kind of military practice for the Greek poleis, having attended a method to mil-
itarize the society, to wage war more vigorously. The traditional Greek warfare was to a large 
extent agrarian in nature. In traditional Greek ideology, the aim of waging warfare was con-
centered on arable lands and the crops produced. Most military campaigns began in early 
summer, just after the crops had been ripen, when the farmers were free from their farm work 
and thus able to arm themselves. Protracted campaigns, therefore, were impractical to the 
traditional method of bellum gerere because ordinary farmers could hardly stay at military 
position for more than a season. In this situation, armies breaking into hostile territories could 
only lay waste their land and retreat to their home after the campaign if they could not capture 
the polis. Four times the Lacedaemonians had broken into Attica since the beginning of the 
Peloponnesian War/^ and, yet, four times they had to retreat back to Peloponnesus without 
doing any harm to Athens, except laying waste the land in Attica. The Long Walls of the 
Athenians, as Hanson states "the most revolutionary development in the history of Greek 
strategy,"^^ had functioned well for protecting Piraeus, the life of Athens. 
On the other hand, the adoption of subscription of the Athenians had enabled them to 
employ triremes, raiding anywhere at anytime as they wished, and, through this, they could 
successfully distract the Lacedaemonians and their allies. Finally, the Lacedaemonians had to 
replenish their military strategy by establishing the fortress in Deceleia. So, if the Long Walls 
were the most revolutionary development in military strategy, the fortress of Deceleia was the 
same revolutionary, though somehow reactionary. Although Deceleia was not the first strong-
hold known in Greek history, the establishing of a fortress in enemy's territory means that the 
warfare was extended to an affair of all-seasons. Firstly, the Lacedaemonians had to maintain 
76 They were in the summer of 431，430, 428, and 425 BCE respectively. 
77 Victor Davis Hanson, A War Like No Other War: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Pelo-
ponnesian War, 26. 
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a garrison for all-seasons in guarding this foreign fortress, while the Athenians, having threat-
ened, "were always on the walls or in ranks with arms, because of the enemies in Deceleia,"^^ 
just being similar to the earlier Greeks.^^ Probably the Lacedaemonians could maintain the 
garrison on their own, but extra-boundary garrisons, later, were mainly composed of mercen-
aries Xenophon records the Corinthian War: 
From this large armies were made ceased on both sides, but the poleis sent out 
garrisons, those [of one side] into Corinth, and those [of the other side] into Sicy-
on, guarding the walls. Indeed, both sides had mercenaries and because of them 
they waged war more vigorously. 
£K bz TouTou aTpQTial |i£v l ieydXai EKateptov SiETTETrauvTo, cppoupouc; 6e TT£|iTToi)-
aai CD 7x6入eic;，a[ DC; KopivGov, CD bk eiq SiKDtova, £CPI3入CITTOV ra T£ixr|. |iia0o-
(p6pou(； Y E |ifiv EKdtepoi 爸 X O V T £ C ; 6ia TOUTCOV £pptu|ievcoc; eTioXijiouv. 
Xenophon, Hellenica: IV, 4.14 
The usage of mercenaries had made the strategy more flexible, and more importantly, to 
liberate, at least to a large degree if not wholly, military activities from agricultural influence. 
And throughout the Peloponnesian War, the transformation in the military practice had 
eventually brought dynamics to the social formation of the Greek society, which was symbio-
tic to the Greek war ethos. Traditional conscription system was based on the social classific-
ation of wealth. The domination of hoplite warfare, therefore, indicated the essential status of 
the hoplite class, which was composed of able free farmers. The continuing of the Pelopon-
nesian War, with different elements to the traditional hoplite warfare, gradually blurred the 
social foundation of Greek warfare. At the first place, the seafaring and the abandoning of 
land warfare of the Athenians had undercut the demand of hoplite in warfare. Instead of 丨 a n d 
force, the Athenians were in great demand of ship crews, which was normally consisted of the 
thetes. So, the Athenians had made use of the hoplite class, the zeugitai to fill up the rows of 
78 ( T h u c . , 8 . 6 9 . 1 ) : [FJAAV 6 ' A 0 r | v a l o i TTCIVTEC; a i d , o【^ITV ESTTI TEIXEI O 【 5 ' e v R D ^ E I , TCOV EV A e K s X E i a n o -
入£|aicov EVEKQ Ecp' i^n入oic;]. 
79 See ( T h u c . , 1.6.1-2). 
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triremes. Thucydides states that the Athenians had "manned 100 ships, having those except 
the hippes and the pentakosiomedimoi, and the metoikoi embarked;"^® and later also records 
that the hoplites served as rowers.^' The taking in of the wealthier hoplite class and the immi-
grants, metoikoi, as ship crews raised a different ideology of warfare - the class division with 
military purpose was gradually decaying, while military service become more general to the 
whole population of the polis. And moreover, the adoption of hiring mercenaries, which open-
ed the opportunity for participating in military service more general to every people, had ag-
grandized the decaying of the middle class monopoly of warfare, if we are proper to name this 
war ethos in such modern term. 
Not only the Athenians had the change in their social formation, the Lacedaemonians, 
through extensive warfare, had underwent changing in their own. The Lacedaemonians had a 
social system being very distinctive to any other Greek poleis - the military elite ruling class 
and the slave class of helots. The tradition of the Lacedaemonians relied heavily on the econ-
omic production of the helots, which enabled the elites of the country to have leisure to train 
themselves as professional soldiers. The helots, being always hostile to the Lacedaemonians, 
had initiated rebellion if chance given, like that in 464 BCE/^ The discontentment of keeping 
the Spartan tradition, the alleged law of Lycurgus, in ruling the helots was severely revealed 
in the Peloponnesian War. The thin population of the ruling class, the Spartiates, around 5,000 
preliminarily, had made the Spartans difficult to hold the population in Laconia when they 
were engaged in a prolonged war.^^ The failure of the Spartans on the island of Sphacteria had 
provoked the anxiety of the Spartans for the helot rebellion once more, finally leading to a 
massacre of 2000 of the boldest helots, and sending out of 700 helots as hoplites to the aid of 
(Thuc., 3 . 1 6 . 1 ) : [^TrXt^PCOOAV VAUQ e K a r o v £O(3dvTec; a u x o i TE nX f i v inrtecov Ka l 7TEVTAKOAIO[J£6T|IVCOV 
Kal oi [ieToiKOi]. 
8丨 See (Thuc.，3.18.4 & 6.91.4). 
82 See (Thuc., 1.101.2). 
“Thucyd ides alludes to it by stating that "It was [the Lacedaemonians] willing with an excuse to sent 
out the helots, it was believed they might not revolt with the present affairs of Pylos [KQI d|.ia tdiv Ei入-
coTcov Pou入ofidvoic; f]v eni npocpdaei £KTTe|i\|/ai, TI npoc; ra napovTa TRIE; ！！心入ou £xo|-I£vq(； vecotepiaco-
aiv]" (Thuc., 4.80.2). 
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Brasidas.84 After the triumph of Brasidas in the northern peninsular, with his own life taken, 
the Lacedaemonians set the helots with him free, with the name neodamodes (veo-
5a|itb5r|c;).85 The word neodamddes, which literally means newly franchised, firstly appears in 
this account of Thucydides, but the rising of this class was obviously earlier than that as the 
historian himself tells that the Lacedaemonians "settled them (the liberated helots with Bra-
sidas) with the neodamddes in Lepreum."®^ These neodamddes and other helots had played an 
active role in the military campaign of the Lacedaemonians in the succeeding period of the 
war and even to the Theban War.^ ^ The rising of the class of neodamddes proves that the 
Lacedaemonians had also undergoing mutation in their own social system. The mutation in 
the social formation and military system indicates the militarization of the Greek society. The 
"total war" involved all the general population, instead of the monopoly of the hoplite class. 
The development of Greek military culture in the 5出 century BCE was a period of trans-
formation - t h e ancient ethos and practices of warfare had experienced challenges. The legacy 
of the Persian Wars with the extraordinary long duration of the Peloponnesian War had shaped 
the new form of military principle in the southern Greek Peninsular. New elements, mainly 
cavalry and light-armed infantry had been introduced into the battlefield and merged with the 
usage of hoplite in the modus operandi of Greek warfare. Not only the modus operandi was 
replenished, the social formation and military system had also been changing to suit the new 
environment. Plutarch concludes this period by recording "and this the great calamity had 
befallen to them (the Lacedaemonians) throughout long time; for they lost many brave men, 
the Lacedaemonian hoplites, being overcome by the peltasts and the mercenaries."®^ So, 
practically, although hoplite warfare had not been wiped out from the Greek warfare, the 
84 See (Thuc., 4.80.3-4). 
See (Thuc.，5.34.1). 
86 (Thuc., 5.34.1): [ai)Toi)(； [ieta T(I)V veo5a|iu)5d)v ic, Aenpeov KaTeaTrjaav]. 
87 See (Thuc., 5.67.1; 7.19.3) and (Xen. Hell., 3.1.4; 3.4.2; 5.2.24). 
(Plut. Ages., 22.2): [KQI TidSoc; TOUTO [ieya 6id rro入入oO ； ( p 6 v o u auvErreaEV auToic;- rro入入obc; yap dv6-
p a q dyaOouc ; 廷 g a 入 o v KpaTr|9evTac; vno xe TIE入TA(JT(I)v DN入ITCIC; Ka l [j iaOocpoptov AaK£6ai[.iovio\JC;]. 
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focus of the military culture was shifting from ordinary hoplites and the class they formed to 
the new form of being, with militarized nature. 
In long term, the Peloponnesian War had set the ground for the development of Greek 
military culture in the century, giving the foundation to the Macedonian uprising and final-




The waning Greek city-states attempted valiantly - but more often trag-
ically —to incorporate new methods of fighting, even though they were 
antithetical to the old amateur hoplite battle and the traditional etiquette 
of agrarian warfare.‘ 
Victor Davis Hanson, "From Phalanx to Legion": 30 
The Evolution of Greek Military Culture 
The evolution of Greek military culture was organic. It was a process deeply influenced 
by experience and memory. The Homeric Warfare was a transitional period in Greek military 
history. Although Homer depicts the Trojan War in Bronze Age, his works are indeed the em-
bodiment of the pre-historic and the historic era. His verses preserve the tradition of the 
Heroic Age, in which heroes mounted on chariots dominated the battlefield; while concurrent-
ly, he alludes to the rising of infantry battle in Archaic Period. His sentiment is conservative 
as he presents a strong cult of bronze in his verses. From studying the early Archaic sources, 
we could leam how the Greeks reinvented the war ideology of the Heroic Age into a new 
form of infantry fighting. 
The hoplite warfare was a kind of amateur fighting at its beginning, and it was also a 
kind of extension of the past idea of war. The emphasis of courage and kinship incarnated the 
spirit of the past. The emergence of hoplite in the Archaic Warfare indicates social change -
the conventional idea on the emergence of a middle class. Though this view is often criticized, 
the dependence on farmers to protect their farmland had nevertheless constituted the outline 
of the idea of warfare in Archaic Period. Hoplite warfare was neither a technological nor a 
I Victor Davis Hanson, "From Phalanx to Legion," in Geoffrey Parker ed. The Cambridge History of 
Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 30. 
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tactical revolution, but much likely a reinvention of past sentiment to fit the new socio-
economic situation. For centuries the Greeks had conducted their war in simple fashion, yet, 
the coming of the Persian Wars had offered severe challenges to the Greeks and the hoplite 
tradition. The final triumph of the Wars proved to the superiority of the Greek way of war. 
The Greek word barbaros ((3dp(3apo(；), henceforth attained meaning beyond its original 
reference to "foreigners" — Plato in his Republic and Aristotle in his Politics, have demon-
strated the ethnic particularity and superiority of Hellenic culture.2 Such belief is strongly 
emphasized by Herodotus. Herodotus has been controversial. He is under the skepticism of 
Plutarch, and of course also modern authors. But the historian represents the prevailing psy-
chology of the contemporary Greeks. 
Were the Persians inferior in valor than the Greeks? We might never know. But for sure, 
the overwhelming of the Persians in Marathon and Plataea had positively reinforced the emot-
ion of the Greeks towards their own custom and practice. They were contented with the Hell-
enocentric military ideology while the concept of the Greek way of war was henceforth 
forged. The status of hoplite warfare was also secured; thus, we are not surprised to leam that 
from the example of the Battle of Tanagra, decades after the Wars, the hoplite tradition was 
still dominating. 
However, the rise of Athens as naval superpower had brought dynamics to the stableness 
of hoplite tradition. The intake of new elements into the battlefield had initiated mutation to 
Greek military culture. This time the challenge was profound and its influence was far greater 
than that of the Persian Wars. The Athenians had relied on a kind of arms so much altered 
from hoplites and they, by their seafaring, liberate themselves from reliance on land. The new 
social morphology created a completely different groundwork to military practice. The failure 
2 Aristotle records Euripides' Iphigenia in Aulis, he reported the belief that slave and barbarian are the 
same in nature (Aristot. Pol. 1252b). Gruen has worked on the ancient Greek identity and relationship 
with the "barbarian", see Erich S. Gruen, “Greeks and Non-Greeks," in Glenn R. Bugh ed. The Cam-
bridge Companion to the Hellenistic World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 295-314. 
132 
of Lacedaemonians on the island of Sphacteria created a new memory and experience to the 
Greeks, shocking greatly the foundation of hoplite tradition. The Lacedaemonians regained 
their fame in the Battle of Argos and the later warfare proved that hoplites were still essential. 
The extraordinary long duration of the Peloponnesian War had made the military culture into 
unstable and complicated situation. 
The end of the Peloponnesian War did not end the unrest in military culture; indeed, the 
change after its ending had become no less severe. The adventures of Agesilaus and Xenoph-
on into Persia had kept the Greeks exposed to foreign military practice; the difficulties they 
faced forced the Greeks to re-evaluate their own ethos and practice. Finally, the Macedonians 
had come to the stage and asserted the hegemony of the contemporary world. The nomadic 
culture of the Macedonians had merged with the Greek culture in producing the unique 
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